Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@elessartelcontar6578 Having just recently read through the Normandy portion of the Official History of the Canadian Army, Col. Stacey (the author) provides ample documentary evidence demonstrating a holding action in the Caen sector was always part of Montgomery's plan.
Excerpted from "Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area", produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7, 1944 (one month before D-Day). This was forwarded to First US Army Group, among others, on 18 May under a covering letter which reads in part, "With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander-In-Chief's [Montgomery's] intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."
IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence.
Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes.
On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes.
If, at this time, the enemy weakens hsi Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine.
Part IV of the Appreciation continues, advocating alternating attacks on the East and West flanks of the bridgehead in reaction to German reinforcement moves, in order to bring German reinforcements sent to the American front back to the British front.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@georgesenda1952 The problem with Lee is that he wasn't even subordinate to Eisenhower, he was in Washington!
So Eisenhower had no jurisdiction over any of the logistics arrangements on his side of things. In August, Com Z Headquarters under Lee moved from the UK to a camp at Valognes in France. Although Eisenhower had expressed a desire that headquarters not be located in Paris. This involved the movement of 8,000 officers and 21,000 enlisted men from the UK and Valognes, and took two weeks to accomplish at a time when there were severe supply shortages.
Com Z then occupied 167 hotels in Paris, the Seine Base Section headquarters occupied 129 more, and SHAEF occupied another 25. Lee established his own official residence in the Hotel George V. He justified the move to Paris on the grounds that Paris was the hub of France's road, rail and inland waterway communications networks. The logic was conceded, but the use of scarce fuel and transport resources at a critical time caused embarrassment for the Allies.
Lee was more interested in siphoning off supplies for his endeavours in Paris hotels rather than sending them to the frontlines. This guy apparently pissed off every man around him, up & down the chain of command.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@classicalextremism ", Eisenhower and the civilian leadership are looking to end the war conclusively."
But the Broad front was NOT the strategy go about ending things quickly. The Allies reached the Rhine/Siegfried line and were stuck there for 6 months , in a series of bloody static battles. The Broad front strategy was to encircle the Ruhr in the fall of 1944.
Instead, the Allied armies were stopped at the Rhine and fought a series of very costly battles (Aachen, Metz, Hurtgen forest) for small gains. By March they were still stuck behind the Rhine, and stayed there until the Soviets broke down the front door in the Vistula-Oder offensive., at which point German resistance degraded rapidly.
The Broad Front strategy would only work if the Germans were in disarray, otherwise all 3 attacks would fail.
Monty believed (correctly) that the Germans were rebuilding their defences, therefore a single powerful thrust to seize a Rhine crossing was the best option.
Ike ignored warnings that the Allies were overstretching their supply lines because he wanted to "Keep Patton moving", which proved futile.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1