Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Timeline - World History Documentaries"
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@221b-l3t Your post denying about diverting from the subject, this one :-
'doveton sturdee I'm not trying to divert from anything. Those are munitions aren't they? Why did you not specify that those don't count? It was a coal dust explosion and basically everyone agrees on that. What even is your point if you don't count the munitions manifested? Some secret explosives?'
Doesn't seem to have appeared on here. My original post, by the way, read:-
'Nothing has been found in subsequent explorations of the wreck which was not on the official manifest. This did, by the way, include small arms ammunition, but nothing larger.'
I did, therefore, refer to the small arms ammunition at the outset. My point, therefore, is that you diverted from the issue with your false claim about Ballard, presumably assuming that I hadn't read a book which I actually bought in 1996.
My points are, therefore :-
1). Nothing has been found in Lusitania which was not manifested.
2). Therefore, there were no explosive items aboard which might have contributed to her sinking, as rifle bullets do not explode, and they were both manifested, and permitted by US authorities.
3). You still haven't provided a source concerning Ballard apparently finding munitions.
4). In terms of German Rules of Engagement in place at the time, i.e., unrestricted submarine warfare, Lusitania, like every British or Allied ship, was a legitimate target.
5). The sinking was almost certainly accelerated by explosion of coal dust in an empty bunker.
6). Apart from the unsubstantiated claim about secret 'munitions' I actually agree with you.
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These would be the same bombers which failed to prevent the evacuation from Dunkirk, which had neither training nor experience in operating against warships at sea, and whose own commanders said that preventing the Royal Navy destroying a seaborne evacuation was beyond their ability, I suppose?
Indeed, you could ask the Fallschirmjagers. Or, at least the half division who had survived the battles in the Low Countries, and were all that was available in September, 1940. At the same time, you could ask them how they expected to cram into the 226 operational German transport aircraft which were all that were around at the end of August, 1940.
Maybe, going forward into May, 1941, you could ask about the two convoys sent by the Germans with ground troops to reinforce the Crete landings. The convoy for Heraklion turned back to Greece after the convoy for Maleme was annihilated by the Royal Navy.
Isn't it interesting how, in the 'would be' or 'would have' fantasy world of Sealion enthusiasts, the poor old Royal Navy is always destroyed by the Luftwaffe? Odd that even the most cursory reading about events which actually did happen rather demonstrates how improbable this interpretation really is.
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'If the Germans had gained aerial superiority they would have had ALL the 11 group airfields and a quick march into LONDON.' Wherever did you get that remarkable idea from? Air superiority over South Eastern England would have given the Germans no such thing. It would simply have forced Fighter Command to withdraw to 12 Group bases north of the Thames in order to re-group. Without troops on the ground, the Germans could not make any use at all of 11 Group airfields, and to get troops on the ground, there would need to be a successful invasion, which would require German troops, in their towed barges, getting past the huge Royal Navy presence in Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Nore.
Good luck, by the way, trying to harass the RN with the one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, dozen or so operational destroyers and Wolf/Mowe class torpedo boats, and similar number of S boats available to the Kriegsmarine at the time. The RN had around 70 or so light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of the Channel, without even mentioning the Home Fleet's battleships, battlecruisers, heavy and light cruisers, most of which were at Rosyth. Or the further 50 or so destroyers also in Home Waters.
'Southern Ireland would have been helping the Germans. The Americans would NOT have had a cat in hell's chance as the U.K. would have been SHUT.' The Republic would have done nothing of the sort. Ireland simply wished to remain neutral, which was an optimistic ambition in the unlikely event of Sealion succeeding. The United States was neutral, and would remain so until dragged into the war in December, 1941.
'In reality immediately post the B.o.B. it was the R.A.F.'s under manned and ill equipped Bomber Command that went on the OFFENSIVE as the R.N was spread across the WORLD.' Bomber Command was, actually, better equipped for a strategic role than the largely tactical Luftwaffe ever was, and where did you get that idea about the dispositions of the Royal Navy, which was actually largely concentrated, apart from the Mediterranean Fleet, in Home Waters.
