Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "Montgomery vs Eisenhower on Operation Market Garden's True Purpose | History Debate" video.

Reading Nigel Hamilton's biography of Montgomery illustrates, time and again, that Monty had a nasty tendency to re-write history and treat fellow officers poorly after the war. It is sad, because his re-envisioning of history actually detracts from his ability to improvise and adjust to changes on the battlefield (Alamein and the Battle of the Bulge are two examples of this). His treatment of Eisenhower during the war, and post-war treatment of de Guigand and Horrocks after the war, all point to Monty having major psychological issues.
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Something else I noticed in your video, this version of Market Garden also enables the Allies to take Rotterdam, which, as I recall, is the largest port in Europe. This would have solved all the Allies logistical issues.
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@rickreeve525 Ironically enough, this stands in stark contrast to how he addressed troops. My mother, who was serving with the British Army in the ETO in 1944-45, remembered when Montgomery gave a speech to the assembled British Forces just after the war ended, congratulating them on a job well done. I don't know if the intervening 9 years serving as Chief of Imperial General Staff, then head of NATO, went to his head. More likely, retirement in 1954 finally loosened the restraints that had long held his ego and lack of tact in check. One wonders if he would have had a more tactful personality had his wife not died in 1936.
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@thevillaaston7811 I know. The number of Europeans who have to put with Americans saying, "We won the war" is too numerous to count.
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@bigwoody4704 Really. Tell that to all the Dutch and Belgium civilians who always turn out to cheer the Canadians during the Nijmegen March. Or how welcome Canadians and British people are in those countries. You really don't know anything, do you.
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@johnelliot3246 I was able to find some information on Operation Comet doing a google search. Based on what happened during Market Garden, it would have been a catastrophe (rather like the abort airborne landing at Rome, which was mentioned in Gavin's "On to Berlin").
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@bigwoody4704 Yes, too true. I don't know if you are already aware of this, but Meade confounded Lee on two further occasions in October and November of 1863. First, he authorized a night attack on Confederate position on the Rappahannock that gained two fords across the river, captured over 1,500 prisoners and completely confounded Lee's defense plans. Lee then pulled back and made defensive lines behind Mine Run. Meade, upon seeing the position, decided not to attack. He then flummoxed Lee by withdrawing back across the river before he could be counterattacked, leaving Lee rather perplexed as to what to do next. If you have never had a chance to do so, you should read the account of this maneouvering in Shelby Foote's excellent "Civil War: A Narrative".
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@bigwoody4704 You never lived in the Philippines like I did. MacArthur keeping his promise to return is still remembered there. His offensive through New Guinea was extremely well run after the Buna campaign, and at times showed great imagination. Also, the job he did both writing the Japanese Constitution and helping Japan get back on its feet while suppressing Communist influence is nothing to sneeze at either. Like any commander, he was human and made mistakes, like the one that caused Truman to finally fire him. This issue of December 8th is a bit of a mystery. It is possible he had trouble deciding how to act because he was unsure of the accuracy of the information he received. He was also in an awkward position both as leader of the US forces in the Philippines, but also as military advisor to the nascent Philippine government (who were to become completely independent of the US in 1946). Whether this affected his judgement (like deciding not to strike the first blow from a quasi independent state) we'll never know. Like many generals in his position, he had a huge ego (but then again, this is sometimes needed to make the decisions these people make). He was, however, very bad at selecting subordinates, having the nasty tendency to choose "yes men".
