Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Armchair Historian"
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Simply not true. The famous 'Halt Order' was issued by von Rundstedt. It can still be read in the Army Group war diary, should you so choose. Goering had already told Hitler that the annihilation of the Dunkirk pocket was a 'special job for the Luftwaffe' which, of course, then proceeded to demonstrate a remarkable inability to hit ships, even when slow moving or even anchored.
The decision to evacuate was only made by the British War Office on 25 May, and the evacuation was completed on 4 June, the last lift being of French troops, of whom around 139,000 were lifted, so please explain how the troops could possibly have been on the beaches for two weeks.
What is your source for 'British officers ripped of their badges as they were being shot at by the squaddies?' Presumably, it is made up, like the rest of your post.
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@tot0m You haven't heard of the Battle of Arras then? Oh well. You don't know about the air support the British did provide. The problem was that, however many squadrons the British sent, the French asked for more.
You don't know how many ships of each nationality were at Dunkirk. Oh well. British, of all types, from cruisers to small vessels, 764. French of all types from destroyers to MFVs, 120, Belgian 45 trawlers, Polish, 1 destroyer, Norwegian, 1 freighter, Dutch, 1 yacht and 1 (British manned) motor boat. The agreement was that French ships would evacuate French troops, and British ships British troops. When it became clear that there were not enough French ships, the British began taking French troops as well. The rearguard, by the way, included both British & French troops. The British subsequently attempted to land troops in Cherbourg, only to be told by General Weygand that the French army was no longer capable of organised resistance.
As to France and Belgian being puppets to British diplomacy since 1934, in point of fact France was the dominant military power in the Anglo-French alliance, and Belgian sought to remain neutral, for all the good it did the Belgians. France was the driving force behind the support for Poland.
As to the attacks on the French fleet. The British government had no idea how the new, collaborationist, government in France might behave, and had no intention of risking allowing the French fleet to support a German invasion attempt. What subsequently happened in late 1942, when the outlook for the war was markedly different, was irrelevant to what might have happened in Summer 1940.
Please do some reading instead of simply posting blind prejudice, for heaven's sake!
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Peter Exactly where do you get your nonsense from? Admiral Scheer was, in effect, a heavy cruiser. Capable of 26 knots, with 6 x 11 inch guns, and an armoured belt of 2.4 - 3.1 inches. By comparison, the North Carolinas were capable of 28 knots, had 9 x 16 inch guns, and belts of 12 inches. The King George Vs were capable of 27.5 knots, had 10 x 14 inch guns, and belts of 14 inches. Please explain why Scheer was superior to either.
Of the four 'proper' German battleships, Bismarck was sunk by surface gunfire, Scharnhorst was sunk by surface gunfire, Gneisenau was crippled by mines, further damaged by bombing in port, and then scuttled, and Tirpitz stayed at the end of a fjord until sunk by bombing, largely because she was hidden so far out of sight that warships couldn't get near her.
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@rosesprog1722 Whether Hitler expressed admiration for the British Empire on not is utterly irrelevant. The reality is that, if he wanted the British to agree to an armistice, he was more likely to achieve this aim with the BEF in prison camps than safely evacuated.
As it appears you don't know what the 'Miracle of the Marne' in WW1 was, I won't bother explaining it. You do understand that von Rundstedt was waiting for German infantry, almost entirely horse drawn, to catch up and, if necessary, complete the defeat of the allied troops in the pocket, I suppose?
You might believe that the final conquest of France was inevitable, with the benefit of hindsight, Von Rundstedt, and, indeed, many German generals at the time, did not have this advantage. Von Rundstedt, like every other German commander, was a land animal, and saw an army with back to the sea as trapped. The British, by contrast, saw the sea as a broad highway. In his mind, there was no need to waste his armoured vehicles in such an action.
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Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda.
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That must explain why there were no British troops in North Africa, Tunisia, Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Burma or Malaya then, as well as no British ships in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Arctic, and the Pacific then?
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@tomk3732 Oh well. It is clear you have no idea about what Operation Peking was about. Read up on the Romanian Bridgehead. It was hoped by the Polish government, or, more precisely, by Smigly- Rydz, that Polish forces could hold out in the southeast of the country, near the common border with Romania, until relieved by a Franco-British offensive. Munitions and arms could be delivered from the west via Romanian ports and railways. The Polish Navy would then be able to escort the ships delivering the supplies to Romanian ports. There was never going to be British military support for Poland, other than by air or at sea. How could there be, when the British army was only ten divisions in all. Moreover, the Polish government were well aware of this. You would need to ask a French historian why their 100+ divisions failed to act. The Polish destroyers which took part in Operation Peking became part of the Royal Navy when their own country ceased to exist, just as Polish airmen and soldiers became part of the RAF & the British army, but if you believe that their primary ambition when they arrived in Britain was to defend Britain you are sadly deluded. They fought throughout for Poland, and with, of course, justification. The British, by continuing to resist, gave them the opportunity (and the weapons) to do this.
Incidentally, you wrote initially that 'Before operation MG Polish commander told his British superiors that this is madness.' You are wrong, because he said that about an earlier plan, Operation Comet, and the same comments had been expressed already by several British commanders. He was, in fact, much less critical of Market-Garden. You really should take no notice of 'A Bridge Too Far,' as much of it is inaccurate.
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