Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Biographics"
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@bolivar2153 Releasing Berlin from its obligations towards St. Petersburg (non-aggression), automatically opened up the path to an accord/alliance of sorts between London and Berlin.
Yes, that would then have created an overpowering alliance, which nobody could have resisted.
Not France.
Not Russia.
But you just won't get it.
You don't understand how the creation of overpowering alliances actually lead to peace.
Some, on the other side of the Atlantic, in Washington DC got it because unlike the London lords, set in their old ways, they realized that one can gain from squabbling entities, by temporary allying with the strongest entity (state/alliance/power). Not the weaker side, the stronger side.
So they did just that.
Ally with the stronger power = gain yourself.
Ally with the weaker powers = lose, and game over.
Bye, bye, "Empire".
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@bolivar2153 The Tripple Alliance was a product of Bismarck's Dual Alliance.
Cause and effect.
It was created to protect Germany's only reliable partner (A-H) from Russia.
It was not intended to "draw others in", although it did draw in Italy, which also wanted protection against French ambitions.
No, it was not overpowering.
It was "balanced out" by Russia and France uniting, later followed GB.
Of course, you still don't get it.
No, it wasn't overpowering.
It would have become overpowering if GB had joined in.
Only little problem? London would have loved such a deal, since it would draw off Russia (away from their goal of "going south/India, Dardanelles & ME, and going east Manchuria, clashing with Japan).
Nope.
Not with Wilhelm.
He would not have accepted becoming a punchbag to protect the British Empire (by drawing off Russian forces, potentially clashing in war). He would only have signed a treaty leading to peace, not potentially to war.
It would have to be a deal on eye-level.
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@bolivar2153 From wiki, your favorite :-)
"The Dual Alliance (German: Doppelte Allianz, Hungarian: Kettős Szövetség) was a defensive alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, which was created by treaty on October 7th, 1879 as part of Germany's Otto von Bismarck'ssystem of alliances to prevent or limit war.[1] The two powers promised each other support in case of attack by Russia. Also, each state promised benevolent neutrality to the other if one of them was attacked by another European power (generally taken to be France, even more so after the Franco-Russian Allianceof 1894). Bismarck saw the alliance as a way to prevent the isolation of the German Empire, which had just been founded a few years before, and to preserve peace, as Russia would not wage war against both empires. [2] [3]"
It was a defensive pact, and hd nothing to do with France.
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@bolivar2153 " In 1881, Italy lost in the competition with France to establish a colony in Tunis (now Tunisia). To enlist diplomatic support, Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary to form the Triple Alliance in 1882, which was the first formal alliance in Europe, the second being the Triple Entente, an informal alliance, formed in 1907.
During World War I, however, Italy did not go to war immediately with its allies but stayed neutral."
It was defensive, aimed as protection against French ambitions.
The two were mutually exclusive and not binding in case of aggression on the part of any alliance partner. See July 1914.
No, France was not threatened by it.
See Bismarck's warmongering, whom Wilhelm fired in 1890.
There was no need for "protection" from either the The Dual, nor the Triple Alliance.
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@bolivar2153 Yes, mostly agreed.
Yes, the Tripple Alliance led to France jumping at the opportunity to make an alliance of mutual defense with Russia, even though neither country needed such an alliance. At this stage, under Wilhelm and his naive idea that stretching out an open hand to neighbors would actually be welcomed...
Note: as long as you don't assume malice on the part of Wilhelm's "new course", but rather call it "stupid" or "unrealistic", then we have no differences.
France of course, could also have accepted the open hand and buried their political revanchism** (note, I specifically mention "of the right wing only", not as a general rule), and have accepted a treaty of sorts, burrying the hatchet.
This would also have created an overpowering alliance (Paris-Berlin-Vienna/Budapest) on the continent, potentially drawing others in (Germany could then have used her influence in St. Petersburg to create either non-aggression pact, or similar (something akin to the later Treaty of Bjorko).
**Political Revanchism was a French right-wing policy, as expressed by the poet Victor Hugo:
"From tomorrow, France will have only one thought: to reconstitute its forces, gather its energy, feed its sacred anger, raise its generation...form an army of the whole people, work relentlessly to study the processes and talents of our enemies, to become again the great France, the France of 1972, the France of the idea and the sword...Then suddenly one day it will rise...regain Lorraine, recapture Alsace"
-The French poet Victor Hugo, 1871
Or Britannica:
"All these humiliations caused great anger for French" re. 1871
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@bolivar2153 Why would I want to change the topic, to something which is your preferred comfort zone? That of "ze evil Jermin, alvays vant tu ruul ze virld", lol.
