Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "War Stories"
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@DidMyGrandfatherMakeThis Of course the longest range hit by one battleship on another was exceptional. That is why it was the longest.
On 27 May, 1941, Rodney opened fire on Bismarck at 25,000 yards, and scored her first hit at around 20,500 yards.
King George V, using her Type 284, opened fire at 25,500 yards and, similarly, achieved her first hit at 20,500 yards.
Bismarck's first hit on Hood was at 18,200 yards. Her superb optical rangefinders were unable to bring about any hits on either British battleship on 27 May.
At North Cape, Duke of York detected Scharnhorst at 45,000 yards, but held fire until 12,000 yards, as Scharnhorst remained entirely unaware of her presence. When DoY did open fire, she hit with her first salvo. Starshells from HMS Belfast revealed that Scharnhorst's main armament was still in fore and aft position when she was hit.
Certainly, the RN had the advantage of gunnery radar which actually worked, but Rodney's performance demonstrated that, even without it, British battleships were more than capable of engaging successfully at longer ranges.
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You need to 'chase down the details' yourself. If you did, you would find that, at the time of the Battle of Britain, there were, of just under 3,000 allied pilots who flew at least one operation during the Battle, 112 Canadians, and 32 Australians.
Of ground troops ready to face any invasion attempt, of 34.5 divisions in September, 1940, 32.5 were British. There was one Canadian Division, and two Australian & New Zealand Brigades.
Those are the plain, unalloyed, facts. However much you may dislike them.
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What a pity Montgomery wasn't as modest and self-effacing as others, such as Patton or MacArthur. Indeed, his conduct remains the subject of debate. However, the overwhelming majority of it is favourable to him.
He was an unpleasant, self-obsessed, individual, but he was generally protective of the lives of his soldiers, and sought to avoid committing them to battle without superiority in numbers, equipment, and supplies. He was fortunate in that he was the first British commander in WW2, on land at least, to be in such a position.
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Please don't be silly. Bismarck carried 12 x five point nine inch low angle guns, which were outdated by 1940 and never actually managed to hit anything. The British Nelson class , built ten years earlier, carried 12 x 6 inch LA guns, and the King George V class 16 x 5'25 DP. Modern US battleships carried 20 x 5 inch DPs. Perhaps if Bismarck had had a DP secondary armament, she might not have been quite so unprepared to cope with attacks by torpedo bombers?
The main guns in Bismarck were so powerful that they fired a broadside of 14,112 lbs., compared to the 15,900 of the KGVs, the 18,432 of a Nelson, or the 24,300 of a Washington, Iowa, or South Dakota.
Or, come to that, the 18,000 lbs of a Tennessee, or the 15,504 lbs of a Queen Elizabet or R class..
Do you consider that having radar which failed when the guns fired was really beneficial? The radars of US & British capital ships generally had no such limitations.
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Perhaps you didn't know when the Battle of Britain took place? Try to understand this. In September, 1940, there were 34.5 divisions in the UK. Of these 32.5 were British. The only Commonwealth troops in the UK were one Canadian division and rwo Australian/New Zealand brigades. The nearest Indian division was in North Africa, and the Free French/Poles were not yet forned into (small) coherent fighting units as yet.
In the event of any German landing, however unlikely given the naval supremacy of the (British) Royal Navy, supported by a small number of Canadian destroyers, cries of 'Good luck, lads!' from distant Canada, Australian, South Africa, New Zealand, India or anywhere else would not have been of much help.
However important the Commonwealth & Empire became later in the war.
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Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda with which you have been indoctrinated. However, for once try to think outside your programming and ask yourself this : There were 2.5 million Indians serving with the Allied forces at the time. Is it likely that Churchill would have considered, even for a moment and even had he been so inclined, to alienate them?
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