Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Possible History"
channel.
-
The first challenge would have been the German inability to land meaningful forces in the first place. When your enemy has around 70 destroyers and light cruisers based within 5 hours steaming of Dover, as evidenced by the RN Pink List of 16 September, 1940, and can call up around 500 or so smaller warships, such as sloops, corvettes, fleet & auxiliary minesweepers, gunboats, torpedo boats & armed trawlers in support, then trying to land troops from converted river & canal barges, towed by tugs and trawlers at little more than walking pace, and almost unescorted, is really not a good idea.
42
-
9
-
8
-
7
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
The skill of the German leadership in the early months of the war was demonstrated by their army commanders. The navy was a different matter. It had been badly mauled during the Norwegian campaign, and by September 1940 was reduced to one operational heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven operational destroyers, a similar number of Wolf/Mowe class torpedo boats, around 27 operational U-boats and 13 S boats.
Moreover, the German navy had no assault craft, and was hoping that troops could be conveyed across the Channel in converted barges towed by tugs. All the British had to stop these were 70 destroyers & light cruisers based within five hours steaming of Dover, supported by around 500 smaller warships!
Do you seriously think that the Germans could plan and execute in two months something it took the Royal & US Navies almost two years to organise? Really?
As to Evans, Tsouras, & Macksey, if you think that they represent serious historians, you need to think again.
4
-
@blick5815 'Thats good, now talk about the German aircraft and their demonstrated effectiveness. Most of the British losses in the Norwegian campaign had been to aircraft and that was in open seas.' Actually, they weren't. The RN's losses off Norway were mainly to surface action, being HMS Glorious, HMS Ardent, & HMS Acasta to Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, HMS Glowworm sunk by Hipper, HMS Hunter & HMS Hardy, both sunk by surface action at Narvik. In addition, HMS Effingham was wrecked on rocks. RN losses to air attack were one AA cruiser (HMS Curlew), one destroyer (HMS Afridi), and one sloop (HMS Bittern). Two French & Polish destroyers were also lost to air attack.
The facts of the comparatively small number of RN destroyer losses to German air attack might annoy you, but, nevertheless, they are facts. Please feel free to check them.
'In the confined area of the English Channel AirPower would have have provided a decisive advantage. That is considering that the British themselves refused to send warships into the channel for that very reason.'
You mean, presumably, apart from the regular RN destroyer patrols from Plymouth and the Nore, often accompanied by a light cruiser or two, which sailed the Channel in both directions throughout the period of the invasion threat, I assume. Often actually pausing to shell invasion ports when there were targets of opportunity. Certainly, the RN never intended to use their heavy ships, on the grounds that 3 inch, 4 inch, 4.7 inch, and 6 inch guns were far more effective than 8 inch, 15 inch, or 16 inch guns against barges. Each destroyer, by the way, carried around 600 such shells.
'In the confined area of the English Channel AirPower would have have provided a decisive advantage.' Really? Then what happened, or rather didn't, at Dunkirk. The allied ships were stopped, or moving at slow speed in restricted waters with decks and below decks crowded with troops. Exactly how was that less advantageous than many of those same ships, moving at speed with full freedom to manoeuvre, when they sortied to engage the barge trains? Look up Oskar Dinort, one of the commanders of one of the Ju87 units involved, and read what he said about the difficulty of hitting destroyers at sea. Off Calais on 25 May, when his unit of 40 aircraft failed to achieve a single hit on a Destroyer flotilla. Or Wolfram von Richtofen, commander of Fliegerkorps VIII ( the Ju87 force) who told any of his superiors who would listen that protecting the invasion was beyond the capabilities of his force/
Five hours steaming is hardly a long way when the German Navy required a minimum of two days to extracate the barges from their harbours, form them up into cumbersome box formations, and then send them, largely unescorted, into the Channel. You should read a proper historian, Peter Shenk, 'Operation Sealion - Te Invasion of England 1940' for details of the German preparation and planning, from the German viewpoint, before commenting from ignorance.
