Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Timeline - World History Documentaries"
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Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda.
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@Damadchef Yes, it would, but without the arrival of more heavily armed ground troops, the survival of unsupported, lightly armed, paratroopers for any length of time was doubtful. Even by May, 1941, the number of German paratroopers was still, at 9,000, well short of a single division.
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The Battle of Britain was an attempt to secure air superiority over the Channel and the South Eastern corner of Britain, in order to make possible a, probably disastrous, invasion attempt. The British sought to prevent this, and succeeded. Victory in war involves achieving your objective. The British did, and the Germans didn't. That is the definition of 'Victory.'
Ranting on about chemical warfare, especially chemical warfare which never actually happened, rather suggests that you need to remove 'Considered' from your title. As, of course, does the phrase ' the war criminal Winston Churchill.'
The allies did not use chemical warfare in WW2. The Germans, of course, did, although 'only' against civilians in their Concentration Camps.
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@evanlavery9788 Actually, in September, 1940, to all intents, it was.
In Home Waters, there were 64 destroyers attached to anti-invasion duties, 23 destroyers with the Home Fleet, and 29 on escort duties but recallable within 24 hours. There were a further 11 destroyers at Freetown and 8 at Gibraltar. You can add to these several hundred smaller warships (sloops, corvettes, minesweepers, gunboats, and auxiliaries, etc), and 8 light cruisers. I haven't listed heavier ships, such as heavy cruisers, battlecruisers, battleships, and aircraft carriers, because the Admiralty didn't anticipate that these would be needed. Mind you, they really didn't expect to need to call in the Home Fleet or convoy escort destroyers, either.
The aircraft which were going to destroy these ships from the air. Would these be the same ones which had just failed to destroy many of the same ships when they were much easier targets at Dunkirk, largely because the Luftwaffe had had no training in anti-shipping operations?
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@wimziekman1104 Where does Waterloo come into this? Why would I write about a battle of 1805 when referring to events of 1940?
Why not simply prove to me that Lend-Lease begain before 11 March, 1941, then? I look forward to you trying to do that.
However, about Waterloo. English, Scottish, Welsh & Irish were 'British' in 1805, by the way.
The army was 36% British — although the British provided half of all the cavalry and artillery, but proportionately less of the infantry. Another 10% was the King’s German Legion, which was a unit of the British Army, equipped and paid by the British, but manned by German refugees from Napoleon’s conquest of their homeland.
35% was from small German states (Hanover, Nassau, and Brunswick — note that the King of the UK was also himself the Elector of Hanover, and the brother-in-law of the Duke of Brunswick), and 19% from the Kingdom of the Netherlands (which at that point included Belgium).
Broken down, there were 53,850 infantry, 13,350 cavalry, 5,000 artillerymen with 157 guns, and 1,000 miscellaneous.
You might be wise to print this off and keep it.
Indeed, if you ceased posting ill-informed nonsense and read a few books, you might perhaps learn enough to make yourself able to produce sensible comments. Given your efforts to date, however, this might take a little time.
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The Italian navy had enough problems already with the British Mediterranean Fleet. The Kriegsmarine had very few operational boats at the time, and they were neither able to inflict anything like the level of sinkings required to impose a successful blockade, nor likely to be able to achieve much against the massed anti-invasion forces the RN had established in Home Waters. Generally, U-Boats sought to avoid contact with destroyers, sloops, or corvettes. Actively seeking them out might well have been a recipe for disaster.
At the time, the operational German surface fleet consisted of a heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and about eight destroyers. In the unlikely event (given Darlan's genuine concern about the 'honneur' of the French navy) that the French was sent to support a seaborne invasion, the probable British response was likely to have been sending the full strength of the Home Fleet down from Rosyth & Scapa Flow. Four capital ships, seven cruisers, and twenty four destroyers were more than capable of dealing with the collection of heavy cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers, without capital ship support, that the French had outside the Mediterranean at that time.
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@jackrosario9990 Try again. In December, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy had 10 Battleships, 10 Carriers of all types, 38 Cruisers, 112 Destroyers, and 65 Submarines. Compared to the Royal Navy of December, 1941, rather small. Certainly, compared to the Allied navies combined, tiny.
Oh, and the 50 destroyers were not part of Lend Lease.
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