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@bigwoody4704 Actually, the Japanese were completely shocked that MacArthur actually landed on the beaches on the first day. They couldn't believe it. It was MacArthur who insisted on landing in the Philippines. Nimitz wanted to land on Taiwan. After the war, when he looked at what his troops would have to face, he agreed that MacArthur was right. MacArthur also realized that the Philippine landings would be good political PR for the US (we live up to our agreements, "I shall return"), and would be supported by Filipino guerillas, so a win-win situation. I agree that MacArthur had two great subordinates, Krueger and Eichelberger, but as I have said before, "the buck stops here". MacArthur was in overall command and approved plans that his staff came up with (or developed from his ideas). An army is a team, and must function properly from top to bottom to win. If MacArthur was a bumbling boob, his army would not have performed as well as it did. With regards to him skeedaddling, you need to re-read the battle in the Philippines from December 1941 to May 1942. Roosevelt ORDERED MacArthur to leave, overruling his protests that he would stay and go down fighting with his troops. MacArthur initially refused to obey Roosevelt's order, but was forced to obey. A guy who stands out in the open at the entrance of the Malinta Tunnel and watches the Japanese planes bombing Corregidor (where the Malinta Tunnel is located - I've been there) is not the kind of person who will run when the going gets tough. In this he was like Patton, personally brave to the point of recklessness. But, I also agree with the ego bit. I think I mentioned Eisenhower's quote about MacArthur in a previous post, and it pretty describes MacArthur's posturing.
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@bigwoody4704 There were many who would agree with you that MacArthur should have gotten the axe. Given what appears in most histories, I would also agree that he should have given the boot, with caveats. The biggest problem is that many records from this crucial period are missing, and few of the participants really talked about what happened on the morning of December 8, 1941, in Manila. It would be interesting to look into the archives to see if there were extenuating circumstances. It is important to remember that the Philippines were a protectorate on their way to full independence from the US at the time, and MacArthur's job had been primarily as a military advisor to the President of the Philippines. It is possible there were some communications or agreements made between Quezon and MacArthur that he would not use what could be technically neutral soil as a launching pad for an attack. He may have been under direct orders from Roosevelt and/or Quezon to not provoke the Japanese. Then again, it may just be he completely dropped the ball and Roosevelt figured he couldn't give the Japanese the propaganda value of capturing a high level US General. We may never know. By the way, this does not absolve him for the lack of preparation of the US and Filipino ground forces in December 1941, or shoddy planning during the retreat which left over 3 months of food in warehouses that could have kept the troops in Bataan and Corregidor healthier and more able to counter Japanese attacks. So, as I mention above, I agree he made some truly horrendous mistakes right up until the end of the Buna Campaign in February 1943. After that, he and his staff got their collective acts together, showing great imagination and drive in pushing the Japanese completely out of the region and starting the final drives to liberate the Philippines in early 1945.
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I always thought the concept of creating a "sledgehammer" of 40 divisions and driving them into the Ruhr was a bit ridiculous. A single thrust would have enabled the Wehrmacht to focus on halting a single offensive, rather than spreading out and figuring out where they would be hit next. The theory you present here makes sense, based both on the available Allied logistical capabilities and strategic considerations. The Allies needed to clear the Scheldt to use Antwerp, which was perhaps the largest, or second largest, port in western Europe at the time. Courtesy of the Belgium underground, it was also undamaged. However, it may also be that Montgomery thought he might be able to "sneak" his Ruhr attack in as well (rather like Patton's "recce in force" tactic on Sicily). We'll never know.
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@thevillaaston7811 I don't disagree in principle, this issue really lies in whether the Allies had the logistical ability to pull this off in September 1944. Considering they not only had to supply their own troops, but also feed the populations of the cities they had liberated, it may not have been possible. Also, as the offensive in spring 1945 showed, there were still formidable obstacles to overcome. Rather like Barbarossa, the concept was sound but the means to actually carry it out might not have been there. Plus, there were also the political machinations to deal with, specifically the American Generals resisting all attempts to get them to work under Montgomery, and the ill will that would have been generated in the US by placing American units under British command.