'They just did not want to and operationally were tired having achieved more in 8 months than any other army in history.' Again, read what Schenk wrote, and learn about exactly how much effort the Germans put in to their planning and preparation.
'Significant indication that a negotiated settlement could have ended the fighting, this is long before the days of Illregular warfare.' Don't be a fool. Haven't you heard of the Guerillas of the Peninsular War, the Boers during the Second Boer War, or the Spanish Civil War? Incidentally, by September, 1940, there were 34.5 operational divisions in Britain.
'You’re dismissal of Evans, Tsouras & MacKsey appears to put you into that catagory.' I dismiss them because I have read them. It seems that you have read little else and, unlike you, I have a vast amount of archive material and actual, accurate, historical facts at my disposal.
I really would like to spend further time educating you myself, but instead I would be happy to recommend a few books to you which might be of assistance in dismantling your fantasy.
4
-
4
-
4
-
@palious13 The best that the Luftwaffe might have managed was forcing Fighter Command to temporarily withdraw to bases north of London. The British had been outbuilding the Germans in aircraft, and especially in fighters, since June 1940. In the event of an invasion attempt, Fighter Command would have returned.
Moreover, it wouldn't really have mattered. The Luftwaffe at Dunkirk failed badly. Four of forty-one British destroyers were sunk by air attack, and all but three of the damaged ships had returned to duty within three weeks.
As to concentrating on civilian ships and transports, of 45 personnel ships, nine were sunk, of 40 schuits, one was sunk, of 21 cargo & hospital ships, four were sunk. Your reference to over 200 allied ships sunk is simply wrong. The actual total was 235, of which 72 were lost to enemy action. Of these, 18 were small vessels, such as tugs and barges, whilst 135 were 'little ships' simply abandoned at the end of the evacuation.
The German coastal batteries actulally totalled over 150 medium, heavy, and super heavy guns by the end of August. These fired at British coastal convoys for the rest of the war. No British or Allied freighters were sunk, no allied freighters were damaged, and seven British freighters (totalling 8,000 tons) were damaged. On 29 September, the old Monitor HMS Erebus shelled Calais. She was capable of only around 8 knots. The guns at Gris Nez fired on her, but missed.
On 11/12 October, the battleships Revenge, supported by seven destroyers and six gunboats shelled Cherbourg, firing some 500x 4.7 inch and 120 x 15 inch shells. The Cherbourg batteries fired at the force, but again hit nothing.
If you think that those same guns were likely to hit destroyers and cruisers steaming at 30+ knots, think again.
THe few U-boats were not held back. In fact in September 1940 the Germans had only 27 operational boats, of which only 13 were at sea on any one day. You should read the actual statistics before claiming that anything was 'held back.'
Which 'fast torpedo boats?' There were 13 operational in September, 1940.
What Kriegsmarine? In September, 1940, the German navy consisted, in terms ofd operational warships, one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, seven Wolf/Mowe escort destroyers, and around a dozen minesweepers. Good luck trying to close the Channel with those when, excluding the heavies of the Home Fleet at Rosyth, the RN had 70 or so destroyers and light cruisers within five hours steaming of Dover, and around 500 or so auxiliary warships available in immediate support.
'Sea mines' Which Sea mines?
By the way, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
'Everything you have' in German terms was virtually nothing, whatever you might do in your 'game.'
4
-
@palious13 As I tried to explain to you, the worst that would have happened to Fighter Command would have been the temporary withdrawal of 11 Group to bases north of the Thames. In an emergency such as an attempted invasion, they would, together with 12 Group, return.
Similarly, it was not vital anyway, where any invasion was concerned, as the Luftwaffe's ability to hit ships at sea was low, as Luftwaffe commanders such as Wolfram von Richtofen and Oskar Dinort both stated, at the time. Moreover, the Luftwaffe could not operate in support of any attempted invasion at night, whilst the Royal Navy could certainly operate against it.