No.
I prefer to stick to French revanchism, and their right-wing radicals up to 1914, for which there is ample evidence in history books, essays, websites, etc.
Your previous point is moot.
It's like claiming Trumpism died because he's out of power, or Nazism simply died away because Hitler blew his brains out.
It doesn't work like that.
A populist idea stays around even if a prominent figure dies, or goes into exile, or leaves a political post.
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@bolivar2153 Oooooops, I did it again ;-)
I must be Francophobic...
"Some governments and scholars have called the French conquest of Algeria a genocide. Ben Kiernan, an Australian expert on the Cambodian genocide, wrote in Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur on the French conquest of Algeria:[193]
By 1875, the French conquest was complete. The war had killed approximately 825,000 indigenous Algerians since 1830. A long shadow of genocidal hatred persisted, provoking a French author to protest in 1882 that in Algeria, "we hear it repeated every day that we must expel the native and if necessary destroy him." As a French statistical journal urged five years later, "the system of extermination must give way to a policy of penetration."
French Algeria became the prototype for a pattern of French colonial rule which has been described as "quasi-apartheid".[194] Napoleon III oversaw an 1865 decree that allowed Arab and Berber Algerians to request French citizenship—but only if they "renounced their Muslim religion and culture":[195] by 1913, only 1,557 Muslims had been granted French citizenship.[196] Despite periodic attempts at partial reform, the situation of the Code de l'indigénat persisted until the French Fourth Republic, which began in 1946, but although Muslim Algerians were accorded the rights of citizenship, the system of discrimination was maintained in more informal ways.[197] This "internal system of apartheid" met with considerable resistance from the Muslims affected by it, and is cited as one of the causes of the 1954 insurrection.[198]
In response to France's recognition of Armenian Genocide, Turkey accused France of committing genocide against 15% of Algeria's population.[199][200]"
From wiki
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October/November 1918.
Why did Wilhelm "have to go"...
In politics, we are hardly ever given the real reasons why things happen, or why policy decisions are implemented.
Of course yesterday's politics, is today's history...
The truth behind "why Wilhelm had to go" is there for all to see, and has been written about in great detail in the past.
It had little to do with WW1, or Wilhelm's "personality disorder" (lol).
As Tolkien states, long forgotten history became legend. Legend turned to myth. And after 100 years the reality of what happened passed out of all knowledge.
Re. why Wilhelm had to go, has simply been forgotten.
The reality of "what happened" is that soon after his ascent to power (around the time "leaning East" Bismarck took his hat), Wilhelm wanted to unite Europe.
In his own frustrated later words "with or without GB".
That can be read about in great detail and with sources in largely forgotton works: for example in the first few pages of THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS: MISSED OPPORTUNITY OR MYTH by H.W. Koch (free to read online after registration at JSTOR) or several other free pdf theses on the topic.
Unfortunately most of these scholarly works mostly deal with how it turned out and not the initial intention by Berlin of such a potentially possible European alliance system with an Anglo-German Alliance at its core.
Only a few historians correctly point out how such an alliance system was never desired by key individual European players, especially in London, and therefore "wishful thinking" from the outset. See the "history" of the apparently "poor dissed London lords" who apparently "really really wanted to become Berlin's BFFs" (sic.), but Berlin had insiduous "world conquering dreams".
According to "Die Legende von der Verschmähten englischen Freundschaft 1898 to 1901" (1929) by Gerhard Ritter, the historian makes clear that it was London which never wanted such an alliance. The talks about a Eurpean alliance system did not "start" (as often stated) "in 1898", but much sooner. Bismarck had already sent the "feelers" much earlier, and Wilhelm intended to follow up on these (see the successful good start with the Helgoland-Zansibar Treaty as an act of good faith by both sides).
As it turned out "with GB" was not possible because London wanted "Splendid Isolation" as the elevated policy standpoint of a few influencial lords.
The "few" with veto powers would have used these powers to torpedo any attempt within the circle of London lords for any form of European unity, either "with or without GB".