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@thevillaaston7811 I agree that the armies were able to get sufficient supplies to continue their offensives, but the supply lines were stretched very thin. Although I don't have the statistics, the feeling I get from reading about this time of the war was that there was a choice to shut everything down except for one large offensive, or have a series of smaller offensives with limited objectives to try to keep up the pressure. In Company Commander, the author says that the American FFE (fire for effect) at the start of the Battle of the Bulge was only 3 rounds per gun. I'll have to find the quote, but it might even have been only 3 rounds in total! Patton had to virtually close down his attack at Metz during the autumn, 21st Army Group basically stalled except for the Canadian Army clearing the Schelt, etc. So yes, you are correct in your assertion that enough supplies were getting to the front to continue offensive action, but I get the feeling it was not sufficient enough to allow for large-scale exploitive/ deep penetration attacks (like those the Allies conducted after January 1945). In a sense, the Allies shot their bolt with regards to supplies during Market-Garden. They then had to spend the next 3-4 months improving their logistical network (opening Antwerp really helped for this) and stockpiling enough supplies to conduct major offensives.
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@thevillaaston7811 I don't know if Eisenhower had an overall plan and wanted to repeat Marshall Foch's WW1 strategy against Germans, i.e. using a broad front to conceal where offensives would originate from and deal repeated hammer blows up and down the line, never giving the opponent the chance to rest or put reserves in the line decisively. On the other hand, his "strategy" may have been the result of his lack of field command experience (nil), and he didn't have a clear idea which way to enter Germany when he took over at the beginning of September. I know Eisenhower's lack of command experience worried Monty, and rightly so. However, Montgomery and Bradley were, by this time, starting to butt heads, and it may have been Eisenhower's desire to smooth ruffled feathers between the two commanders (four if you add in Hodges and Patton) as much as possible, as well as mollifying the American Press (and American support at home) which lead him to do what he did. We will never truly know. I do think, though, that if Eisenhower was going to take charge he should have taken stronger control of the 1st US Army, and NOT allowed Hodges and Co. to waste 3 whole months battering themselves silly at Aachen and in the Huertgen Forest. That ill-conceived (if it was even planned at all) and botched offensive is one the main reasons the Battle of the Bulge took place.
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John Cornell So, Market-Garden and the offensive discussed here were basically phase one of a 3-stage plan. There were three problems (potential and otherwise) with the concept. First, a single thrust would have allowed the Axis to predict where the attack would be coming from, and throw everything at it. Strategic surprise would have been difficult. Plus, Holland is not exactly an easy place to fight through (although by the end of this part of the offensive they would have been past the worst of it). Second, you would still be open to an Ardennes-style offensive potentially cutting you off if your attack stalled or took too long to resupply. The German start lines would likely have been closer to Antwerp as well. Third, and most important (unfortunately), was politics. By this time Bradley, Patton and Hodges hated the idea and optics of the allied armies being led by a Brit, especially Montgomery. I think the American public would also have been demanding a US general lead the attack because by this time of the war they were supplying the bulk of the Allied army in western Europe. It was also difficult for most of the American generals to swallow because they had just spent the last 3 months undercutting Montgomery in the press! As an aside, I always find it interesting that Simpson of 9th US Army never had problems getting along with Monty, and 82nd Airborne's General Gavin prefered Monty to most of the other US generals.
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@bigwoody4704 I think you missed the first line I wrote at the start of this thread, "I always thought the concept of creating a "sledgehammer" of 40 divisions and driving them into the Ruhr was a bit ridiculous". It was Monty's plan and, as Harry S. Truman once said, "The Buck Stops Here", i.e. it was his idea with his backing, so the failure also falls on him. I will also add that, had it actually succeeded (which we now know with 20:20 hindsight was a long shot) Montgomery would have been hailed as a military genius and we would not be having this discussion. Same with Patton - had he failed at El Guettar, he would likely have been denigrated like Truscott at Anzio. So no, I am not a Montgomery apologist, but do recognize he was a good army commander who lead the British Army to victory in North Africa and Europe. Were he as incompetent as many American authors say he was, he would have been replaced.
