Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Timeline - World History Documentaries" channel.

  1. 1
  2. 1
  3. 1
  4. 1
  5. 1
  6. 1
  7. 1
  8. 1
  9. 1
  10. 1
  11. 1
  12. 1
  13.  @tonyjames5444  Well, I am a full-time historian, so you might consider reading my view. Firstly, the Norwegian campaign demonstrated two things. The first was that air power could influence a land campaign in a manner that sea power could not. The second was that air power could inconvenience naval operations but couldn't, in 1940 at least, prevent them. As Stephen Roskill wrote of Norway 'It is very far from being a triumph of air power over sea power. In spite of the total absence of air cover, short nights, and perfect weather, I do not think any essential sea or landing operation has not come off. And escort vessels, solitary & stationary in fjords, have been constantly maintained.' Secondly, dive bombers did not 'play havoc' with coastal convoys. Certainly one CW8, suffered 8 losses from a combination of S boats & Stukas, on 25/26 July. These convoys, from Southend to St. Helens Roads, comprised small colliers and coasters, moving very slowly. Between 1940 & 1944 there were 531 convoys (both CW & CE, the same route in reverse), involving 9097 ships. In total, 31 ships were sunk, not all in convoy & not all by air attack. Similarly, of FN & FS (River Thames to Firth of Forth) there were 3584 convoys, involving 104,792 ships, of which 203 were sunk by a combination of factors. In other words 0.34% of the CW/CE traffic, and 0.19% of the FN/FS traffic. Havoc? Thirdly, the Mediterranean. By January, 1941, the Luftwaffe, belatedly, had realised the need for training in anti-shipping operations. Even so, the Royal Navy was still able to prevent reinforcements reaching Crete by sea in May, destroying one convoy and forcing a second one to turn back. Fourthly, the Russian fleet, usually immobile in harbour, is not relevant.
    1
  14. 1
  15. 1
  16. 1
  17. 1
  18. 1
  19. 1
  20. 1
  21. 1
  22. 1
  23. 1
  24. 1
  25. 1
  26. 1
  27. By August, 1940, the British had sent a troop convoy to North Africa, where the British were operating A9, A10, A13, and Mark VI tanks, all British built. The first US tanks in North Africa were M3s (Stuarts) which did not arrive until late November, 1941. 'What makes you think the Germans could not have put U-boats in the channel?' They did. In late 1939 three Type IIs were sent there. Their wrecks, still encasing the corpses of their crews, are still there. The Channel was heavily mined, heavily patrolled, shallow, and subjected to strong tides and currents. In short, a death trap for your typical WW2 submersible. Repulse & Prince of Wales were sunk by aircrews highly trained in anti-shipping techniques, operating advanced high performance torpedo bombers. The Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti shipping operations, and didn't even have a suitable torpedo bomber unti mid 1942. U-boats, even in June-October, 1940, the period when the RN had withdrawn most of their anti-submarine vessels to form their anti-invasion flotillas, were not sinking merchant shipping 'left & right'. The German calculation was that it would be necessary to sink 600,000 tons per month to defeat Britain, based on von Holtzendorff's WW1 estimate. The actual figures for these months of the first 'Happy Time' were :- June 356937, July 197878, August 287136, September 284577, October 363267. In other words, only in one month did the U-boats achieved over 50% of their supposed target. In fact, in the whole of the war, the target was achieved only three time, in May 1942 (616835), June 1942 (636926), & November 1942 (802,160). Moreover, at the time of the invasion threat, the Germans simply had too few operational boats to have a decisive impact. In August & September 1940 there were 27, of which 13 were at sea, on average, per day. Octobers average was 12, Novembers 11, and Decembers 10. January 1941 saw a reduction to 8. As a number of these boats were small Type II 'canoes' unsuited to Atlantic operations, the Germans colud never hope to approach von Holtzendorff's target. Certainly, even at the height of the German campaign, it never remotely approached the successes of the unrestricted warfare of 1917.
    1
  28. 1
  29. 1
  30. 1
  31. 1
  32. 1
  33. 1
  34. The Luftwaffe didn't do well against easier 'can't miss' targets at Dunkirk. In fact, in the whole of the war, it sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Shore Batteries? By the end of August, 1940, there were 150 medium, heavy, and super heavy guns lining the Channel coast. In the whole of the war, these damaged seven British merchantmen, but sank none. Between August & December, 1940, 1,880 rounds were fired at Channel convoys, with no hits at all. On 29 September, the monitor HMS Erebus shelled Calais. As she withdrew, she came under fire from the great Griz Nez guns, without result. On 10/11 October, the battleship HMS Revenge shelled barge concentrations in Cherbourg. Shore batteries fired at her for 90 minutes, again without result. U-Boats? In WW2, the German U-boat fleet took great pains to avoid close encounters with escorts. Now you suggest that they should deliberately seek them out? In fact, the Germans sent three U-Boats, U12, U16, & U40, into the Channel to operate against British shipping in late 1939. Their wrecks are still there. Your reference to Prince of Wales and Repulse fails to acknowledge that both were sunk by high performance torpedo bombers flown by highly trained crews. When did the Luftwaffe acquire torpedo bombers? Actually, mid 1942. In 1940 the Luftwaffe had had no training in anti-shipping techniques, and was, according to senior commanders such as Oskar Dinort & Wolfram von Richthofen, incapable of protecting the invasion, given that by September, 1940, the RN had 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours of the Straits of Dover, with 500 or so smaller warships in immediate support. Don't worry about the Home Guard, as the most they might have needed to do was to help bedraggled survivors from sunken barges into PoW cages. Sorry, to be so brutal, but there are a number of books from which you might have gleaned this information.
    1
  35. 1
  36. 1
  37. 1
  38. 1
  39. 1
  40. 1
  41. 1
  42. 1
  43. 1
  44. 1
  45. 1
  46. 1
  47. 1
  48. 1
  49. 1
  50. 1