'So now just imagine North Africa would have been under German control with access to ALL the Oil Fields, a quick cruise over to South America where the Germans already had their contacts and supporters.' Utter fantasy. The Germans did not even arrive in North Africa until late February, 1941, and only then as a holding force after the shattering Italian defeat that was Operation Compass. Historically, the Italians and Germans struggled to maintain the smallish forces that they actually managed to send to North Africa, as control of the Mediterranean remained in British hands throughout.
Oh, and the Marshall Plan only came into being in 1948!
I fear that your 'would haves' are simply fantasy. Would you like a few books about the realities of the Battle of Britain and Operation Sealion to be recommended to you?
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In September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had 27 operational boats, of which half were Type IIs, coastal vessels incapable of operating in the Atlantic.
The Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping techniques, as their failure at Dunkirk effectively demonstrated. They did not even acquire an effective torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Indeed, in the whole of WW2, they sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN ship larger than a light cruiser.
Moreover, what, in this context, does 'victory' even mean? Given the fact that Luftwaffe fighters were very short-legged, probably nothing more than superiority over the south-eastern corner of Britain, as Fighter Command withdrew to bases north of the Thames to reequip. At the time, of course, the British were outbuilding the Germans in aircraft, & especially in fighters. How would such a situation affect the Battle of the Atlantic in the slightest?
The first Liberty Ship was SS Patrick Henry, only launched in late September, 1941. By which time, of course, Operation Barbarossa had commenced.
'Would haves' especially ones based on false premises such as yours, actually count for nothing.
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@iridescentprism5113 I prefer to believe the evidence from the time.
No, it isn't possible to keep such a secret. Moreover, you haven't explained why the British should deliberately engineer such a situation.
Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
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@Crashed131963 It has the Germans in control of the sky. Which, of course, they also had when the Luftwaffe failed at Dunkirk. Sinking of Repulse & Prince of Wales proves precisely nothing, in that both were sunk by torpedo bombers. The Luftwaffe didn't even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid-1942. Even their own commanders, Dinort & von Richtofen, thought that protecting the invasion barges was beyond them, and said so at the time.
In the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN ship larger than a light cruiser. The RN had, in September, 1940, over 110 destroyers in Home Waters, backed up by several light cruisers and around 500 smaller warships.
The Luftwaffe of 1940 really, in terms of anti-shipping capability, did not compare with the Fleet Air Arm, and to put them on a par with the American & Japanese naval air arms at Midway (over 18 months later, by the way) is like putting a Panzer II and a Tiger II on the same level, on the grounds that they were both tanks!
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The Germans were never remotely able to gain air superiority over Britain. The best they could ever hope for was a measure of superiority over the South-Eastern corner. They might then have been in a position to attempt their suicidal Operation Sealion. This superiority would be temporary at best, as the British were outbuilding the Germans in aircraft, and especially in fighters, from June 1940 onwards.
By the way, the RAF had little relevance to the protection of convoys, incoming or outgoing, until mid 1943, when a small number of VLR Liberators were made available to Coastal Command. The Air Ministry consistently refused to release long range four engined bombers for the same task.
The Royal Navy fought the convoys through, and in any case, in September1940 the Wolf Pack concept hardly existed, given that, on any one day, only an average of 13 U-Boats were at sea, half of which were short range Type IIs unsuitable for Atlantic operations. At no time in WW2 were convoy losses anywhere near large enough to suggest that Britain was anywhere near being starved of supplies. Certainly, the situation never came anywhere near that of 1917.
Do you seriously think that the small tactical bombers available in comparatively small numbers to the Luftwaffe could have inflicted anything like the damage that the thousands of large British & American strategic bombers subsequently did?
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Incorrect. The Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping techniques, hence the poor performance at Dunkirk. It did not even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Nor could it operate at night, when the Royal Navy could.
In fact, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. In September, 1940, the RN had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers within five hours steaming of the Dover Straits, a further 500 or so smaller warships in immediate support, and a further 40 or so destroyers in Home Waters.
As to 'Britain only regrouped many years later.' Actually, Britain regrouped very quickly. In August, Britain had regrouped to the extent that a large troop convoy, including a complete armoured division, was sent to North Africa.
Sealion believers always talk about what the mighty Luftwaffe 'would have' done, but rarely bother to look at the actual facts of 1940.
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