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John Cornell I still think that in September 1944 the Allies' logistics were strained to the point where this might not have been feasible. As I have mentioned in other posts, we weren't there, and can only rely on the word of others as to whether it could have been pulled off or not. Had Montgomery been less abrasive and more diplomatic, it might have gone ahead. I think his row with Eisenhower in September-October 1944 over command of field forces probably sealed the fate of this operation. As far as rating the American generals, both Patton and Simpson were very good. Not sure about Patch, but Hodges, I think, left something to be desired at the operational and strategic levels of thinking. It is a shame that Montgomery does not receive the battlefield credit he deserves because of the three albatrosses around his neck: his poor treatment of subordinates he thought were incompetent (later extended to almost everyone else as well); his personal demons that caused him to recast things so he always seemed to be right (when some of his best actions were his improvisations when the initial plan failed); and that fact that many of the authors who have written about him were his worst critics and people who were always trying to back-stab him. Rather like General Meade during the US Civil War - one of the best Union commanders in the east. He actually ran rings around General Lee, but is completely ignored by history because the people he offended wrote him out of the history, giving all credit when possible to General Grant.
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@bigwoody4704 Actually, it was the press that deliberately besmirched Meade's name. I think it was during the Battle of the Wilderness that Meade got ticked off with a reporter trying to get dirt on Grant. Meade tossed the guy out of his tent (as I recall, literally tossed), and this reporter took offence. He then gathered his media buddies and together they decided to give all credit in future battles to Grant. The British call this "sending someone to Coventry" (why Coventry I have no idea). With regards to Dan Sickles, historians still have mixed feelings about his movement into the Peach Orchard, Devils's Den and the Wheat Field. On one had he exposed his Corps to an attack that virtually gutted it, but on the hand he may have accidentally (it was definitely not on purpose) delayed and weakened the blow against Sykes Corps, buying precious time for the Union forces to fortify Little Round Top. This does not excuse Sickle's actions, which were against orders. Nor are military historians sure it had this effect, as had he remained in position it is possible he might have been able to launch a flank attack on Hood and McLaw's left flank. And yes, he did use this for political gain, even having his leg embalmed and placed in a glass case to show his guests years after the war. On the topic of Monty, yes, he did lie to the press when he didn't have to, he was an egotist (so were most, if not all, of the German generals), but in spite of all that I will say he was definitely a much better general than Sickles. I doubt Sickles could have taken his unit out of the line, performed a night march of 25 miles with an entire division (3rd) on unfamiliar roads, and plug the gap left in the lines when the Belgium Army capitulated. The only other Allied general I know who came close to this sort of manoeuver was Patton in the Ardennes. As far as lying to the media goes, I think the earliest example of this is Ramses II claiming victory over the Hittites in the Battle of Kadesh, 1274 BC. One has to ask, if he was victorious, why was the border between the Hittite kingdom (in modern day Turkey) and Egypt drawn SOUTH of Kadesh?
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@bigwoody4704 I suspect Lincoln's issue was that Meade did not actively pursue Lee and destroy his army (from Lincoln's perspective as an armchair general, that is). Being frustrated by Meade's slow follow-up after Gettysburg, he would have been ripe for hearing somewhat slanderous descriptions of Meade's performance, as it would have confirmed his own (erroneous) opinions.
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@bigwoody4704 Let's see, 2nd Manassas, Bristoe Station, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, heck, even Antietam. Yep, little wonder Meade was cautious. Of course, given the fact that Lincoln had to deal with "The Confederates outnumber us two, three, no five times" McClellan for the first year of the war, I am not surprised he was a bit concerned about the slow pace of the army.
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Speaking of Lightning Joe Collins, I was thinking after you mentioned his name that it is a pity he wasn't put in charge of 1st Army, rather than Hodges. He was a corps commander who knew his stuff. If Monty (who didn't suffer incompetents) thought highly of Collins, as Monty also thought highly of Patton, then he was definitely a good general.
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@bigwoody4704 Well, Eisenhower did say he learned amateur dramatics from MacArthur.
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