Comments by "Mikko Rantalainen" (@MikkoRantalainen) on "Mentour Pilot" channel.

  1. Great video as usual. One idea for future improvements would be to include the year or even date of the original incident in the description to make it easier to find the correct video when you're searching for specific video on the channel.
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  2.  @marhawkman303  I agree. Instead of "delete all" button they should have "dismiss all" button to clear the screen but not delete the messages forever.
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  3. Well played, sir!
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  4.  @Blazo_Djurovic  The holding pattern that they were supposed to follow would have been perfectly safe is they had kept the minimums specified. I still cannot understand how a pro crew could fail to see such an important data in the map. Did they think that the minimum for the holding pattern means the minimum to enter the holding pattern but you're allowed to fly lower within the holding pattern if ATC gives you permission?
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  5.  @Blazo_Djurovic  Maybe it's just me but I would be aware of status of "have we safely completed briefing" even if I had been interrupted by passager, kid, ATC or a fly. Establishing safe minimums for every part of the flight should be bare minimum required to consider briefing complete before even considering the landing.
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  6.  @Freeeez3  How could a professional pilot try to fly to a previously unknown airfield without carefully studying the map? If that indeed happened, it wasn't a simple mistake they did for one flight, it was a systematic failure in their methodology.
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  7.  @Kaptain13Gonzo  Another good example of relativistic time :D
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  8.  @yungsh0ttalex592  Russia is indeed highly probably sourcing missing parts from unofficial sources. And then can only hope that they get original parts and not some random counterfeit parts because they won't have any way to confirm the parts from the manufacturer. And of course the unofficial sources know this, too, so there's incentive to sell counterfeit parts because the buyer cannot verify the product.
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  9. Interesting video as usual from you! It seems obvious that the major reason for this accident was get-there-itis. Had they executed go-around when runway wasn't visible on minimums, they would have missed the original destination but avoided the accident, which is a book example of get-there-itis.
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  10. The problem is that such monitoring systems would need electricity to work and circuit breakers are supposed to cut electricity automatically. As a result, the pilots are supposed to visually inspect the system and notice the abnormal breakers using the material colors. I guess it would be nice to have to have computer system to automatically warn about failed circuit if such detection can be done using the remaining wiring but pilots cannot trust such warning system to work so the checklist would still need to require manual verification. The same applies for your car but there checking the circuit breakers manually is much more difficult and stopping the car in case of problems is not as hard as stopping a 100 ton aircraft flying 10 km above the land. This incident highlights how well the pilots should/could know their aircraft. If either of the pilots knew that the battery circuit breaker is required for alternative gear out system, they might have tried to activate that breaker, too. It's a bit surprising that the technician didn't know this either!
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  11.  @dredeth  The "exceptions confirm the rule" is just an old expression that's used to deflect any counter arguments after you've decided your mind about something. It's about pretending that whatever was said earlier is true "rule" regardless of some contrary information. I'm not sure if it's more commonly used as a joke or an actual dismissal argument nowadays.
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  12. Even truck drivers have much stricter standards for mandatory rest times and fatigue prevention than medical staff.
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  13. However, they are not going to stress about that too much!
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  14. Great video as usual! I already knew most of the stuff in this video and you could still provide some additional details that I hadn't heard previously. And I really like the fact that you focus on known facts and minimize the interpretations and guesses – this is like the scientific counterpart to many other documentaries that want to tell stories in addition about the accident itself.
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  15. Great episode and superb animations on this one!
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  16. You've definitely earned subscription and a bell! And nice cliffhanger at the outro!
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  17. I think that the elevators were supposed to hang towards the ground when the plane didn't have airspeed so it was in the expected orientation. The problem was that airspeed was supposed to turn the elevator in horizontal orientation but that didn't happen because the hinge didn't move. However, the yoke only moved the control tabs and that part would have worked despite the elevator being jammed. The problem was that there was no standard way to move the elevator at all without the plane moving with enough airspeed.
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  18. Damn.. you're not allowed to park even semi trailers without wedges in Finland. And those trailers have brakes that lock by removing pressure meaning only way to release the brake is to re-pressurize the system. Why would you ever park a plane without chocks?