'And my statement of over 200 sunk was not wrong. You yourself said 235, which is more than 200.' Good to see that the efforts of your maths. teacher were not wasted. Don''t you understand the information I gave you earlier, about the actual losses? that 135 of the losses were abandoned 'little ships' such as Thames barges, motor launches, etc? Vessels of no relevance at all to anu future defence of Britain? I am sorry to confuse you with mere facts, but the RN Pink List of 16 September, 1940, effectively the RN's order of battle, shows, of destroyers alone, 64 in anti-invasion ports, 8 on escort duties, 21 in escort ports, and 23 with the Home Fleet. That does not include, of course, a further 8 light cruisers in anti-invasion ports, the more than 500 smaller vessels in the area, and nor does it include the battleship, battlecruisers, and heavy cruiser of the Home Fleet, which were largely based in Rosyth, as the Admiralty did not believe their intervention would be necessary.
'I dont think those guns are likely to hit cruisers or destroyers, but shells will be landing amongst the ships causing disruption.' Oh dear! Those guns couldn't hit small coasters and colliers moving through the Channel at 8 to 10 knots in straight lines, but could 'distrupt' destroyers and cruisers moving at 30+ knots on zig-zig courses. Nonsense.
'Actually, in September, 1940, there were over 80 E-boats in operation. And with these ships had already proved their use at Dunkirk sinking 2 destroyers.' Absolute nonsense. Up to 1 September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had commissioned 37 S boats. 1 was an experimental prototype, and 4 had been sold to Spain before the war.
By mid September, a futher 5 had been rebuilt as fast anti-submarine boats, 1 scrapped due to extensive storm damage, and 1 decommissioned due to her poor mechanical condition.
3 had been sunk in action, and a further 2 (S28 & S55) were still working up and not yet allocated to flotillas. 1 had been damaged by a mine on 28 August and was under repair, and 3 were repairing from collision damage. A further 3 had received bomb damage in Ostend on 8 September.
As your Maths. teacher taught you well, calculate the number for yourself, and then compare it with Kriegsmarine records from the period, which identify the following boats as operational in late September :-
S11, S12, S13, S18, S19, S20, S22, S 25, S27, S30, S31, S34, & S54.
You are, of course, perfectly free to prove me wrong. Or to try to do so.
'And when I said I threw everything I had, that means U-Boats also.' Which U-Boats? Presumably the 27 Frontboote which were all that were available in September, 1940, of which on average 13 were at sea on any one day? You seem utterly unaware of how dangerous the Channel is for U-Boats. In October, 1939, three Type IIs, U12, U16, & U40, were sent to operate there. All three were sunk within days. Moreover, U-boats throughout WW2 generally sought to avoid contact with destroyers. Now you suggest that they should actively seek them out? Good luck with that. Such boats were not called 'Iron Coffins' by their own crews without reason.
'The planes of the Luftwaffe, with the exception of the FW-200 Condor and the HE-111, were not good anti-ship planes. German bombs simply weren't designed for antiship warfare.' The Condor was useful on occasion against unarmed merchantmen, but attacks ceased as such ships received defensive armament. There were very few FW200s, and they were simply too valuabe as maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The problem with the other two engined German medium bombers was not the aircraft themselves, but the lack of training, at least until the end of 1940, of their crews in anti shipping techniques. Moreover, the lack of a torpedo bomber, until mid 1942, might have been something of a disadvantage, don't you think?
Oh, and why sahould there be a need for a specidic anti-shipping bomb in any case? You are simply inventing excuses for failure.
'Hitler didn't understand naval matters. If he did, he would have been using his light forces and aircraft to whittle away at the British fleet during the phony war and he would have had a completely different naval building plan. I have gone to great lengths to educate you in the reasons why that was not possible.
If I were you, I would stick to your games, and leave accurate analysis to academics & historians.
4
-
4
-
3
-
The Luftwaffe tried, and failed, to destroy Fighter Command.
What German naval forces?
How would the Germans get significant ground forces to the Middle East.
