Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Historigraph"
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Not correct. Dudley Pound, who made the wrong decision to scatter the convoy, was in the early stages of a brain tumour which first paralysed and then killed him, but he didn't resign until September, 1943.
As to 'from that day forward US Navy warships escorted American cargo ships to allied countries under American Command' I presume you are, in view of this statement, unaware of the fact that there were twenty-three Arctic outward bound convoys after PQ 17, all with Royal Navy escorts. These convoys included at least 348 US flagged nerchantmen.
Furthermore, from late 1942, there were eleven Atlantic Escort Groups protecting SC, HX, & ON convoys. Six groups were British, four Canadian, and one American, which consisted of a mixture of British, Canadian, and (two) American warships. After the two American coastguard cutters were withdrawn from this Group, it was redesignated as a Canadian group.
By Mid 1943, there were seven British groups, and five Canadian ones. There were no American groups operating in support of SC, HX, & ON convoys.
Would you care to re-consider your earlier claim?
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@joegatt2306 'I re-consulted the book and discovered that I missed out totally the tables on pages 349 and 352!' I rather thought that you had.
Actually, statistics can be twisted to suggest whatever someone wishes them to say.
In point of fact, the stats. are as follows :-
Rounds Hits %
BCS 1 & BCS 2 1469 21 1.43
BCS 3 373 16 4.29
BS 5 1099 29 2.64
BS 1, BS 2 & BS 4 1593 57 3.58
Total 4534 123 2.71
1st Scouting Group 1670 67 4.01
1st, 2nd, & 3rd Battle Squadrons 1927 57 2.96
Total 3597 124 3.44
The inference from this is that the Rosyth based BCS 1 & 2, which had not had any opportunity for regular gunnery practice, and had a commander who was foolish enough to regard rate of fire as more important than accuracy, dragged down the efficiency of British gunnery statistics to a remarkable. Especially when the figures for Hood's BCS 3, which had been transferred to Scapa Flow precisely for exercises are viewed, as they suggest what a properly trained Battlecruiser Fleet might have achieved.
In terms of the main fleets, the Grand Fleet & the High Seas Fleet, the three RN Battle Squadrons demonstrated themselves markedly superior to Scheer's Fleet.
No wonder, then, that Scheer reported to Kaiser Bill that the HSF should not be risked in such a manner again, and that unrestricted submarine warfare was the only way forward. However, catastrophic that eventually turned out for the All Highest and his Empire.
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@LordZontar You appear to think that I believe that Sealion was possible. I don't and never have. Indeed, my book on the subject was rather well received when published a few years ago. In short, I am certain that an attempt had no hope of success.
However, that does not mean anyone went through the motions. In point of fact the military archives at Freiburg detail a number of exercises carried out in 1940 involving loading troops onto barges, putting a short distance out to sea, and carrying out landings. The barges, by the way, were capable of withstanding normal Channel conditions. They, and their tugs, could not have withstood what the resources available to the Admiralty would have sent against them.
Would you like me to provide you with a list of the dates of the meetings held between Hitler and the naval and army staffs during the period, or details of the reports from Generals Busch & Strauss, of 9th & 16th Armies, that their preparations were complete, which reached Hitler on 13 September? Hitler, in response to a request from Raeder that the attempt be deferred until 8 or 24 October, when the moon & tides were favourable, informed him that a decision would be made on 17 September, which left open the possibility of D-Day being 27 September.
By 15 September, the transports were in position, and the troops of 9th & 16th armies ready to board. By then, von Richthofen, of Fliegerkorps VIII, had openly voiced his doubts, which supported those of Raeder. Coincidentally, on 14/15, 15/16, and 16/17 September, the regular RN destroyer patrols from Portsmouth & the Nore inspected the coastal barge ports as usual, and, with storms in the Channel on 17 September, Sealion was indefinitely postponed.
You don't need to try to lecture me on the shortcomings of the planning, or of the extreme improbability of success, but there is nothing, at least until mid-September at the earliest, in any German archive to suggest that it was merely a bluff.
