Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "Why the German Army couldn't overcome their bad logistics" video.
-
16
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Something that I should have mentioned before - NO construction job or activity EVER counts every screw, nut, bolt, piece of plywood, etc., required to do a job. You always buy in units, in bulk. Supplies purchased for every piece of work done on my house has been done this way. It is the same with supplying front line units. Logistics staffs figure out the daily consumption rates and then order units of supply accordingly (5,000 boxes of bullets containing x number of rounds each, 5,000 gallons of fuel, 15,000 rations, etc.). This is why you often see tonnage required per division as an indicator of logistics, and why supplies are usually listed as units, not physical numbers. However, no matter how you slice it, the German Armies were constantly running out of fuel, running low on ammo, lacking spare parts to fix equipment. This shows conclusively that their logistics, and the planning to continuously supply their offensives, quite frankly sucked!
2
-
@TheImperatorKnight If the statistics that Richard Overy presents in "Why the Allies Won" are correct, this is only part of the story. Yes, Lend-Lease gave the Russians the boots, trucks and food they needed to go onto the offensive. However, the Russians produced more equipment with fewer raw materials than the Germans did, and got more of it to the front than the Germans did even in 1941. They were able to move a large proportion of their factories beyond the reach of the Germans in 1941, a feat that I doubt the Germans could have replicated.
I think the issue with German logistics was something you touched on but may not have fully explored, that being the huge number of "satrapies" created within the Wehrmacht and German industry. Everyone in the Third Reich was "empire building", so rather than having a unified manufacturing and supply system, you had a bunch of little fiefdoms all scrambling for the same resources. This lead to a rat's nest of conflicting priorities and massive inefficiencies. There was no real centralized planning, which is what happened in the Soviet Union and, ironically enough, in the United States. It is something that Speer tried, with some success, to fix in 1943 and 1944.
This is perfectly illustrated with your description of the chain of command at 4:26 in the video. I mean, seriously, why wasn't there a 3rd person at railhead in charge of distributing the supplies to the units as required, rather than QM General Wagner (whom I suspect was back in Germany)? Why should the general in charge of supplying the army be saddled with the minutia of which unit gets what? Why should the Luftwaffe have a completely different system separate from the Army one vying for the same transportation links? This chain of command makes absolutely no sense at all!
However, it does fit with the Nazi ideology, as exemplified by Hitler's inner circle, of creating competing entities that fight one another for some resource (including access to Hitler), preventing any one entity becoming too powerful. And, in my opinion, it also fits with the explanation that the Germans didn't plan for extended campaigns or wars, and thus overlooked the importance of a rational logistical system to supply their army over the long haul.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1