To Quote: "Thirdly — but more contentiously — his veto of an Anglo-German alliance, as late as 1901, has been blamed, notably by Julian Amery in his biography of Joseph Chamberlain, as leading to the First World War and, by implication, to all the horrors which came after." (Amery 1969, p.158: edit for clarification, "third" in a list of the historian's list of key failures re. the Chamberlain Sr. years).
Just to clarify further. The same British lord who "oh-so honestly" set out try to create an Anglo-German Alliance in 1898 together with Lord Balfour, admitted to vetoing it if there was ever a chance of a version not to the lords' liking under discussion. Same as today, a few key figures can always veto any idea put forward, advocated on, or even decided on by majority concensus, and it did not matter how good such an idea (political proposition) is today, or was at the time.
It was GB which chose "against".
In 1896, Wilhelm II therefore "turned East" and personally handed the Russian Tzar a memorandum named "On the need to form a politico-merchantile union of European states against the USA".
In it, Wilhelm expressed his desire to turn Europe ("with or without GB", but still preferably including GB) into a united power which could stand up against the rapidly rising USA.
Hmmmmmmm....interesting.
"Against the USA" (sic.), and in 1918 Washington DC insisted on exactly this man to abdicate...
In 1918, Wilson representing the rapidly rising power USA, demanded that Wilhelm II should leave office in order for any peace talks to commence.
Of course, the "dividers" intent on "dividing" European power into manageable bits, sat in Washington DC. With their own entry into WW1, these strategists had got their "foot in the door" of European matters: their willing "little helpers" in London and Paris thereby signed the own death warrants for their own empires.
Because if you are a dragon (an imperialist power with an "empire"), don't cuddle up to a dragon slayer (a nation whose very foundation was anti-imperialism).
Wilhelm II had to go, because he wanted a united Europe, to mirror what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic.
It wasn't the "flamboyent Weltpolitic" or "nasty rhetoric" or "wanting to rule the world" (or any of the often overstated "historical details") which made Wilhelm unpopular with the other powers on the fringes of the European continent, but his desire to unite Europe in order to speak with a united voice against the rising USA. Germany's neighbors were unwilling to accept Berlin's "price tag" for such a "united Europe": more influence in the world (and a few more colonies) for Berlin.
Of course, everything has a "price tag".
Even the USA's "help" to "win WW1" had a price tag...
To add to the above.
Our history is often overburdened with judgements, rather than analyses.
A certain standpoint of "my government was better than your government"-attitude plays a large role.
The forms of governments which evolved (timeline) were a result of their geographical locations.
(see also below comment re. "divide and rule").0
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Simon Bolivar was a tool or a proxy of the rising USA.
Washington DC used foreign blood (South Americans) while Europeans were off to look for easier targets of exploitation in Africa and Asia, and local South American "iron and blood" was "employed" indirectly to drive a slowly fading European colonial power out of the Americas (geopolitics/grand strategy) by offering a "shield" (Monroe Doctrine) that revolutionaries in the Americas could operate behind, whilst at the same time doing most of the "bleeding" (aka the "freedom"-argument). Strange thing though, is that nobody has ever bothered to find out what percentage of the population who lived in these regions at the time, actually wanted this "freedom" for themselves. It is simply assumed that most wanted it, 'cos "who can argue against freedom"...
After the "freedom" set in after the series of wars left many exhausted, the road to own US economic and political domination into these reformed political systems was paved, in the form of taking away the markets of the European Empire (Spain). Carved up into statelets, each of minor power inferior to the USA, is of course a classical "divide and rule"-strategy...
A template Washington DC later expanded on in a much larger scale as it "came for" Europe, and a little bit later (see footnote) the last powerful European empire in the world, the British Empire.
A historical observation of "carving up potential opposition into statelets" (Spanish Empire territory, turned into "statelets" like Venezuela and Columbia), each of lesser power than the "divider"...
This exact same technique was later used, scaled up sufficiently by Washington DC, to overpower the British Empire after 1945.
Footnote: The Father Niemöller logic of "morality", is of course as much a warning to heed a "balance of power", since if once destroyed, there will be nobody left to unite with in order to protect the own interests from an overpowering rival (or the own "best friend/s").
