Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Timeline - World History Documentaries"
channel.
-
138
-
24
-
20
-
18
-
11
-
11
-
@maade9642 How is it, then, that in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship bigger than a light cruiser? Moreover, how is it that the Luftwaffe failed so badly at Dunkirk. In point, of fact, in 1940 the Luftwaffe hadn't had any training at all in anti-shipping techniques, as the bombers were seen as providing close support for the army.
S-Boats? Do you know how many the Kriegsmarine had in commission in September, 1940? Thirteen. They were intermittently effective against East Coast convoys, but successes again warships were few and far between.
U- Boats? Not in the Channel. The Kriegsmarine sent three into it in late 1939. They, and their unfortunate crews, are still there. Indeed, in September 1940, the Kriegsmarine had a total of 27 operational boats, of which only 13 on average were at sea on any one day. You are aware, I assume, that U-boats spent the whole of the war trying to avoid destroyers? Actively seeking them out was likely to result in disaster.
Your scenario is only effective if you either ignore or don't know the historical facts.
10
-
10
-
10
-
9
-
9
-
9
-
8
-
7
-
@rjpunkin The Royal Navy withdrew the H, I, & J classes on the 29th. But promptly returned them on the 30th. The Royal Navy sent 41 destroyers to Dunkirk. Four were lost to air attack. Of those damaged ( more by grounding and collision than air attack) almost all were repaired and back in service within two weeks.
If Stukas would sink every ship within range, why didn't they at Dunkirk? Why did Oskar Dinort, commander of Stuka-Geschwader 2, write about the immense difficulties his aircraft experienced in attacking destroyers at sea, and why did Wolfram von Richthofen, commander of Fliegerkorps VIII, tell his superiors that providing air cover over the proposed landing areas was totally beyond the capabilities of his command?
Perhaps, instead of sagely informing people of the mighty deeds the Luftwaffe 'would have' achieved, Sealion enthusiasts should be required to read up on what the Luftwaffe at the time did, or more relevantly, did not, achieve, and what the people in command thought of their real prospects
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
6
-
@georgekaragiannakis6637 Firstly, the Royal Navy based the Home Fleet at Rosyth, and didn't intend to use it against any attempted invasion, because the Admiralty had already place around 70 light cruisers and destroyers, and some 500 smaller warships, within 5 hours' steaming of the Straits. Battleships, heavy cruisers, and carriers are really not suitable for use against towed barges.
Secondly, Prince of Wales & Repulse were sunk by torpedo aircraft. The Luftwaffe in 1940 had no torpedo aircraft, other than a small number of slow seaplanes based in Norway, and used to attack merchantmen.
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
Either of the Nelsons and King George V could have gone 'one on one' as you simplistically put it, with Bismarck. They all had much superior armour and weights of broadside.
That, however, is irrelevant. When you have superiority of numbers, you take advantage of it. It is called Force Concentration. The US Navy demonstrated something similar, equally effectively, at Leyte Gulf. Incidentally, Bismarck was sunk by two battleships, supported by two heavy cruisers. You don't know much about the Royal Navy of WW2, do you?
Still, if you want fairness, go and watch a game of tennis. Fairness doesn't apply in war.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
Crete is indeed an excellent example. The Royal Navy was ordered to prevent German and Italian reinforcements reaching Crete by sea. The axis sent two convoys. The first, heading for Maleme, was annihilated by a RN squadron. The second, heading for Heraklion, turned back to avoid a similar fate. The result? No reinforcements reached Crete by sea until Wavell had ordered an evacuation, at which point Cunningham transferred his ships to ports on the south of the island.
In point of fact, no British warship heavier than a light cruiser was sunk by the Luftwaffe in the whole of WW2. Furthermore, in terms of Sealion, by September 1940, the Luftwaffe had had no training whatsoever in anti-shipping techniques. You comment that 'In my opinion the Stuka would have had a field day.' Would you care to explain , then, how it was that they didn't have such a field day during the Dunkirk evacuation? Indeed, why two of their own senior commanders, Oskar Dinort and Wolfram von Richthoven, stated, at the time, that protecting German invasion barges was beyond the capabilities of the Luftwaffe?
In September, 1940, the Luftwaffe did not even have torpedo bombers and could not provide any protection for the invasion barges at night. As the Royal Navy had around 70 cruisers & destroyers within 5 hours' steaming of Dover, backed up by around 500 smaller warships, what defences against these ships was available to protect the barges during the eleven days (and nights) that the Kriegsmarine estimated was necessary to land the first wave of troops. Without, of course, most of their motorised transport & their divisional artillery?
Finally, aren't you aware that the aircraft carrier never attained the importance in the war against Germany that it did in the Pacific?
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
you mean that Churchill was responsible for the failure of the Government of Bengal to admit how serious the crisis was, or for the hoarding by speculators of foodstuffs, or for the loss of food imports from Malaya, or for FDR's refusal to allow transfer of allied merchant shipping?
You do know that Churchill took food distribution out of the hands of the Bengal administration and gave to the Anglo-Indian army, or that he diverted grain shipments from Australia to India? No, of course you don't, because it doesn't fit your prejudiced agenda.
Churchill was certainly guilty of not realising that the Bengal administration were making light of the situation as it developed. Obviously, he should have done. After all, it is not that, in 1943, he had anything else on his mind, is it?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Piorun (formerly HMS Nerissa) was armed with six 4.7 inch guns, one 4 inch gun, and five torpedoes. On the night of 26-7 May, 1941, she accompanied Captain Vian's 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Cossack, Sikh, Maori & Zulu) in attacks on the already crippled Bismarck. Your hint that Piorun might have fired the torpedo which wrecked Bismarck's stern simply won't wash, by the way, as the damage was inflicted by an 18 inch aerial torpedo dropped by a Fairey Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal earlier in the day. This is known for certain.
Vian's destroyers or, at least, four of them, carried out a series of torpedo attacks on Bismarck, which scored no hits, but the constant worrying tactics of the British helped wear down the morale of the Germans and deepened the fatigue of an already exhausted crew.
Piorun, however, failed to use her torpedoes. Instead, her captain chose to exchange gunnery salvoes. Neither side scored any hits, and Piorun subsequently lost contact
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@markjones336 Yes, I do. It seems that you don't. India was largely self-administered with a tiny number of British civil-servants, and a small British element within the Anglo-Indian army. The princely states remained largely self-governing, and I doubt the average Indian ever saw a European, except in the major cities. If British rule was so brutal, why did 2.5 Million Indian volunteer for the Allied armies in WW2, when conscription was never attempted there, because it was never needed.
I don't propose arguing about this on a place by place basis, but suggest that you try to get the 'British Empire bad' fixation out of your head, and understand that 'Empire' whether British, French, German, or anyone else's, is a rather more complex and nuanced concept.
4
-
J Calhoun Not really. In 1917 Admiral Holtzendorff estimated that, in order to starve Britain of supplies, U-boats needed to sink British/Allied shipping at a rate of 600,000 tons per month. Karl Doenitz worked on the same calculation.
By December, 1941, the most the U-boat arm had managed was 363,267 in October, 1940, and 362,268 in May, 1941. The average for the last six months of 1941 was 125,088 tons per month.
With the entry of the United States' Mercantile Marine to the war, from January, 1942, Doenitz raised the monthly target to 800,000 tons (which, given the mass production techniques introduced to US shipyards, was an under estimation in any case), and, of course, the Germans never came close, but the reality is that, up to December, 1941, they had never come close to the necessary figure, certainly nowhere as close as they did in 1917.
4