Far from rebelling, 2.5 million Indians joined the Allied forces, without conscription. The Indians knew all about Japanese behaviour in China, and especially about the rape of Nanking.
'England' (I assume you mean 'Great Britain'? and France did not go to war to protect Poland. The agreement was simply that, if Germany invaded Poland, they would declare war on Germany. Which, of course, they did.
No-one 'gave' Poland to the Soviet Union. The Red Army simply occupied it as the Germans were driven out. After years of praising Genial Joe and his gallant lads, do you really think that British & Canadian politicians could have convinced their populations that a new war against the Soviets was justified?
I see that you exclude the United States from your criticism. Do you think that either FDR or Harry Truman thought a war against the Soviet Union over Poland was a good idea, either?
3
-
The Royal Navy's heavy ships (battleships, battlecruisers, and heavy cruisers) were mainly based at Rosyth, rather than Scapa Flow. From there, they could intercept any German heavy ships seeking to support Sealion, whilst still being able to move against a potential sortie into the Atlantic.
In mid September, 1940, the Royal Navy had some 70 destroyers and light cruisers within 5 hours steaming of the Straits of Dover, supported by some 500 other smaller warships.
In the battle of Crete, the task of the RN was to prevent axis reinforcements landing by sea. The Germans sent two convoys. The first, for Maleme, was largely annihilated, whilst the second, for Heraklion, turned back to Greece to avoid the same fate.
'They (the RN) were run out of the channel twice in 1940 by air attacks.' Really? When? The Luftwaffe failed to prevent the RN undertaking Dynamo successfully, and RN destroyers patrolled the Channel almost daily during the period of the invasion threat, from the Nore & Portsmouth.
'Any counterattack would be a week at the eariest and with few tanks and weak aged artillery.' In fact, the army had been re-equipped to such an extent that, by September, 1940, there were 34.5 active divisions in Britain. So confident was the British Government that a large troop convoy, including three armoured brigades with full supporting artillery, had been sent to North Africa in mid August, 1940.
I fear that your 'would haves' dissolve into irrelevance in the face of actual, historical, facts.
3
-
@brucewilson77 Nonsense. The Royal Navy's Pink List (in effect, the order of battle) for 16 September, 1940, shows some 70 destroyers and light cruisers within five hours of Dover. As an example, there were 24 destroyers and two light cruisers at the Nore, and 16 destroyers with one light cruiser Portsmouth, as well as 16 destroyers and two light cruisers in Plymouth.
'Germans would have had almost two full days to do whatever they wanted.' No, they would not.
'The British will run out of the channel on two separate occasions during this period and that was before they would have gotten the full attention of the Luftwaffe.' I asked you earlier for details of this, without response.
In fact, you have simply blindly repeated your first post, without even attempting to try to justify it.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
'Just a scenario to think about.' But not a credible one. The Luftwaffe of 1940 was untrained in anti-shipping operations, hence the failure at Dunkirk. By September, 1940, the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers stationed within 5 hours steaming of Dover, with around 500 or so smaller warships in support, without involving the heavier ships of the Home Fleet based at Scapa & Rosyth, or even the 40 or so other destroyers in Home Waters. In fact, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Yet you seriously believe that they could 'obliterate' the Royal Navy in a few days? I suggest you read up on precisely how large the RN of 1940 really was.
The RN prevented any Axis reinforcements reaching Crete by sea, annihilating one convoy which tried, and the losses off Malaya were caused by torpedo bombers, which the Luftwaffe lacked until mid 1942, or strong naval forces which, again, the Germans totally lacked.
At Dunkirk, the '240 ships' is, frankly, nonsensical. The losses involved, overwhelmingly, small boats simply abandoned at the end of the operation. In fact, of 235 vessels recorded as lost, 169 were small ships, of which 151 were abandoned, rather than lost due to enemy action.
