Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "TIKhistory"
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@bigwoody4704 More planes? Woody these are the statistics.
In 1941 the British produced 20,000 aircraft, almost double Germany's 12,000 air craft.
In 1941 the British produced 4,800 tanks, the Germans produced 2,400 tanks. In 1942, 8,600 British tanks and 3,600 German tanks. During the whole war Germany produced roughly 350,000 trucks to Britain's 460,000 trucks and 815,000 Canadian trucks.
So they clearly were not as far ahead.
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@johntrottier1162
Monty’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the Germans would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese were forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished off, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse: a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on the flat plains of North Germany.
It is worth noting that the Germans used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty or it shows that Monty took a leaf out of the Germans page.
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I think this is an excellent point. If my numbers are correct, the LW has 3,500 combat aircraft in June 1941, and 2,500 of those are deployed in the East. From July 1940 to June 1941 the LW has already lost about 2,500 aircraft and pilots, 1,900 in the BoB, and another 600 in subsequent operations. (Greece, Crete, Malta, N. Africa, Channel, France, UK)
So it would be reasonable to conclude that without those 2,500 aircraft lost, the Luftwaffe could have deployed at least double the number of combat aircraft to attack the USSR than it did historically.
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@flyoptimum "He was ineffective during the Normandy campaign, taking far to long to take Caen."
Monty's performance in Normandy was good and he gave Rommel another spanking. I don't really care whether he took too long to capture Caen, the point is he took the city and succeeded in the operation instead of risking his forces and taking lewd casualties. Montgomery was correct that neutralising Caen would effectively cut off all the Germans towards the beach heads, rendering Cherbourg practically useless. Even an attack on Caen would force the Germans to redeploy and rethink their strategy. Most people forget that Monty was the most experienced of the Allied generals and played the key role in Normandy, which was needed to kick start the reconquest of France.
" He was slow to counterattack however and astonishingly left most of those glories to Patton. "
What Montgomery did, and it should not be under appreciated was lay the foundations for the US Army to redeem itself, catch their collective breath, organise better defence and then hand out a beating to a German Army which was really on a fool’s errand.
He, almost instantly, recognised what the German aim had to be and ensured, by placing his units in a position to thwart any breakthrough guaranteed no German force could possibly break into a position to threaten the port. This shored up one flank. He then took control over a crumbling command and enabled the US commanders to stabilise the north.
"The breakout is largely credited to Omar Bradley leading the push south and east from the western sector."
The breakout took place while Monty was still in command of all the Allied land forces in France, so Bradleys breakout was his breakout as well.
"Market Garden was his idea, was pushed for by him"
It might have been his idea but he had ZERO control over what happened in the Operation, which gets conveniently forgotten. These are the facts, Monty had no control over the command of 1st Allied Airborne, no ability to appoint or dismiss subordinates, nor any control of objective targets or the timing, location & sequence of drops.
21st Army Group was to assume control of the Airborne Corps only AFTER they linked up, at which point it was far too late to rectify any of the appallingly bad planning decisions that Brereton and Browning had made.
Here are two direct references.
First, Zaloga
Quote In spite of this, the new organization made its debut on August 16, 1944*, *as the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA)*, directly *subordinate to SHAEF rather than to Montgomery's 21st Army Group or Bradley's 12th Army Group*"
Zaloga - "US airborne divisions in the ETO, page. 57"
US Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944–45
Second, from the US Army history website:
Quote*" On the Allied side, the planning and command for the airborne phase of MARKET-GARDEN became the responsibility of the First Allied Airborne Army*. The army commander, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton*"
The Siegfried Line Campaign: Chapter 6
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@flyoptimum The senior chain of command in Normandy was like this, Dempsey and Bradley were the Army commanders who took their orders from Monty, who took his orders from SHAEF. Normandy was Monty's success, and the Allied armies attained the areas that Monty had made as objectives for the campaign 3 days sooner than had originally been intended.