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  19. Yes, that tells a lot about the usual software quality in planes. A safe way to deal with that would be to assume computer is broken BUT still consider all blamed systems as broken, TOO. It would be safe to assume that you have to complete the flight without the computer or any of the systems that the computer reported as problematic. If losing all those systems is not safe, it's time to start looking for place to land as soon as possible.
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  20.  @fluchschule  After hearing about accidents like this, I'm starting to think that "Dual input" should override even the GWPS warning.
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  21. 25:18 It seems that flight safety routine should include part where the crew says "in case of evacuation, if I see you reaching for your luggage, I'll shoot you immediately without a warning".
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  22. I think the problem is that to be a captain, you should have better success rate for critical tasks than say 10%. If you fail some specific task (e.g. correctly handling engine out during take-off in a simulator) 9 times in a row and then succeed once, you should be considered to have about 10% abilitity to correctly handle the situation. Instead, many training programs assume that you know the task 100% since you executed it correctly!
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  23. And the sound of reverse thrust, too. If you are expecting to hear the sound of reverse thrust immediately after every landing and you would hear normal engine noise instead, you'd know that something is going wrong.
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  24. Great video as usual! I have to wonder how fast the engines fail if you push them to too high power without working water injection? It appears that if they could have pushed the engines for 60 seconds, it would have been enough to get them safely to the sea – would the engines fail before that if they just pushed full power in a case like this? (Obviously that would ruin the engines but it would be much better than a crash.)
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  25.  @moviemad56  Yes, pulling too much power from a jet engine will damage it. The question is how much it will lose power – will it give above nominal max power for 2 seconds or 2 minutes before failing?
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  26.  @VWaudiRULEs  Unless I've misunderstood somehting, the MCAS system using only AoA sensor was intentional decision to avoid FAA rules. FAA rules say that if any aircraft system is built redundant, it will be automatically considered critical. And pilots must have specific training for all critical systems which would have prevented MAX from using the same type training as non-MAX version. And that would have caused major issues for the sales department. So they instead went with "this is not a critical system and as such, even though MAX can be fitted with two AoA sensors, there's no smarts to automatically use only the working one". And even the warning light about sensor disparency was optional because "there's no need for that because this is not critical". And in theory the runaway stabilizer on autopilot was supposed to be similar enough so that pilot could control MCAS failing using the same memory items described in this video. It didn't work in practice because MCAS put the nose down so fast that if you didn't immediately do the correct response there was a change to totally lose control - and pilots didn't have good enough training to handle this in reality. I still wonder why MCAS is claimed to be "software error" when it was fully intentional hack to side-step FAA rules. It was only slightly less cheating than VW adjusting the ECU controls when it detected bonnet open switch to hack the pollution emission tests without really reducing emissions.
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  27. Great video! It's easy to imagine how rapidly the passanger could panic in real situation and have much worse communication than Tom is doing.
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  28. Very good video indeed and I'll definitely watch all videos in this series! I would have added one sentence to intro around 1:33 explaining the final result before going to question "why did this happen?". Something along the lines "The plane stalled and crashed one nautical mile before the runway, killing total of 8 humans onboard and injuring several." That would make it easier to "connect the dots" later when you provide more details.
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  29. I'm not a pilot myself but I can see similar incidents happening on other jobs, too, when automation gets better but not perfect. Every time we have humans monitoring really perfect automation, there's really high risk for the humans to start doing something else but pure monitoring. Even Tesla autopilot is already good enough that there has been casualties because of driver distraction (e.g. watching movies).
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  30. Would have it been possible to steer the aircraft on the runway using asymmetric thrust-reverser power? (Obviously this wouldn't have been the official method but would it have been possible?)
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  31.  @misterflibble9799  It's true that moving the injured person is a risk but that's vs all the other passangers in plane which may need to cabin crew after possible crash landing to evacuate from the plane. Moving the injured person seems like the least worst option here.
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  32. It seems that in many Airbus accidents, the pilots fail to undestand that the aircraft is no longer flying in normal law. Would it help if the whole primary flight display had e.g. bright red or bright orange margins in that situation?
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  33. Great video as always! I was aware of this accident but I didn't know the that forklift had run out of fuel which made things even worse.
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  34. The result of the calculation is the amount you need to have in the tank before starting the engines. Of course, any existing fuel in the tank will be considered for the actual refueling part.
