Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "The Problem of Coordinating Arms in WW2" video.

  1. Of all the powers that fought in WW2, I think Japan had the worst interservice rivalry. What other Army would actually gloat if their Navy suffered a major defeat like Midway?
    16
  2.  @sydhendrix4853  Yamamoto was not as great a commander as many people think. He was in large part responsible for the attack on Pearl Harbor, which sank the US fleet in waters where most ships could be salvaged. He pushed for and assisted in the planning of the Midway campaign, and his use of naval aviators in the Solomons gutted the Japanese carrier fleet of its best pilots. Nagumo was actually stuck trying to implement a bad plan at Midway. Of the officers who should have been in command, Ozawa comes to mind. So does Mikawa. Both fought with imagination and intelligently.
    4
  3. One of the few Allied Air commanders who should be lauded for trying to integrate air power into ground operations was General "Pete" Quesada. He was apparently one of the few air force commanders on the Allied side who was appalled by the disinterest and often outright hostility of airmen to supporting the infantry.
    2
  4.  @sydhendrix4853  Well, if you are talking about Pearl Harbour, Nagumo didn't know where the American carriers were, so he was concerned about an ambush. He basically had the entire Japanese strike force present, and losing it at the start of the conflict would have been disastrous. Also, the Japanese had limited fuel for their ships. Based on some material I have read they were actually operating 2 carriers and several other vessels beyond their normal range cruising ranges, so time was of the essence (they had packed the ships to the gunnels with oil drums to make the trip). Also, The Japanese never considered fuel tanks and repair facilities to be "honorable targets", so why lose more precious airmen attacking a fully alerted target. At Midway, Nagumo showed he was aggressive (Shattered Sword is a good reference for this), in fact too aggressive. His decision to not pull back about 30-50 nautical miles after they discovered the US carriers, and actually trying to close the distance with Hiryu after the 10:25 strike, demonstrates a rather reckless aggressive approach to the battle. Then again, he was following Japanese naval tradition.
    2