Comments by "Bullet-Tooth Tony" (@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-) on "Biographics"
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 Why is it so hard to acknowledge that Charles outnumbered Napoleon? 😂Just curious, if Archduke Charles was so good, why was he not given command of the Austrian Army after 1809? Aspern-Essling was at best, inconclusive and he was beaten at Wagram, not a particularly impressive record.
Blucher was not a good tactician and strategist at all. Blucher relied upon Von Gneisenau for much of the leg work. Blucher only had the spirit to lead armies but was weak tactically and had no grasp for Napoleonic warfare this was evident in the Six days campaign and Ligny. Wellington was a far superior tactician.
Wellington was able to concentrate his forces, while the much larger French forces were forced to occupy Spain. What Wellington did was looking at Napoleon's approach to fighting a campaign and adopting and improving it. the Austrians, Russians and Prussians were far slower to adapt to this and it cost them dearly on many occasions.
None of the Coalition commanders in central europe studied Wellington's proven system and implemented it, by 1814 they were still doing the same thing as they had done in 1805 again and again trying to bludgeon through Napoleon's army in costly frontal attacks. Wellington on the other hand won his battles at a tolerable loss in terms of casualties. Wellington was also always outnumbered in the theatre of operations, unlike Blucher and Charles which makes him even more impressive.
Wellington defeated 3 invasions of Portugal, expelled the French after Vimeiro, destroyed Massena's army while having a numerical disadvantage in the Torres Vedras campaign, tied up a large chunk of French forces and lead much of the allied effort in the Peninsular. You can bring up Southern France, but that doesn't diminish the fact he performed superbly on the tactical level and managed to drive Soult out of strong defensive positions in the Pyrenees, winning several battles across difficult terrain.
Napoleon was effectively beaten before Blucher arrived. He may have won the field if 'Marschall Vorwarts' hadn't arrived to deliver the coup de grace, but the meat grinder of Waterloo meant that his forces were decimated and would have been badly in need of rest and reinforcements; the reality being that they would have been forced to march on and likely fight again shortly afterwards. Napoleon's tactics were to split his opponents and overwhelm them with numbers, winning wasn't enough, he had to win with as few casualties as possible. The situation back in Paris was that even with victories, Napoleon's position was at best precarious and reinforcements were by no means guaranteed.
Wellington's tactics at Waterloo was to hold the French and make sure that they paid for every inch of ground. Would he have stood if Blucher's intervention was doubtful? I have the feeling that he may have, as he knew that his tactics on this battlefield, and the tactics he knew Napoleon was likely to employ, would mean that the French would at best achieve a phyrric victory.
Blucher wasn't an incredible commander, nobody studies him . I've already repeated this.
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@ronaldmcdonald2817 Besides the Rhine Campaign he had Stokach, Ostrach and Zurich in the Swiss Campaign, though he took high casualties despite having a big numerical advantage. In Italy the Austrians were already destroyed by the time he arrived, he couldn't really do much to stop Napoleon and it was a feat that he managed to escape with his army in tact. He lacked aggression to carry out offensives and his heart wasn't in the right place most of the time.
Wellington was the better general and possibly one of the greatest generals of all time in my opinion. Defensively he was a master of positioning and maneuvering, never losing a major battle. He had daring offensives such as Vittoria, Assaye and Salamanca, proving that he was competent offensively and could seize the moment unlike Charles. His campaigns in India, Torres Vedras and through Spain were brilliant and in my opinion some of the greatest military feats in modern history. It's an insult to even include Blucher.
And I disagree about Waterloo.
Wellington takes a deserved part of the credit. He was holding the line as promised and the Prussians arrived as planned.
The French were not winning. They had failed to take 2 out of 3 strong points, and had most of their cavalry expended, most of their infantry had been shattered outside Hougoumont, in D’Erlons crushed attack, storming La Haye Saint (which took them most of the day) and at Papelotte and Plancenoit.
Wellington on the other hand still had effective garrisons in Papelotte and Hougemont. His centre was exhausted, but he’d only had 1 cavalry regiment routed. Contrary to myth he still had lots of brigades who were comparatively fresh.
He had a Full Dutch-Belgian Division still untouched, most of his light cavalry brigades were still effective, his Dutch heavy brigade and the household brigade were still in fighting condition.
His British brigades, 2nd Guards were in good condition, 5th Brigade was desperate, 3rd Brigade has barely been scratched, 4th Brigade was also borderline fresh, 8th Brigade was also fairly unscathed... but they had taken a pounding at Quatre Bras, 9th Brigade were very beaten up but again they’d had it worse at Quatre Bras, 10th had taken losses in the cavalry attacks.
So there was lots of troops (I didn’t go into the Hanovarians and KGL) in Wellingtons army still in relatively good condition. Napoleon couldn’t say the same. His Imperial Guard were mostly tied down. He only had the middle guard left which he threw away...The Wellingtons line was wavering myth is revisionism but not born out by hard study.
When the Middle Guard attacked, only really troops that looked unsteady were British 5th Brigade... a brigade heavily engaged at Quatre Bras and in the thick of it again all day at Waterloo, but their unsteadiness at this point was not the case for the whole army as some like to pretend.
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@bigwoody4704 Quote The Battle of Alam el Halfa took place between 30 August and 5 September 1942 south of El Alamein during the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War. Panzerarmee Afrika (Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel), attempted an envelopment of the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery). In Unternehmen Brandung (Operation Surf), the last big Axis offensive of the Western Desert Campaign, Rommel intended to defeat the Eighth Army before Allied reinforcements arrived.
