Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@daveofyorkshire301 Actually, my information comes from, among others, 'Whitehall Histories: Naval Staff Histories. The Evacuation from Dunkirk..'
The Naval Staff Histories were in the Public Record Office for some time prior to being published from 2000 onwards. They contain around 220 pages of detailed accounts, statistics, and analyses of the evacuation on a day by day basis, and list every vessel which took part, together with the number of men they lifted, and the fates of vessels which were lost.
Edward & Mary, by the way, was not part of the flotilla, at least according to the Naval Staff History and to The Association of Dunkirk Little Ships. She, along with several other Hastings-based fishing boats, and the Hastings lifeboat 'Cyril & Lilian Bishop' went to Dover, but only the lifeboat was actually used. 'Cyril & Lilian Bishop' was under the command of Acting Petty Officer W.H. Adkin during the evacuation.
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No, Operation Sealion was wargamed in 1974 at Sandhurst, the senior commanders being experienced WW2 commanders such as, on the German side, Galland & Ruge.
In order to allow some level of fighting on land, the Germans were (falsely) given a landing window of opportunity when the actual dispositions of the Royal Navy were artificially adjusted, moving them further away than had been the reality.
The result? The German first wave landed on 22 September, at dawn. Two days later, the RN anti-invasion forces arrived (17 cruisers and 57 destroyers, with smaller support vessels, which was actually reasonably accurate), annihilating German transports in the Channel. The last pockets of German resistance, out of ammunition and supplies, surrendered on 28 September.
Apart from the fact that the RN anti-invasions forces were, in the main, based at the Nore, Portsmouth, & Plymouth, rather than further away as in the game, no-one seriously quibbled about the result.
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@jonathanwilliams1065 But the new French Government was to be headed by two enthusiastic collaborationalists, Petain & Laval. I doubt that Darlan, with his concern about the honneur of the French navy, would have agreed to the surrender of the French fleet to Germany or Italy, but he was not irreplacable.
Moreover, the British concern was not that it be surrendered to the Germans, as they had no immediate means of manning it, but that French ships, with French crews, would appear in the Channel under orders from the Petain/Laval government to operate in support of a German invasion attempt on Britain. Put simply, it was not a risk the British government were willing to take. Interestingly, when FDR heard of Mers, he remarked that, had Britain been in the same position as France, he hoped that he would have taken similar action against the Royal Navy.
The scuttling of French ships at Toulon in late November 1942 is hardly relevant. By then, the war situation had changed beyond recognition, and the eventual defeat of Germany by the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union was becoming apparent. That certainly was not the case in July, 1940.
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Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
Sorry, I know this doesn't meet the required agenda.
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Not without the Distant Covering force, which might have been too far away to intervene. That said, the scatter order based on inadequate information was a mistake. What was right for an Altantic convoy scattering to avoid a lone raider, with no U-boats in contact and far from enemy aircraft, was wrong for a convoy threatened by, potentially, a whole task force, supported by U-boats and aircraft. My view is that the convoy should have stayed united, and Hamilton's cruisers sent in support.
However, I have, as we all do, the considerable benefit of hindsight.
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@chernobylcat1791 Douhet was a theorist who, basically, argued that bombing civilians would bring about civil unrest. The population would rise up against their government, and a new government would agree to an armistice. It was, of course, nonsense, in that it didn't work against the British or the Germans when it was actually tried, but the British Air Ministry 'Bomber Barons' Goering, and le May, all believed in the theory.
One area where it did work, albeit unintentionally, was that it obliged the Germans to retain a large proportion of their air force for home defence, and to keep many anti-aircraft guns around their cities when they were desperately needed on the battlefield.
You mistake me. I haven't said that I believe it to be a 'good idea' but I do believe it to have been an inevitable one. If you wish to degrade your enemy's industrial capacity, you must destroy his factories, and the workforce in the factories is civilian.
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