Comments by "Nicholas Conder" (@nicholasconder4703) on "WW2 American, British, Soviet and German Rifle Squad FIREPOWER Comparison" video.

Reading accounts of the British Army in 1944-1945 shows why the British used set piece battles and overwhelming artillery support. They were running out of troops. By early 1945 the British Army was so pressed for manpower that they actually disbanded divisions to bring other frontline units up to strength. Essentially Montgomery had the last field army Britain could muster, so he had to husband his strength and avoid needless casualties as much as possible.
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@28pbtkh23 There is a rather good video about this on channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f79KgQVL3MM&t=861s). Although somewhat conjectural, the video makes a good case that what Montgomery said was the objective for Market-Garden (the Ruhr) was NOT the actual objective. In fact, TIK makes a really good case that the objective was to surround the 15th Army and destroy it within Holland, while at the same time opening up the Scheldt Estuary to Allied shipping. This would have had the benefit of eliminating a large chunk of the Wehrmacht in the West, and relieving the Allies' supply problems. If Rotterdam was freed as well, then the Allies could have pushed into Germany in late 1944, rather than struggle for 4 months until Antwerp was fully operational. It was also within the capabilities of the British Army (30 Corps) at that time. If this was the case, it would also have saved Allied (British) lives and shortened the war. Seen in this light, Operation Market-Garden makes strategic and logistical sense. I suspect this is one of those cases where Monty "rewrote the script" for a failed operation to try to paint himself in a better light.
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@jonhart7630 Actually, no, they couldn't. Politics played a huge role in this. One needs to remember that, unlike WWI, many of these sources for troops were now independent or semi-independent countries that placed strictures on recruiting and where troops could fight. The Canadian Army was running out of troops, primarily because of the lack of volunteers and the conscription crisis in Canada. Canadian troops could only be sent overseas if they volunteered to go. The Australians had their hands full fighting the Japanese in the Pacific. I'm not sure about the South Africans, but I think they were restricted by their government as to where they could fight. The Indian troops were facing off against the Japanese in Burma. The New Zealanders were tied up in Italy. The Eastern Europeans also represented a limited pool of manpower which was also starting to run dry. Overall, the British Army was in rather dire straits by 1945.
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@donalhartman6235 One needs to consider several factors here, though. First, many of the British commanders had the unfortunate experience of impaling themselves on 88mm AT guns, which made them literally "gun shy". Second, the Germans occupied good defensive positions in the bocage, which restricted movement in places. Granted, the bocage was not as prevalent around Caen, but it was made up for by the fact the Germans occupied all the high ground south of the city. Not much fun organizing an attack in a fish bowl. Third, Montgomery was facing the cream of the German units and the bulk of their armour, so rapid breakthroughs in the face of these veteran troops were going to be tough regardless. Lastly, there were a number of occasions when divisional and corps commanders "dropped the ball", and didn't exploit situations when they could have. As an example, during Operation Goodwood, General Simonds, Canadian Corps commander, failed to take advantage of the fact that an SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment had moved out of the line, and so failed to exploit a breakthrough. In the Normandy campaign, Montgomery was using tactics based on superior firepower both the reduce his own casualties. The use of attritional tactics was not through choice, but out of necessity. I would also add you didn't level the same criticism at the Americans or the Russians, both of whom used similar tactics.
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@nickdanger3802 Very good review of the issues involved. It was good the article also emphasized that many of the British units (officers and men alike) were relatively "green", while most of the German units were veterans of years of fighting, mostly in Russia. This, combined with the German's effective use of both mortars and the terrain, made it difficult for the British to advance. Mind you, the IWM article also brought to light Montgomery's biggest flaw. It may have been alright for morale purposes to paint a failure like Epsom as a partial success, but to continue to do so after the war shows how Monty's ego got the better of him, much to the detriment of his legacy as a general.
