Comments by "Андрей Борцов" (@Mentol_) on "Military History Visualized"
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The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production.
Import tanks - 12.3%
Planes - 13%.
Artillery - 2.7%
Ships - 22.4%
Infantry weapon - 0.75%
Food (grain) - 2.8%
Self-propelled artillery - 7.8%
Anti-aircraft guns - 21%
Antitank guns - 9%
Automobile gasoline - 2.7%
Aviation fuel - 40%
Railway rails - 36%
Steam locomotives - 72%
Explosives - 36.6%
Aluminum - 55%
Copper - 45%
Tires - 30%
Sugar - 29.5%
Cotton - 6%
Industrial machine tools - 24%
The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
It is also necessary to remember that the share of supplies increased slowly. In 1941, only 1% of the total number of goods was delivered, and 1942 - 27.6%. Thus, more than 70% of supplies fall on the period 1943-1945 - the moment when a turning point in the war has already come.
Plus:
In late May 1945, US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, said: "... we never believed that our Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army. "
In the report of the US President to Congress on the implementation of the Lend-Lease program until March 31, 1945, it was pointed out that the Soviet armies were supplied mainly with Soviet weapons and materials.
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Arthur Brogden
> A Soviet rifle division in WW2 was roughly 8500 men at FULL STRENGTH. An America infantry division numbered 14-16,000. Why?
Soviet rifle division had 14,500 men at the spring of 1941. As the war started and continued, the number of divisions increased and large losses appeared, so the division’s strength decreased. Same for the Wehrmacht. United States did not fight for own survival in this war, therefore the direct comparison is not correct. Always try to find rational reasons.
> Stalin's murderous regime
For a correct understanding of history, we must correctly understand the historical context. What does this mean? To evaluate Soviet politics, we must use their own perspective, not propaganda from the times of the Cold War. You must discard any of your stereotypes and try to look at the world through the eyes of Stalin. Otherwise you will misinterpret the Soviet agenda, and the vacuum of misunderstanding will be filled with demonization. People who do not understand history often use demonization.
> In 1944 at Yalta he admitted to 8 million total casualties at that point. A laughably low number
At the end of the war, German documents "recognized" the death of 2.5 million people. Why aren't you funny in this case? In fact, accurate data on casualties during the war is difficult to establish. Plus, the fate of prisoners of war is authentically unknown. United States and Britain use expeditionary forces in this war, whose numbers (and losses) are much easier to ascertain.
> At Nuremberg Soviet prosecutors used the figure "over 10 million military" repeatedly.
This does not contradict the known data.
> Glantz, Stahel, Citino cite numbers that average about 12.5 million
This also does not contradict. 7.8 million killed, dead and missing plus 5.5 million prisoners. Total - 13.3 million operational losses. If you use a similar methodology for the enemy, then he lost more than 10 million (including those who surrendered after capitulation). Thus, any speculation regarding the exorbitant price of victory (for USSR) is an unfounded appeal to emotions (element of propaganda).
> Given the shortages of Soviet infantry by Spring 45, that seems about right
If I remember correctly, then the USSR called people into the army at the age of 17-50, and Germany from 12 to 65. Why did Germany use the elderly and children at the end of the war? Because human resources have come to an end. Why did this happen? The result of the war of annihilation. Why, in this case, you do not hear speculations about the fact that the Germans have lost the entire combat-ready nation? Because nobody needs it. Think why.
]v[acGyverFiN
1. After the Soviet defeat in the Cold War, his opponents gained a monopoly in the information space. That is why you appeal to the consensus that has arisen after this point. However, it does not make sense to understand the historical context.
2. Britain received three times more aid from the US than the USSR, but no one talks about it. Think why.
Jagnole101
You do not understand the most important thing: even if 100% of the Red Army were supplied with Western weapons, these weapons would still be used on the Soviet front by Soviet soldiers.
In reality, world war is a coalition war. From the point of view of the Soviet perspective, it would be optimal for him if these weapons and resources were used by the allies to open a second land front in Europe.
But the allies postponed this decision pursuing egositic interests (contrary to coalition interests). At the beginning of 1943, Britain had 5 million soldiers and other personnel plus United States had another 8 million. In total, 13 million people. But only about 1 million (8%) fought against the enemy at that time.
Thus, the Allies preferred to supply the USSR, supporting it in the war, instead of using own an active offensive strategy. This decision can be understood, but after it, any rhetoric about the importance of Lend-Lease immediately becomes ridiculous.
Daniel McGREW
The data for the cars are taken from the automobile control of the Red Army. You can find the video "Великая Отечественная: миф о решающем значении ленд-лиза" where historian Alexey Isaev (at the seventh minute) shows the data from this document. I can not give a direct link because this can be considered as spam.
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The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production.
Import tanks - 12.3%
Planes - 13%.
Artillery - 2.7%
Ships - 22.4%
Infantry weapon - 0.75%
Food (grain) - 2.8%
Self-propelled artillery - 7.8%
Anti-aircraft guns - 21%
Antitank guns - 9%
Automobile gasoline - 2.7%
Aviation fuel - 40%
Railway rails - 36%
Steam locomotives - 72%
Explosives - 36.6%
Aluminum - 55%
Copper - 45%
Tires - 30%
Sugar - 29.5%
Cotton - 6%
Industrial machine tools - 24%
The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
It is also necessary to remember that the share of supplies increased slowly. In 1941, only 1% of the total number of goods was delivered, and 1942 - 27.6%. Thus, more than 70% of supplies fall on the period 1943-1945 - the moment when a turning point in the war has already come.