If a reader of this essay wishes to truly understand the "how" and "why" the British Empire failed, then go to the Kai..ser Wilh_elm II video of the "Hi--story R--oom" educational channel (distorted to avoid the autoblock function of some channels). Divide and rule as a strategy is elaborated in more detail in the comments thread under this video. Go to the other channel, select "latest comments" first (three little bars at the top of every comments section), and read as far back as desired.
Most of what we are fed by our systems, as "rote learning" details, are "99% ancillary details": not saying these are untrue or wrong, but simply that they are not as important on the ranking or "tiers" of events as geopolitics and grand strategy.
For these geostrategists, divide and rule/conquer is their main strategy, regardless of what you as an individual believes.
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The USA and divide Europe and rule the world...
From wiki, and regarding the theory:
"Divide and rule policy (Latin: divide et impera), or divide and conquer, in politics and sociology is gaining and maintaining power by breaking up larger concentrations of power into pieces that individually have less power than the one implementing the strategy."
Elements of this technique involve:
- creating or encouraging divisions ...
- to prevent alliances that could challenge ...
- distributing forces that they overpower the other
- aiding and promoting those who are willing to cooperate
- fostering distrust and enmity
Historically, this strategy was used in many different ways by empires seeking to expand their territories."
[editted for clarity re. the states/empires level of things]
Regarding in practice:
After her defeat in 1871, and being isolated by all of her neighbors, France started "making eyes at" Washington DC (as exemplified by the Statue of Liberty "gift to the American people"). Since the Franco-Prussian War had already removed the biggest obstacle to a French/US rapprochement, which was Napoleon "meddle in Mexico" the III, this war thereby inadvertently opened the door to better relations between Washington and Paris. Of course, the divider must be receptive to such advances.
What was "in it" for Washington DC?
Simple: After almost a century of British and French attempts of playing "divide and rule/conquer" in North America, trying to avoid a single hegemony here (Washington DC) to advance own interests at the expense of North American unity, it was now Washington DC's turn to start playing some "division" back at Europe...
First "tool" to come swimming across the Atlantic, straight into the wide open loving tender arms of the eagerly awaiting American Internationalism? (soon to become the all-powerful American Century)
Answer: Isolated France/Paris, in conflict or dissed by her neighbors.
Who would have ever thought that dissing a neighbor could ever have consequences...
Regarding this policy, it needs a keen sense of observation by a nation's leaders, so as not to inadvertently become a part of it.
"Defeat Them in Detail: The Divide and Conquer Strategy. Look at the parts and determine how to control the individual parts, create dissension and leverage it."
Robert Greene
And "observe the details" and "leverage" is what the American Internationalism fans did...
The next "tool" to come swimming across the Atlantic with a Great Rapprochement, amongst other less "valuable" suitors (like Germany, see below comment), was London. It was London which had the "policy" standpoints which would make any binding geopolitical/grand strategy treaties with continental powers in peacetimes virtually impossible. It was also London which intended to keep the continent of Europe in a situation of constant tension, exploiting the already existing tensions by pacifying these when it suited London, or amplifying these when some form of benefit could be descerned (multiple examples in the thread below).
These were her own historical attempts at "dividing the continent" and "ruling the world" which wiser heads in London were already beginning to question as they obviously noticed a shift in the global balance of power.
Note that in order to play this game, the "divider" must have some form of advantage. In regards to Washington DC, this advantage which it could use to attract suitors was their own rapidly increasing power. Ever important markets acting like a lighthouse for capitalist ventures. But with a geographical advantage which made it virtually impossible to invade by the late-1900s, the USA already had little to fear militarily (unless of course Europe should inexplicably become united and speak with a single powerfull voice, by settling the multitude of differences).
What was "in it" for Washington DC in her favoratism of London?
London was Europe's only power that could effectively unite Europe, by acting as a unifying power as a matter of policy, rather than as an aloof divider herself.
Regarding any form of united Europe, by whomever or for whatever reasons, the "gatekeepers" sat in London. A "united Europe" either with or without GB/Empire could only go through London and with London's approval. Ask Napoleon I. He knows what it resulted in when "gatekeepers" stepped in to avoid any form of continental unity or hegemony. These "gatekeepers" followed policies which made any form of unity impossible. At the first signs of unity/friendship on the continent, London would step in and divide, using a variety of age-old, trusted and well-honed skills up to the point of declaring preventive wars (multiple examples in the thread below).
A disunited Europe at this point, suited Washington DC just fine.
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