Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@JimmysEssay 'This is basic stuff mate.' Indeed, Britain and France declared war on Germany in support of an alliance with Poland, which was intended, unsuccessfully, to deter Germany from further expansion in Europe.
Germany, of course, by July 1941 had invaded Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the Soviet Union, without declaring war on any of them. Generally, those countries learned that the arrival of tanks, troops, aircraft and in many cases einsatzgruppen represented the nazi equivalent of a declaration of war.
Britain sent her main field army, of thirteen divisions, to support a combined Franco-Belgian army of over 100 divisions. The Belgian army then capitulated, and the French army largely collapsed. Britain, a small land power with the largest navy on earth, then used her navy to evacuate the BEF, and much of the French First Army Group, from the Dunkirk pocket, and attempted to re-land troops in Cherbourg, before being told that the French army was no longer able to resist further.
After that, the British, largely again because of their navy, successfully ensured that a German invasion was never attempted, and provided a rallying point for opponents of nazism in Europe and beyond.
Granted, it is difficult to see how Britain and her Commonwealth alone could have liberated occupied Europe, but the lunatic German attack on her former friend, the Soviet Union, entirely changed the situation, especially since the US, although neutral was providing aid for Britain and, after Barbarossa, the Soviet Union.
After Pearl Harbor & the German declaration of war on the US (unusual, that, as Germany generally simply attacked without such a courtesy), Britain then led the campaign in the west. The Royal and Royal Canadian Navies eventually won the Battle of the Atlantic, the RN convoyed supplies to North Russia, with two of 78 convoys only suffering significant losses, the Royal Navy held control of the Mediterranean, prevented any major Japanese campaign in the Indian ocean, and was largely responsible for planning most of the Assault Landings in the west, such as Torch, Husky, Avalanche, & Overlord. This enabled the growing US Navy to concentrate almost entirely in the Pacific against Japan, although the most significant Japanese land defeat of WW2 was the repulse of their operation U-Go, which caused them 55,000 casualties. Only for about the last six or seven months of the war were US ground forces in the west greater in numbers than British & Commonwealth ones. Oh, & by the way, isn't it odd that a 'bit part player' provided the commanders of the Naval, Ground Forces, and Air Forces, during Operation Overlord?
The reality is that Britain could not, alone, have defeated Germany, but there again neither could the United States. The Soviet Union might, possibly have done so, but as a post war Soviet historian wrote, 'The Soviet Union was largely responsible for the defeat of Hitlerism, but it largely did so using US trucks, eating US food, using US radios, and wearing British boots.'
That is what almost every historian working in the field will actually tell you.
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@kemarisite Firstly, destroyers, US or otherwise, were not obliged to steam at 30 knots. The modern RN vessels which accompanied Arctic convoys, for example, had no problems when operating at reduced speed. Nor had those US boats which had briefly accompanied North Atlantic convoys in early 1942. Moreover, what actions did the US Atlantic Fleet undertake in early 1942 which required massive destroyer escort numbers?
Yes, Coast Guard cutters, DEs, or corvettes and sloops were more suited, but as these were not available, did that really justify allowing the mass slaughter of freighters in large numbers?
Armed merchantmen had very little hope of protecting themselves from U-boats. Generally, the first warning the merchant ship had was went a torpedo exploded.
'Note that the Royal Canadian Navy immediately organized convoys, despite the lack of escorts, and this appears to have cut sinkings of the Canadian coast from 37 in January and February to 11 in March and April.' Indeed. Isn't that the point I am making? The RCN itself noted that U-Boats preferred to hunt further south, in a convoy free environment.
In April, the RN & RCN detached 24 escorts from their own resources to support US efforts, but still convoys were not established. The British then set up their own convoys between Halifax & Trinidad, later Aruba. Between May and August, they escorted 14 convoys, totalling 76 tankers, withouit a single loss.
Incidentally, if I am wrong about the authority of the US War Shipping Administration, how was it the Kentucky and Ohio, two fast tankers, were transferred to the British Ministry of War Transport for service in the Mediterranean in early-mid 1942?
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Not quite. Even Fighter Command's historical website details the long periods during which there was no air cover.
Estimates of RAF losses over Dunkirk vary between 106 & 177 of all types. The RAF Museum estimate just over 100 aircraft lost. The Museum account also states :-
The measure of Fighter Command’s success, however, is not in the destruction of enemy aircraft but the extent to which it defended the evacuation. Initially, the RAF attempted to provide continuous air cover, but faced with large German formations it adapted its tactics and instead looked to provide air cover in strength — with patrols involving four squadrons — but not continuous air cover. The move from stronger patrols at less frequent intervals was not successful.
The four squadron patrols were often unable to cooperate effectively over Dunkirk. The flying conditions over Dunkirk, with low-cloud and thick smoke, would have taxed pilots experienced in combat operations as part of larger formations. During DYNAMO, it was almost impossible for patrols involving more than two squadrons to maintain contact and fight together. By the time the patrol had reached the French coast the squadrons had become separated and the patrols broke up into single, or pairs of squadrons, with part of the patrol below the cloud cover whilst others, having initially been instructed to provide top cover, flew above it. The result was that there was ineffective support between the squadrons at different heights and the force structure of the patrol was wasted.
The larger patrols also quickly became disorganised in combat, as the squadrons fragmented into sections, largely dissipating the effect of the patrol. Norman Hancock, a Pilot Officer in No. 1 Squadron, recalled that:
‘You went as a squadron towards your target. You were in appropriate formation but once you’d engaged the enemy then by and large people tended to split up. You might get the odd pair who stayed together, but by and large the squadron was split up and individually attacked targets. You didn’t stay as a solid machine of 12 aeroplanes pointing in the right direction. It didn’t work that way… everybody disappeared. … [After the first attack] there was no cohesion to the squadron.’