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  35.  @AaaBbb-ff1pn  I think the real problem is that sitting in the cockpit while autopilot is active is counted as flying experience. When somebody has 5000 hours of flying experience as a long haul FO, the amount of actual flying is pretty minimal. If experience were measured as amount of takeoffs and landings in manual mode on the type we would have a much better meter for experience.
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  36.  @schawo2  How slow do you think it is? I understand that it cannot be used to render constantly updated value in the instrument cluster but couldn't it be used to cross-correlate the altitude measurement after minutes following any QNH adjustment? That way you wouldn't get instant warning about incorrect QNH setting but a warning after e.g. 1–2 minutes after setting the value.
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  37.  @hb1338  We are talking about feets above the airfield here. I think commercial aircrafts already do include information about how many feet above sea level the airfield is. Then you can use GPS positioning information to calculate your altitude relative to the airfield. I totally agree that it cannot replace radar altimeter without terrain maps but it would be good to validate QNH.
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  38.  @hb1338  The Boeing explanation for disabling the MCAS is that it's supposed to be handled similar to runaway stabilizer trim so there's no need for extra training. And that's true in reality, too, except that MCAS needs maybe 10–20 faster reactions from the pilots so your training must be spot on (above expected from training) to survive MCAS failure in low altitude. As far as I know, all MAX aircraft did actually have dual AoA sensors but only one was used in reality and the feature to even tell that AoA sensors disagree was an optional extra that most airlines never purchased.
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  39. I think it would be a good idea to list KNOWN RISKS in th QRH. Sometimes aircraft might be experiencing multiple issues at the same time and you cannot follow all the procedures because of the circumstances. In that situation, it would be helpful to have the most important risks in case the procedure cannot be followed to the letter. If the QRH had said "risk of uncontrollable fire" as the most important risk, the decision making would have been different in this case with high probability.
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  40. Try watching the top of the pole with the signs and the text of the signs, for an example. There's also some rendering artefacts where hands go over the signs.
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  41. I think aviation safety would improve a lot if pilot training would include mandatory minium 50 videos watched from Mentour Pilot channel.
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  42.  @MentourPilot  I think the corkscrew analogy was perfect. It nicely explains the forces in effect and makes it easier for laymen to understand why the whole tail can rip off in situation like this.
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  43. 15:30 Confirmation bias combined with hypoxia was the final error they made. However, I cannot avoid thinking that this accident was because of poor training. How on earth the crew didn't know how to react to cabin pressurization failure?
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  44. Great intro!
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  45. I would have expected aircrafts to be maintained in a way where torque wrench is used on every screw in the whole plane. No matter if it's tray on the seat or the windscreen of the pilot. With proper tools it's nearly no extra effort to set the wrench to correct torque and you tighten every screw correctly every time. Some people do this for their private bicycles so it shouldn't be much a requirement for aircraft maintenance engineer.
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  46. One thing I cannot understand is how come they had gear down even after finally pushing the thrust lever to toga position? Also, it seems that they didn't properly understand the autopilot system of the plane during any moment of the flight.
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  47. As far as I know, big planes have so much asymmetrical thrust with one engine shut down that the fuel consumption goes up because the remaining engine must work so much. (You use rudder all the time which results in more drag.)
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  48. If I were to decide, any intermittent problems that haven't been fixed for sure should stay in technical logbook for at least 6 months. It's very probable that there's something wrong which will re-appear again. The fact that the thole ADIRU unit was replaced without resolving the issue suggests that the problem was caused by something else. (E.g. power delivery? I do computer software for living and nearly time any computer fails to be deterministic the issue is power delivery or oxidized connectors – note that I'm considering software race errors as deterministic behavior here.)
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  49.  @TecnamTwin  Except computer programmers who have to compute delta between two timestamps. And if getting the delta correct is important, you absolutely have to consider leap seconds, too. However, typically the correct concept is to forget about computing delta between two timestamps. Timestamps are about stamping events relative to human readable time notation. For actual time differences where getting delta is important, you want alternative purely monotonic time source which is never affected by political decisions such as leap seconds or timezone changes.
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  50. 4:33 I think it would be better to say "-4 degree Celsius" instead of just degrees.
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