Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Imperial War Museums" channel.

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  12. Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about. You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India. The Singapore disaster was a direct result of the fact that a situation existed in 1940-2 for which no pre-war planning could have prepared. The assumption was that a war with Germany would be fought with the support of France, who would take on the bulk of the fighting on land, whilst the French Fleet would play a significant role. Indeed, had France not collapsed, Italy may well have remained neutral. As a result, the British, never a significant land power, were obliged to attempt, with insufficient military resources to meet the new situation, to find ships and men to defend Britain, protect the Atlantic supply lines, and prevent axis control of the Mediterranean. The Far East, not at war until December, 1941, was, inevitably, starved of resources.
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  25.  @nickdanger3802  Never a good idea to accept uncritically an RAF source where the Battle of the Atlantic is concerned. To use an accurate, Naval, source :- 'Total shipping losses of the Allied and neutral nations were about 456,000 gross tons a month during the period July 1940 to March, 1941, more than 60 per cent higher than during the first period. Meanwhile the building rate had increased only slightly to about 114,000 gross tons a month, making the net loss of shipping about 342,000 gross tons a month. Total shipping available had decreased from about 38,000,000 gross tons at the start of the second period to about 35,000,000 gross tons at the end of the second period. Of the 456,000 gross tons of shipping lost monthly, about 404,000 gross tons were lost by enemy action. U-boats accounted for 42 ships of 224,000 gross tons a month (55 per cent of the total tonnage lost by enemy action), more than twice the monthly tonnage sunk by U-boats during the first period. Monthly shipping losses due to enemy surface craft jumped to 87,000 gross tons (22 per cent) and those due to enemy aircraft increased to 61,000 gross tons (15 per cent). Monthly losses due to mines dropped from second place in the first period to only 27,000 gross tons (7 per cent), with other and unknown causes accounting for the other 1 per cent of the total losses due to enemy action. There is no doubt that the U-boats had inflicted a serious defeat on the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic during the second period, but the situation was beginning to look more promising toward the end of this period. One favorable element was the increasing number of antisubmarine ships and aircraft becoming available for convoy escorts as the threat of the invasion of England was decreasing. The number of antisubmarine ships suitable for ocean escort (i.e., destroyers and patrol craft such as sloops, frigates, corvettes) had increased from about 235 at the start of this period to about 375 (includes 240 destroyers) at the end of the period. Important factors in this increase were the coming into service of the new corvette and also the transfer of the 50 old Town class destroyers from the United States to England from September 1940. These destroyers were equipped with U. S. echo-ranging gear, called sonar, which was similar in principle to the British Asdic.' Thus, although the figures are largely accurate, the conclusions are incomplete, in that, losses in terms of gross tonnage available had decreased by less than 8%, at a time when the first 'Happy Time' was in full swing. Evasive, or Diversionary, Routing didn't apply during the period June-December, 1940. It relied upon widespread use of HF/DF sites on ships and shore bases, combined with successes in breaking German Naval Enigma, both of which post-dated that period. How, by the way, is any of this relevant to PQ17 or Paukenschlag?
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