Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "Why Soviet Logistics weren’t as nightmarish as German Logistics in WW2" video.
-
One thing I would add to your comment about Soviet logistics compared to German logistics. Inefficiencies in the system and the stupidity of communist ideology aside, one point you make, perhaps without realizing it, is that for all their failings, the Soviet leadership put more effort into logistics than the Germans. There was (eventually) a rational system for logistics. And from Overy's book "Why the Allies Won" we see that immediately after the start of the war that the Soviets did take logistics seriously (even if, as suggested by your sources, in 1941 and 1942 they placed a lower priority on it). If they didn't take logistics seriously, why did Stalin ask for trucks, rather than tanks? I would suggest that the collective experience of Stalin and his generals during the Russian Revolution and subsequent Civil War showed them the importance of logistics.
I would like to suggest that you brought forth one reason for the poor state of Soviet logistics in 1941-1943, the lack of rail lines. By the winter of 1941-42, the Russians were reduced to few rail lines (in some cases single tracks) that could transport men and material to the frontline areas. This made their supply system inefficient. One source you quoted indicated that Soviet logistics improved during 1943 as the north-south rail system was recovered from the Germans, and rail traffic no longer had to go through Moscow. This not only shows why Moscow was so important to the Soviet war effort (it was perhaps the most important rail hub in the USSR), but also how badly they Germans had disrupted the Russian rail network. A single rail hub can handle only so much traffic, and back-and-forth traffic on a single track is very inefficient (one reason the Canadian Pacific Railway spent so much money on laying parallel tracks wherever possible). The capture and holding of Rzhev by the Wehrmacht in 1941 reduced the ability of the Soviet Union to move supplies around in bulk by rail, and is the reason the Germans fought so hard to keep it. Once this vital hub was retaken, Soviet frontline logistics probably became more efficient (going from a linear back and forth movement to a more efficient circulatory movement of rail traffic), and aided the Red Army's advance.
Obviously the USSR had way more oil and gas than Germany did, but it is still interesting that the Germans didn't try developing ways to get around the fuel issue, or focus more on rationalizing their logistical system (which you demonstrated in the last video as being a convoluted Gordian's Knot of conflicting fiefdoms). Instead, as you have indicated, they preferred to coerce client states for these resources or steal them instead. The fact that they started Barbarossa expecting to steal enough Soviet locomotives and rolling stock to solve their mass transportation issues is a prime example of the Wehrmachts poor logistical planning.
This is not to say that Soviet logistics was vastly superior than German logistics, rather the Soviet Union had a better appreciation of the problem and dedicated more time and effort to resolving the problems. And, unlike their German counterparts, they at least did a better job of it.
7
-
1