The patrols by four squadrons reduced the combat effectiveness of Fighter Command and it is evident that more frequent patrols, involving only two squadrons, would have been more effective. This was a lesson drawn and learnt from the air cover by the officer in charge, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, and he applied that lesson during the Battle of Britain despite the vociferous advocation of larger formations from elsewhere in Fighter Command.
Following the move to larger formations there were only two clear days of weather for the Luftwaffe to launch full scale attacks. On the first day, 29 May, the evacuation suffered heavily and the Royal Navy temporarily suspended the use of its modern destroyers — a decision which based on the lift capacity of remaining ships would have left over 100,000 men to be captured. On the second day of clear weather, 1 June, daylight evacuations were suspended. One defence of the RAF’s air cover is that German artillery fire west of Dunkirk was at least as responsible for that decision. A detailed review of the decision behind the suspension indicates this is entirely false.
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@sailingtoatlantisandliveab2455 Slavery wasn't despite what appears to be your conviction, solely British. Moreover, you will not find a 'colony' where the existing population, or any part of it, was deported as slave labour. The bulk of slaves transported by British ships were acquired from local tribal leaders in West Africa (a handy way of getting rid of the excess population, or of useless mouths captured in battle from other tribes) or from the long established Arab slave traders who had been active in the area for generations. The trade was organised by private companies from most European countries, not by the British or English governments, and the British government, in the form of the Royal Navy, were by far the most active in supressing it after 1833.
Bengal, by the way, had already been conquered by the Mughals in the 16th century, and the collapse of the Mughal Empire left Bengal in a state of virtual anarchy. I presume that you have no objection to one Indian power subjugating another, by the way? Would you, perhaps, like a list of known famines in India in pre-British times, or do these not count in your world view?
I cannot really comment on events in America after the end of the War of Independence, except to ask how they can be relevant to the British Empire. Moreover, it borders on the infantile to seek to apply 21st century values to events over 200 years ago. Why not condemn Antoninus Pius for not introducing a Health Service into the Roman Empire in 140 AD, or Hammurabi for not devising old age pensions in 1800 BC?
In conclusion, has it ever occurred to you that the British Empire, uniquely in history, was the only one voluntarily given up by the 'masters' or, equally uniquely, that most of those former 'colonies' have maintained close relationships with Britain since independence?
Don't both to reply, as I have no such further intention.
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I recall being told by my parents that Harold Wilson visited Preston in 1964 and made speeches to the workers at Warton, Preston, & Samlesbury, stating that TSR2 was safe in his hands. As a result, in a desperately tight election, one of the two Preston seats which had previously been Tory, Preston South, changed hands.
Within weeks, the jigs on which the TSR2s were being built were broken up, on Harold's orders. The British then paid the US in order to purchase their F111, and then paid them again in order to cancel the purchase.
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@2adamast You only seem to refer to the British retreating. What were the much larger French forces in the area doing? From 20 May, by the way, the operations of Allied forces were being supervised by Weygand, although no one told Gort that Gamelin had been replaced until 23rd.
Weygand devised a plan for the BEF to move south on Amiens, to take station on the French left. At the time, seven of Gort's divisions were in action on the Escaut, and could not disengage without being followed up. Instead, Gort planned an attack around Arras, which was to have been supported by the French Cavalry Corps, and two divisions of French V Corps southwards from Douai. Most of this support did not materialise, and the attack, after initial success, was called off. The (impracticable) Weygand Plan was called off at the meeting between Gort & Blanchard on the morning of 26 May, when the arrangements for a joint withdrawal were determined. At the time, of 128 miles of the Allied front, 97 miles were held by the BEF. The Gort-Blanchard plan intended to reduce the 128 miles by 58 miles, although the imminent collapse of the Belgian army, was feared.
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@thosdot6497 My mistake for a typing error. I should have put 1 not 12 April, as the figures were those which applied to the RNAS on the last day it existed.
On 1 April, 1918, the RFC had 4000 combat aircraft. On 1 September, 1939 the RAF had 2600. A contraction of 35% On 1 April 1918, the RNAS had 2949 combat aircraft, on 1 September, 1939, the FAA had 232 aircraft of all types. A contraction of 92%. You did ask.
The unedifying spectacle of inter-service rivalry in the 1920s and 1930s is distressing in view of what happened as a result. Both the Navy & the RAF were fighting over a declining defence budget, with the result that, as someone once wrote, 'The RAF spent most of the funding on bombers (which, according to the Air Ministry fantasists, would 'always get through.' These people saw Douhet's theories as a means of justifying their existence, after all), some on fighters, a few spare quid on Coastal Command, and the contents of Trenchard's jacket pocket after a night out at his club on the Fleet Air Arm.'
The United States seemed to manage very well in WW2 with an Army Air Force, a Naval Air Service, and Marine Corps, all independent of each other.
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Why is trying to avoid mass slaughter 'cowardice?' The Munich agreement was enormously popular in France and Britain, where the civilian population (presumably, in your gung ho view, oddly) were quite keen on not having their menfolk killed in large numbers once again. Just out of interest, by the way, the first Spitfires entered service in August, 1938 and, whether you like it or not, the Agreement gave British an extra year in which to re-arm. Would you like a list of the warships which were commissioned, launched, or ordered during that period?
I'm sure you find it easy to condemn people from your comfy chair, 85 years after the event.
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