In terms of losses to larger vessel, the total figures, including French and Belgian vessels, were as follows. The first figure is ships involved, and the bracketed one ships lost:-
Cruisers 1 (0)
Destroyers & Torpedo Boats 56 (9)
Sloops. patrol Vessels, & Gunboats 15 (1)
Corvettes 11 (0)
Minesweepers, Trawlers, & Drifters 268 (28)
Special Service Vessels, Boarding Vessels, & MTBs 15 (0)
Schuits & Yachts 67 (2)
Personnel Vessels, Hospital Ships, & cargo Ships 66 (13)
So, unless you hide behind meaningless totals, the hugely successful operation was executed without serious hindrance by the Luftwaffe. For reference, in September, 1940, the Royal Navy had 182 destroyers on strength, compared to the number of 193 on 3 September, 1939.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
You have already received a more than adequate reply, but please consider one simple fact. In early September, 1940, the Luftwaffe's order of battle listed around 220 operational transport aircraft. Do you seriously believe that large land forces could be maintained by such a small number of aircraft?
You can, by the way, forget the idea of a 700,000 strong 'motorised' army. The actual forces planned for the First Wave consisted of elements of nine divisions, all infantry or mountain, without their mechanised transport oand much of their divisional artillery. In reality, what might be called 'the first wave of the First Wave' consisted of around 6,700 men from each division.
Assuming, of course, that this first wave, in their towed barges, managed to evade the 70 or so cruisers and destroyers, supported by around 500 smaller warships, which comprised the forces the Admiralty had allocated to their anti-invasion forces, that is.
'4 tank armies includes 2000 tanks.' As a great British military strategist, George Mainwaring, often said, 'I think we are entering the realms of fantasy here.'
3
-
@websystema 'I still think, that Sea Lion in 1941 was more realistic for nazis.' Then you haven't read the sources. To give one simple example. By May, 1941, the RAF had 56 fighter & fighter bomber squadrons based in SE England, carrying out regular sweeps over northern France. In fact, the British had been outproducing the Germans in aircraft, and particularly in fighter aircraft, since June 1940.
As to warship production, the British, supported by Canada, had vastly greater resources where shipyards were concerned, and by late 1940 and early 1941 these were churning out destroyers, corvettes, and sloops in large numbers. Certainly, the Germans had access to Belgian, Dutch, and French yards, but how many warships did these actually build? None. Czechoslovakia was useless, for the obvious reason that it was landlocked, which is something of a problem where shipyards are concerned.
It really doesn't matter how huge the German army might have been, as it was never remotely able to cross an English Channel totally dominated by the Royal Navy.
3
-
A 'redoubled' U-boat effort? When, on any one day in September, 1940, the Germans had only 13 boats at sea?
'Sinking Royal Navy ships in the Channel?' Like the Luftwaffe did, or actually didn't, at Dunkirk?
By September, 1940, the RN was already concentrated in the Mediterranean and Home Waters in any case. There were already over 100 destroyers in Home Wates alone, of which over 60 were based within 5 hours steaming of Dover, supported by several light cruisers, and around 500 auxiliary warships.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@mystikmind2005 'Effective against the Navy?' Like at Dunkirk, when it totally failed to prevent the evacuation, despite the ships being either stopped, or moving slowly in restricted waters whilst hampered by the number of troops aboard?
Or, not even having a torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Out of interest, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Churchill's 'fight them on the beaches' was simply a device to raise British morale and to 'stiffen the sinews' after the collapse of France. As Ed Murrow said of Churchill, "He mobilized the English language and sent it into battle."
Churchill's real assessment of the situation can be more accurately demonstrated by the Apology convoy, which took reinforcements to North Africa, and enabled General O'Connor to carry out Operation Compass, the total defeat of Italian forces in Libya. The convoy included half of the total number of operational Matilda II tanks, the best British tank at the time,, in the British arsenal.
When did it sail? 22 August, 1940, less that three weeks after the Churchill speech, when the outcome of the Battle of Britain, according to conventional wisdom, was on a knife-edge, and a potential invasion imminent.
2
-
2
-
2