Montgomery knew of Axis intentions through Ultra signals intercepts and left a gap in the southern sector of the front, knowing that Rommel planned to attack there and deployed the bulk of his armour and artillery around Alam el Halfa Ridge, 20 miles (32 km) behind the front. Unlike in previous engagements, Montgomery ordered that the tanks were to be used as anti-tank guns, remaining in their defensive positions on the ridge. When Axis attacks on the ridge failed and short on supplies, Rommel ordered a withdrawal. The 2nd New Zealand Division conducted Operation Beresford against Italian positions, which was a costly failure.
Montgomery did not exploit his defensive victory, preferring to continue the methodical build up of strength for his autumn offensive, the Second Battle of El Alamein. Rommel claimed that British air superiority determined the result, being unaware of Ultra. Rommel adapted to the increasing Allied dominance in the air by keeping his forces dispersed. With the failure at Alam Halfa, the Axis forces in Africa lost the initiative and Axis strategic aims in Africa were no longer possible.
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@markuhler2664 Sorry this is late, but here's the issue with Lee. Rather than being under Eisenhower, he was operating from Washington.
Eisenhower had no jurisdiction over any of the logistics arrangements on his side of things. In August, Com Z Headquarters under Lee moved from the UK to a camp at Valognes in France. Although Eisenhower had expressed a desire that headquarters not be located in Paris. This involved the movement of 8,000 officers and 21,000 enlisted men from the UK and Valognes, and took two weeks to accomplish at a time when there were severe supply shortages.
Com Z then occupied 167 hotels in Paris, the Seine Base Section headquarters occupied 129 more, and SHAEF occupied another 25. Lee established his own official residence in the Hotel George V. He justified the move to Paris on the grounds that Paris was the hub of France's road, rail and inland waterway communications networks. The logic was conceded, but the use of scarce fuel and transport resources at a critical time caused embarrassment for the Allies.
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@bnm0883 "Wellington steps that we have forgotten apart from the British who are looking for a hero like you."
Sure, that's why he's ranked second place behind Napoleon in most successful generals of all time, theres a video on here that shows that if you don't believe me. The Spanish, Portugese, French and Indians remember him.
😂
Blucher also had a 5 to 1 advantage in many of his victories that's not brave, btw the Prussian army's movement and tactics were mostly planned by Von Gneisenau, not Blucher. He won thanks to an abundance of manpower. Never took on the french army at a disadvantage. In contrast Wellington at Bussaco, Torres Vedras and Fuentes De Onoro, he defeats one of Napoleon's best marshalls Massena outnumbered 30,000 against 65,000 and in the Pyrenees campaign he beats another in Soult outnumbered, 62,000 vs 100,000, and also held out against Napoleon for 6 hours (outnumbered with a 5,000 men disadvantage).
In all honesty Wellington could (and probably should) have been well beaten before the arrival of Bulow's IV Corps. Instead Napoleon spent 6 hours hurling columns at an unbreakable line and cavalry at unbreakable squares, as well as tying up thousands of men trying to occupy well defended redoubts. Wellington never once fell back in retreat despite all of this, the fact his elite Guards men repulsed the Imperial Guard without the Prussians is evidence of that.
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@bnm0883 So is Wellington
"Quote Wellington is famous for his adaptive defensive style of warfare, resulting in several victories against numerically superior forces while minimising his own losses. He is regarded as one of the greatest defensive commanders of all time, and many of his tactics and battle plans are still studied in military academies around the world"
The French were not winning at Waterloo. They had failed to take 2 out of 3 strong points, and had most of their cavalry expended, most of their infantry had been shattered outside Hougoumont, in D’Erlons crushed attack, storming La Haye Saint (which took them most of the day) and at Papelotte and Plancenoit.
Wellington on the other hand still had effective garrisons in Papelotte and Hougemont. His centre was exhausted, but he’d only had 1 cavalry regiment routed. Contrary to myth he still had lots of brigades who were comparatively fresh.
He had a Full Dutch-Belgian Division still untouched, most of his light cavalry brigades were still effective, his Dutch heavy brigade and the household brigade were still in fighting condition.
His British brigades, 2nd Guards were in good condition, 5th Brigade was desperate, 3rd Brigade has barely been scratched, 4th Brigade was also borderline fresh, 8th Brigade was also fairly unscathed... but they had taken a pounding at Quatre Bras, 9th Brigade were very beaten up but again they’d had it worse at Quatre Bras, 10th had taken losses in the cavalry attacks.
So there was lots of troops (I didn’t go into the Hanovarians and KGL) in Wellingtons army still in relatively good condition. Napoleon couldn’t say the same. His Imperial Guard were mostly tied down. He only had the middle guard left which he threw away...The Wellingtons line was wavering myth is revisionism but not born out by hard study.
When the Middle Guard attacked, only really troops that looked unsteady were British 5th Brigade... a brigade heavily engaged at Quatre Bras and in the thick of it again all day at Waterloo, but their unsteadiness at this point was not the case for the whole army as some like to pretend.
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@bigwoody4704 Monty’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the Germans would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese were forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished off, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse, a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on the flat plains of North Germany.
It is worth noting that the Germans also used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty or it shows that Monty took a leaf out of the Germans page.
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