Plus:
In late May 1945, US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, said: "... we never believed that our Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army. "
In the report of the US President to Congress on the implementation of the Lend-Lease program until March 31, 1945, it was pointed out that the Soviet armies were supplied mainly with Soviet weapons and materials.
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1. In June 1941, the Red Army was equipped with cars for only 36% of the planned capacity. Out of a total of 272,600 cars, trucks accounted for 193,200.
2. To sum up the supply of foreign cars (for each date) is not necessary because they gradually accumulate, and losses amount to a small percentage. In addition, mobilization from the civilian sector can continue. Plus own production.
3. USSR lost from 35 to 40% of own economic power at the end of 1941, not 80%.
4. USSR produced 1,146,700 cars in the period 1928-1941. Plus another 265,000 during the war.
5. Even if the USSR had 100% of foreign weapons, it would be used on the Soviet front by Soviet soldiers. For the USSR, it would be optimal if these weapons and resources were used to open a second front in Europe, and the economic burden on the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition was distributed more evenly. But this was not done - the USSR had to do a significant part of the dirty work on its own. Thus, any attempt to idealize foreign aid without these nuances becomes immoral.
6. Nikita Khrushchev used a lot of lies regarding Stalin’s policies during the struggle with the cult of his personality, therefore his words need to be taken skeptically.
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@chekvb
1. After the Polish campaign, the Germans created "tank groups" that made it possible to break through the defense to a great depth. In these groups there was a good balance between the number of tanks, vehicles, infantry and artillery. Their organization allowed them to operate autonomously even when separated from supply bases.
Another situation was in the Red Army. The Soviet command did not have the experience of breaking through modern defenses (the Finnish war was a specific experience), therefore, in the shock units of the Red Army there was an excess of tanks and a lack of transport, infantry and artillery. In 1941, the Red Army captured German documents and studied them. This made it possible to balance the amount of equipment and at the end of 1942 tank armies were created, which were analogous to German tank groups. For the first time they were successfully used to encircle the German 6th Army near Stalingrad.
2. Infantry losses are affected by the number of artillery shells (where Germany was the leader on the eastern front until 1944) and the quality of education of soldiers and the level of your technologies. When you attack the defense, if it is not broken through, then you usually suffer more losses than the enemy. But if it is destroyed, then the enemy loses its organization and communications, which either compares the losses, or makes them more than those of the attacking side.
In 1943, the Soviet government abandoned the large encirclement of enemy armies for political reasons (Stalingrad was an exception). This led to a more rapid expulsion of the enemy from Soviet soil, but without its complete destruction (the German organization was preserved). This was one of the reasons why Soviet casualties in 1943 were still higher than German ones.
In 1944, the Red Army changed its strategy of driving the enemy out to a strategy of destroying him. In addition, Germany lost its leadership in the number of heavy artillery shells. As a result, German losses increased from 814k in 1943 (killed and captured) to 1756k in 1944. If we add the German allies here, the result will show that the ratio of losses on the eastern front in 1944 became 1 to 1 and rose to 2 to 1 (in favor of the Red Army ) in 1945.
When you need to compare the ratio of losses on the eastern front in 1944, then people usually take Krivosheev's data for the Red Army, which includes all categories of losses and "ten-day reports" for the Wehrmacht, which exclude those who died from wounds, slightly wounded, non-combat losses, missing who were recognized as killed through time, losses of supply personnel, as well as aviation and navy personnel. The German casualty system showed short-term losses for the their high command, but it is incorrect to use ten-day reports for a general comparison of losses. So, for example, according to these reports, the Wehrmacht lost 359k killed on the eastern front in 1944 against 1233k according to Overmans, whose study takes into account these categories.
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The percentage of allied aid from Soviet production.
Import tanks - 12.3%
Planes - 13%.
Artillery - 2.7%
Ships - 22.4%
Infantry weapon - 0.75%
Food (grain) - 2.8%
Self-propelled artillery - 7.8%
Anti-aircraft guns - 21%
Antitank guns - 9%
Automobile gasoline - 2.7%
Aviation fuel - 40%
Railway rails - 36%
Steam locomotives - 72%
Explosives - 36.6%
Aluminum - 55%
Copper - 45%
Tires - 30%
Sugar - 29.5%
Cotton - 6%
Industrial machine tools - 24%
The percentage of imported cars in the Red Army:
22.6.41 - 0%
1.1.42 - 0,1%
1.1.43 - 5.4%
1.1.44 - 19%
1,1,45 - 30,4%
1.5.45 - 32.8%
It is also necessary to remember that the share of supplies increased slowly. In 1941, only 1% of the total number of goods was delivered, and 1942 - 27.6%. Thus, more than 70% of supplies fall on the period 1943-1945 - the moment when a turning point in the war has already come.
Plus:
In late May 1945, US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins, in a conversation with Stalin, said: "... we never believed that our Lend-Lease assistance was the main factor in the Soviet victory over Hitler on the Eastern Front. It was achieved by the heroism and blood of the Russian army.
In the report of the US President to Congress on the implementation of the Lend-Lease program until March 31, 1945, it was pointed out that the Soviet armies were supplied mainly with Soviet weapons and materials.
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