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@senakaweeraratna741 Of course they were. Are you entirely ignorant of allied naval strategy? Clearly you are. The Royal Navy concentrated in the west, and defensively in the Indian Ocean, thus leaving the US navy to operate almost exclusively in the Pacific.
The British lost, in terms of significant warships, two cruisers and one small carrier in the Indian Ocean. If you think that represents 'The pride of the Royal Navy' then you are very ill-informed.
'The Imperial Japanese Army defeated the British Army in Burma, Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, Papua new guinea among others.' I urge you to read up on Operation U-Go. 55,000 Japanese casualties, greater than the massive US victories in the Pacific. The British were never in New Guinea. The Japanese there were defeated there by Australian & American troops.
'Japan had support throughout Asia as a fellow Asian country.' Yes, it must have been delightful to be beheaded by a fellow Asian.
Are you aware of the fact that 2.5 million Indians volunteered to serve with the allies in WW2?
Indeed, are you actually aware of much at all?
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@trumbettier Clearly, your need to resort to obscenities (or, rather, the same obscenity. Couldn't you at least think up a few others?) demonstrates the true validity of your argument, but, more in hope than anticipation, I feel I should ask you, if the British did not save Malta, where the five merchantmen which reached Malta with 32000 tons of supplies came from? Likewise, where did the November convoy, MW13 (Stoneage) come from?
Furthermore, I doubt there was anything in the Atlantic Charter which surprised Churchill, largely because he helped to compose it. I agree, there were aspects to it which he certainly didn't like, but equally the same comment could be applied to FDR.
Yes, the British Empire was largely history by 1960. All empires are transient, whether they be Roman, Spanish, or British. Indeed, historians of the future will probably identify the immediate past as the time when the United States began to decline in prestige and authority, with the rise of the next great world power, China.
Your post, by the way, rather reeks of hubris. You should be aware that generally follows is nemesis.
Odd that you should suggest that the British hadn't learned the importance of air power by mid 1942, when they were clearly well aware of it in 1940. They certainly understood it in 1944, when two thirds of the 11600 aircraft at D-Day were British. Mind you, so were 892 of 1213 warships, two thirds of the troops who landed (British & Canadian,) and 3261 of the 4127 landing craft were British manned. Furthermore, whilst the Supreme Commander was American, the heads of the three armed services were all British, and the naval landings were planned by a British Admiral, Bertram Ramsay.
One final thing. How did Churchill 'bait' Germany between the wars when he held no political office of any kind between 1929 & September, 1939?
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@trumbettier Brisbane Star did nothing of the sort. She had been damaged and could only make 8 knots, and her captain, Frederick Riley, concluded that she could not reach Malta on 13 August without protection, especially since she had been spotted by a Sicily based Sm79. Consequently, he took his ship into French territorial waters and the aircraft, obeying the rules of war, did not attack.
At 1000, Brisbane Star began receiving signals from the Vichy authorities at Hammamet, but ignored them. Around 1700 a Vichy patrol boat appeared and Brisbane Star was boarded by two officials, who insisted that she should be interned. After some discussion, and liberal doses of whiskey, the officials left, boarding their patrol boat, taking a badly injured crewman with them, and even signalling 'Bon Voyage.' Riley kept Brisbane Star behind a series of shoals and sandbars well inshore until nightfall, before continuing on his course for Malta, where she arrived at 1530 on 14 August, a gaping hole in her bows notwithstanding. For most of the last day, she was actually protected by Beaufighters, until she came within range of Malta's Spitfires, by the way.
Riley never at any time sought succour from French authorities. He made a considerable effort to avoid being interned, and his ship was capable of far more than 3 knots. It looks like you have been reading wikipedia, rather than a proper account of Pedestal written by a professional historian, of which there are several available. Even wikipedia does not suggest that Riley sought help from the French. That, presumably, is the bit you invented all by yourself.
You are therefore, utterly wrong in your facile comments.
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