Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Timeline - World History Documentaries"
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Repulse & Prince of Wales were sunk by torpedo aircraft. In 1940, apart from a tiny number of seaplanes based in Norway, the Luftwaffe didn't have any torpedo aircraft. Moreover, the Luftwaffe hadn't trained in operations against warships, and were far from proficient at it. As a result, the Luftwaffe failed badly at Dunkirk. In September, 1940, the RN had around 70 destroyers and cruisers within 5 hours' steaming of the Straits, backed up by around 500 smaller warships. Moreover, the first wave of the invasion was estimated, by the Kriegsmarine, to require eleven days. The Luftwaffe could not operate at night, the RN could. What happens to the unprotected barges every night?
I always find the 'would have' comments of Sealion fans fascinating, by the way, when they pontificate sagely about the tremendous deeds that the Luftwaffe 'would have' achieved had Sealion been attempted, but are at a loss to explain the numerous failures of that same Luftwaffe in operations which actually took place.
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Apart from Tirpitz, you mean? Oh, and Graf Spee, if you consider her to be a battleship, that is.
It is very difficult to sink ships which never, or rarely, emerged from port, such as the High Seas Fleet after June, 1916, or the WW2 German surface fleet after mid 1941.
Perhaps you might address an alternative question? Why did the High Seas Fleet make no attempt to challenge the British Blockade which reduced Germany to starvation and virtual anarchy in WW1 (I refer you to the 'Turnip Winter') and what contribution did the Kreigsmarine's surface fleet make to the German war effort in the last four years of WW2?
I don't think the British were too worried about the German surface fleet in WW2, when they were busy sinking 454 of the 808 U-boats lost during the failed German attacks on Allied shipping known as the Battle of the Atlantic.
Still rankles, after all this time, I observe.
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@ikashibimauler If there is another lesson learned from WW2 it is that air power was not the force in 1940 that it subsequently came to be. If it had been, why did the Luftwaffe fail so badly at Dunkirk?
Of course, aircraft carriers were important in the Pacific from 1942, but they never attained anything like the same importance in the west. Indeed, in terms of Sealion, your point is irrelevant, as aircraft carriers played no part. Furthermore, your general point does not take into account the fact that the Luftwaffe of 1940 was a tactical air force intended to provide support for the army, and had been neither trained to operate against ships, nor expected so to do. Certainly, by early 1941, the Luftwaffe had become more proficient in anti-shipping operations, but early 1941 is not September, 1940.
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@Nate-uf4xk Really? Why didn't the Luftwaffe do precisely that at Dunkirk, then? 41 RN destroyers, stopped close to the shoreline or moving slowly in restricted waters, crowded with troops and unable to manoeuvre. Sitting ducks, except that during the whole operation, the Luftwaffe managed to sink just 4. Why should anyone believe that, three months later, that same Luftwaffe would be able to sink with ease those same destroyers, this time moving at at least 25 knots and able to take avoiding action? The commanders of the dive bomber units, Oskar Dinort & Wolfram von Richthoven, didn't think they could, and surely they were in a position to know.
I enjoy reading posts from Sealion enthusiasts. Always full of what the mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' done during Sealion, but rarely able to explain why, in the actual events of 1940, they didn't even come close.
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