Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "War Stories"
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Yet, apart from one Canadian division & two Australian/New Zealand brigades, there were no Commonwealth troops in Britain in 1940. In the event of an assault landing, however unlikely it might have been, it would be the British who, almost entirely would be the ones who resisted it.
Encouragement from far away, whilst good for morale, would not have helped much. There were 574 Commonwealth & Foreign pilots in the Battle of Britain, and 2353 British ones, by the way.
Moreover, you greatly exaggerate the importance of the Battle of Britain. After all, if the Germans had achieved a temporary measure of air superiority, all that they then needed to do was find a way past the largest navy in the world for their towed barges.
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Actually, the German force at el Guettar was 10th Panzer, which had only arrived in Tunisia in December, 1942, and had been part of von Arnim's 5th Panzer Army. It had actually served under Rommel's command for around four days, at Kasserine. The el Guetter spoiling action was von Arnim's by the way, not Rommel's.
At the time, what was left of Rommel's army ( 15 & 21 Panzer, 90 Light, and 164 Infantry, were being defeated at Mareth, as part of Messe's 1st Italian army, before being finally routed at Wadi Akarit, On both occasions, by 8th Army.
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@soulfella1 If you are writing about Sealion then in September 1940 German had no heavy ships at all, apart from one heavy cruiser, Hipper. Bismarck, Tirpitz, & Prinz Eugen were not yet in service, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were under repair following damage during the Norwegian campaign, These repairs were not completed until November.
Prince of Wales & Repulse were sunk by high performance torpedo bombers, flown by crews trained in anti-shipping techniques. In September, 1940, the Luftwaffe had no torpedo bombers, and had not been trained in these methods. German aircraft did indeed attack warships in the Channel, but in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers. In September 1940, the RN had more than 100 in Home Waters.
There was intermittent RAF air cover at Dunkirk, but even the RAF's own website confirms long periods on each day of the operation when no cover was provided.
The 50 ex US destroyers did not appear until after the invasion threat had dissipated, late in 1940. The British feared that, had the French fleet been ordered to support an invasion, a landing might have been attempted, which was why it was attacked.
In 1940, the bulk of the RN was in home waters, apart from Cunningham's fleet in the Mediterranean. Finally, the escape of three German warships through the Channel in early 1942 was a strategic retreat by the Germans, and three fast warships speeding through the Channel in a matter of hours is hardly the same as attempting to land troops from hundreds of converted river barges on a hostile shore over eight days and nights without the protection of a surface fleet.
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@waynepatterson5843 Very good. Add the total number of boats up, and it will give you twenty seven. As I said in my earlier post. Furthermore, 17 of these were Type IIs, which carried 5 torpedoes each, and were of the same type which were lost in the Channel without achieving anything in late 1939.
Clearly, you don't have access to the Royal Navy 'Pink List' for 16 September, 1940. If you even knew what this document was, you would know that it listed the location and operational state of every RN major warship, and was produced fortnightly. It was, in effect, the Order of Battle of the Royal Navy. A similar one, by the way was produced for minor vessels.
The List does indeed given the names of over 70 light cruisers within five hours of Dover, and the others further away to which I have already referred, and which I won't repeat. Would you like me to provide you with the name of every vessel?
There was no need for escorts for the Home Fleet, because firstly the Home Fleet already had destroyers with it, as I haver previously stated, and secondly the Admiralty did not intend to send the Home Fleet further south than its base at Rosyth unless the Kriegsmarine sent heavy ships in support of Sealion, which wouldn't have happened because, as we now know, there was only one operational German heavy ship available at the time. If, of course, you consider a heavy cruiser to qualify for this description. Why, by the way, would the Admiralty seek to sink barges with 15 & 16 inch guns, when 4.7 inch, 4 inch, & 3 inch quick firing guns are far better suited to the task?
Perhaps you should read the books I recommended, as you don't seem able to give any sources of your own?
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@waynepatterson5843 You are getting desperate, mon Brave! Firstly, the mine barrages were never possible. For every German minelayer, there were at least 20 British minesweepers, as I have already mentioned, I believe. Add to that the nightly British destroyer patrols from Plymouth & the Nore, and you really are in considerable difficulty.
As the coastal convoys were important to the British, as they delivered essential coal supplies for domestic & industrial use, pray explain why your wonderful batteries simply didn't do precisely as you romantically suggest, and place pre-registered concentrations in front of the route these little colliers would take, in order to stop them? Do you really, by the way, believe that a RN destroyer flotilla, hastening to attack an invasion convoy of towed barges, would be deterred by SPLASHES?
You have just made three posts of increasing irrelevance. Why not just give up and go elsewhere?
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@waynepatterson5843 Do you deal entirely in irrelevancies, or is it that you simply cannot understand what is relevant and what isn't? You have referred to one freighter damaged, an unarmed liner bombed in mid-Atlantic, and a number of similar attacks on unarmed merchantmen by Condors. Don't you know that Condors were only ever effective when attacking lone merchantmen and that, once defensive armaments were fitted, they were ordered not to carry out such attacks, as they were too vulnerable to be risked, and too valuable as reconnaissance aircraft?