From what I understand Montgomery was reluctant to carry out the operation in the first place, given the changes to the Air Borne planning that he did not make. He only took interest in the ground offensive mainly.
I don't agree with the notion that he's incompetent, because he was chosen specifically to be the man who would oversee the defence of the Kent coast in 1940 for the potential German invasion of Britain. As you know he was also given command of the Normandy ground forces and the Northern flank in the Bulge, you don't get those kind of roles unless you have a proven record, and the fact is he was the most experienced Allied commander, who understood both the strengths and weaknesses of the British army and also understood what it took to defeat the Wehrmacht.
The truth is, after the war mainly due to war of generals memoirs , post war historical revisionism and nationalistic jingoism, several authors the likes of Ambrose, Carlo D'Este threw unjust accusations against Montgomery in an attempt to bring down his reputation as if he did not lead first an army then an army group sucessfully to victory from Africa to all the way to Northern Germany. Mainly for his record in Normandy and Northwest Europe Campaigns. He was even accused of degrading US soldiers in the Bulge, even though it has been proven that the Germans intercepted and messed around with his messages and edited what he said in order to make him look bad, when he infact actually PRAISED the US soldiers on the ground.
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@bigwoody4704 I wonder if Carlo d'Este read the following:
Excerpted from "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area", produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7, 1944 (one month before D-Day). This was forwarded to First US Army Group, among others, on 18 May under a covering letter which reads in part, "With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander-In-Chief's [Montgomery's] intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
"The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence."
"Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes. "
"On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes."
" If, at this time, the enemy weakens his Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine. "
Part IV of the Appreciation continues, advocating alternating attacks on the East and West flanks of the bridgehead in reaction to German reinforcement moves, in order to bring German reinforcements sent to the American front back to the British front.
Thus it is fairly clear that Montgomery intended before ever landing to hold in the East and strike in the West, unless an opportunity presented itself for a favourable attack in the East. Certainly there is NO indication of anyone contemplating a breakout on D+2.
I feel d'Este got that bit wrong.
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@lufasumafalu5069 British incompetence? Ok it's time for a history lesson....the British Empire stood alone for 20 months and after the evacuation of Dunkirk, destroyed 30% of the fighting strength of the Luftwaffe, which was not fully rebuilt and entered the Soviet campaign greatly diminished. Engaged the Germans in Africa, Greece, and tied up 300,000 German troops in Norway for the duration and captured over 250,000 in Tunisia.
Destroyed the capital ship strength of the Kriegsmarine forcing them to rely on submarines, discovered the enigma codes that allowed the allies to decipher the German war plans, crushed 80% of the German armoured divisions in Normandy, which allowed the U.S to advance to cherbourg, conquered Hamburg and all of Northern Germany.
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@aniksamiurrahman6365 What glory of D-Day? These are the facts. D-Day has huge relevance for the postwar world, absolutely enormous. If D-Day hadn't happened, the whole of Germany and probably Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, maybe the Low Countries too, and possibly even France would have been in Soviet hands, maybe even Spain.
D-Day gave the Western Allies the time they needed to establish a military presence on the Continent, as far east as they did manage to get, and also to guarantee & provide safeguard for the independance of several European countries where they hadn't campaigned (eg Sweden, Finland, etc). Most importantly, perhaps, the West got control of the most heavily industrialized parts of Germany.
Without D-Day the Allies would have been unable to secure the independance of most European nations - we would have had no leverage at all in Europe and we would have been completely ignored by the Soviets if there even were negotiations of the sort that took place at Potsdam.
Yes the war was decided in the East by the Soviets, but that doesn't mean the Axis were not still in the fight. One of the reasons that Operation Bagration was possible is because the Germans deployed many of their best divisions to France, leaving their forces in Belarus thinly spread and lacking front line armour and armour reserves. The Germans didn't have much with which to oppose Bagration. Huge expanses of front and not enough to plug the gaps since 12 Panzer divisions that would have halted the Red armies advance were committed to Normandy instead.
Stop being so biased.
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