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@dpollak59 In this I would disagree. One of Montgomery's problems was that many of the officers under his command had difficulties fighting their units. At El Alamein, for instance, the initial plan was for an armoured thrust through the German lines. However, Montgomery soon realized that his armored divisions were not up to the task, and changed his plan to having the infantry lead. Operation Supercharge was a master stroke of improvising a reserve to get a stalled attack moving. He out-generalled Rommel at Homs, baiting Rommel into taking an inferior defensive position east of Tripoli that could, and was, "bounced", enabling the 8th Army to enter Tripoli without a long battle of attrition in hilly terrain. And, you need to remember, he was in charge of the ENTIRE Normandy campaign from June 6 until September 1, 1944. One further reason for him being downplayed as a good general is Montgomery's own habit of re-writing history. Had he been willing to admit to his improvisations (Operation Supercharge) and failures (such as Goodwood), history might have been kinder to him. Sadly, his ego never allowed this. In trying to make himself seem flawless and that everything went the way he had planned it, he instead opened himself up to ridicule. If TIK is correct that the real aim of Market-Garden (which may actually have been to seal the German 15th Army in Holland and destroy it, as well as capture both the Scheldt Estuary and Rotterdam), then this is a prime example of Montgomery making himself look like a sub-par general with no conception of logistics or operational warfare. I am not trying to make Montgomery out to be the most incredible general who fought in WW2, but a general who has been given the short end of the stick by many.
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@jonhart7630 I have always wondered about that myself. Part of it is the enormous effort and manpower that went into the RAF. I know, for instance, that many "recruits" ended up having to work in the coal mines and such (Bevan Boys). I think part of the answer may come from the fact that Britain was fighting a war in the Far East, so divisions that might have fought on the Western Front were tied up in Burma and India. Also, unlike WWI, the Dominion Territories were more independent, so could only be asked for help, not requested. But you are right, there must be more to this.
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I saw one video on line (cannot remember the name or URL) comparing simulations of an American squad verses a German squad. The results were quite interesting, as unit tactics played an important role in the outcome. I really look forward to seeing what will be essentially Part 2 of this video, because the weapons, especially the light machine guns, affected the tactics each nationality's squads used in combat. If the other video I watched (where they conducted about 1,000 simulations in all terrain types) is any indication, the results could be quite interesting.
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However, if you watch accounts of the final battle of Wittmann, you find that the British tanks on one side of the field took out 3 Tigers, while the Canadians took out Wittmann's tank. At Medenine, the attack by the Tigers was halted by gunners manning 6 pounder AT guns. In the Ardennes the Americans stopped Joachim Peiper's attacks and knocked out a number of Tigers during the initial days of the battle. For psychological effect, it was great, but when you faced steady troops and the right weapons, Tigers could and were stopped dead in their tracks.
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I agree that Montgomery is under-rated. Part of this stems from his personality - he had the appalling habit of treating his peers badly, and did the same with many subordinates after the war. The other part was that he was British, not American, and most of the American generals (Simpson and Gavin excluded) hated fighting under the command of some cocky Brit. Since most of these people wrote memoirs that were widely read, he suffers in the minds of most readers of history (most of whom also accept the myth of the incredible German generals). Regarding the Tiger tank, part of its success could be attributed to what you wrote above. Most people forget that the Tiger scored most of its victories in DEFENSIVE actions. The tanks could lie in ambush and take out their opponents before they knew what hit them. On the offensive, the Tiger was not that great, as the battles of Kursk, Medinine, Beja, and Wittman's final attack near Cramesnil in Normandy demonstrate.
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@jonhart7630 One always has to remember the sign on Harry Truman's desk, "The Buck Stops Here". Mind you, following this logic, Eisenhower is ultimately to blame both for not insisting that 1st US Army assist by attacking alongside the British to draw off reinforcements (instead of piddling around Aachen), but also because as SHAEF he approved the operation. Montgomery conceived Market Garden as a quick offensive to catch the Germans while they were still vulnerable, much as he had done against Rommel in North Africa. Unfortunately, the Germans were not as off balance as the plan required and were able to scrape together just enough units to attack vulnerable sections of the corridor. The Wehrmacht's rapid response to the attack enabled them to delay 30 Corps' advance long enough so the SS Panzer Divisions could make the British Airborne bridgehead(s) near Arnhem untenable. One can argue forever which Allied commander(s) made decisions that lead to the failure of this operation. There is a whole daisy chain of bad decisions and missed opportunities that helped doom the attack. However, the real issue is that the Allies (like the Soviets on several occasions) underestimated the Wehrmacht's ability to rally after a major defeat. This, combined with their own logistical issues and inability to push more troops northwards along or (better yet) parallel to "Hell's Highway" (thereby giving the offensive more "punch") is what really doomed Market Garden.
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