I have already answered your question concerning RN destroyer availability by referring to the RN Pink List. I have a copy, whereas you don't, and my copy deals with the critical period for any attempted invasion. If you would like a copy, contact the British Records Office at Kew. The Public Record Office reference is ADM187/9.
By the way, your source seems to think that all the cruisers in Home Waters were attached to the Home Fleet, which in a mistake the badly or inadequately informed often make, as, in addition to the Home Fleet, the RN also had a number of separate 'Commands' in Home Waters.
If you are interested, and you may wish to keep this as part of your education, cruisers in Home Waters on 16 September, 1940, were :-
Scapa Flow :- 2 heavy cruisers and 2 light/AA cruisers.
Rosyth :- 3 light/AA cruisers.
The Humber :- 3 light cruisers.
The Nore :- 2 light cruisers.
Portsmouth :- 1 light cruiser.
Plymouth :- 2 light cruisers.
Firth of Clyde :- 1 light cruiser.
In addition, there were also 6 heavy and 5 light cruisers repairing, refitting, or completing in various British ports. There was also a Dutch light cruiser, operating as part of the RN, under repair.
The names are all available if you ask nicely!
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@waynepatterson5843 Odd how people tend to become abusive when they run out of credible arguments. Still, I have already posted details of the actual number of minesweepers elsewhere. Read the book I recommended for further information. As to minelaying, aircraft mines can only be laid in shallow waters or estuaries, and in September 1940, the Kriegsmarine had precisely seven destroyers capable of minelaying, and nine auxiliary minelayers. Perhaps you would explain precisely how these ships would avoid the nightly RN destroyer patrols. I have asked before, yet oddly you haven't responded. You still haven't, by the way, explained why your guns did not use these techniques against the convoys or even, years later, why they were not used against the D-Day flotillas.
You seem to have adopted the standard response of the Sealion 'would have' enthusiast, in that you confidently assert that 'this is what the Luftwaffe (or Kriegsmarine, or whatever) would have done' but are rather short of credible arguments when asked exactly why they didn't 'do it.'
Incidentally, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 destroyers, or less than half the number available to confront the Sealion barges and their tugs within five hours of them being observed.
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@soulfella1 I cannot really answer your post in detail as it is largely incoherent. You make a reference to June 1940, then start writing about Pedestal. What connection is there?
Just to correct the sections I can understand. Operation Pedestal ended on 15 August, 1942. Ohio was helped into port by the destroyers Penn, Bramham, & Ledbury. Brisbane Star, Melbourne Star, Port Chalmers, & Rochester Castle also reached Malta. Pedestal was attacked at various times by axis aircraft, submarines, and light surface units. The Italian surface fleet was not committed.
The Atlantic convoys were never halted, and the 40 (actually 50) US four stacker destroyers were not part of lend-lease, but pre-dated it, and were part of a 'ships for bases' agreement.
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@kickassandchewbubblegum639 As Abe Lincoln said, 'Better to Remain Silent and Be Thought a Fool than to Speak and Remove All Doubt.' Good advice for you to consider.
In 1940 , the Germans had a small number of DFS 230 light assault gliders, capable of carrying nine lightly equipped men each. Commercial aircraft were already under military control. A Ju52 could accommodate, at most, 18 paratroopers. Once the first wave landed, the British know where they are, and are able to respond.
By September, 1940, the British had considerable forces in place capable of dealing with a small number of lightly armed paratroops, who would have lacked transport, artillery or armoured support, and had no hope of relief.
Please, please! buy a book about Operation Sealion and read about the reality, rather than simply indulging yourself in bizarre fantasies.
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@kickassandchewbubblegum639 Tell me when Churchill said what you claim. You might also explain why, if Churchill really did think that, he sent a troop convoy, with three full armoured regiments, and supporting AA, AT & Field Regiments, to North Africa in mid August, 1940? If think you are about to be invaded, would you really send your best equipped troops, and half of the total number of your most battleworthy tanks (the Matilda II) to another Continent? Don't believe me? Then read about the 'Apology' convoy, which sailed on 22 August. I did refer to this earlier, but it appears you chose to ignore it.
I am not, by the way, interested in what 'everyone and his mother said.' I have read the archives from the time (both the British & German ones) and, like the vast majority of my colleagues writing on this subject today, I know that an invasion was never a real possibility as long as the Royal Navy held total naval supremacy in the Channel.
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Oh, dear, a victim of the indoctrination which has replaced education in many places.
Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis.
The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't want to believe any of this, as it doesn't suit your agenda.
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Nonsense. 'France, Holland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Czechosolvakia, Poland, and Norway' had been occupied. There were no Indian, South African, or Rhodesian, troops in Britain in 1940. The only Commonwealth troops were one Canadian Division, and two Australian & New Zealand Battalions.
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Except that Operation Barbarossa changed the face of the war beyond recognition. Actually, the idea that Britain was 'hanging on' is rather overdone. In May 1941, the RAF had over 50 squadrons of fighters and fighter bombers carrying out regular sweeps over Northern France, and the level of monthly sinkings, which Doenitz believed needed to reach 600,000 tons per month, only once exceeded 200,000 tons between July & December, 1941 once, and in three of those months was below 100,000 tons.
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