Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Historigraph"
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@trumbettier My opinion on David Irving, and my views on Brexit, are irrelevant to Pedestal. Buchanan's book might well appeal to those who have a superficial, at best, knowledge of the facts, and/or have existing prejudices which they seek to reinforce. I really don't care what you think about his work as that, also, is irrelevant to Pedestal.
By the way, you do know that Churchill held no political office between 1929 & September, 1939, do you? Whatever his own views, he had no influence at all on British governance during that period. In fact, he was widely regarded as a renegade, especially since he had crossed the floor of the house twice.
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@trumbettier I assume that, by 'intransigent comments' you mean indisputable facts which you don't like. Just for information, the Germans didn't start fitting turbines in their capital ships until the Kaisers of 1912. The British had been using turbines since Dreadnought. Furthermore, the last of the class, Prinzregent Luitpold, was supposed to have been fitted with a diesel engine driving her centre shaft, but never was. This also applied to the succeeding Konig class, which, likewise, were never fitted with the intended diesels and, indeed, resorted to partial coal firing, with 12 of 15 boilers being coal fired. Even the last two, German battleships, Baden & Bayern, had 11 of 14 boilers coal fired. No German battleship in WW1 had a diesel engine. Oh, and the 'enormous fire power' is interesting. I presume you mean the German 11 inch and 12 inch, as opposed to the feeble British 12 inch, 13.5 inch, & 15 inch. Only the last two German battleships, the Baden & Bayern, carried 15 inch guns, in comparison to the (entirely oil fired) Royal Sovereign & Queen Elizabeth classes (10 ships in all) of which the QEs were some four knots faster than the Badens.
By the way, the (oil fired) Bismarcks were hardly wonder weapons. Both had outmoded incremental armour, whereas every British capital ship since the Nelsons had adopted the Nevada type, vastly more effective, all-or-nothing system. Bismarck was able to sink a twenty year old, unmodernised, British battlecruiser, but was quickly reduced from a warship to a slowly sinking, helpless, target in about twenty minutes by HMS Rodney on 27 May, 1941. The other two WW2 German battleships, Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, were also oil fired, although the panzershiffs, often wrongly called pocket battleships, were diesel powered, but hardly formidable vessels, as their performance in WW2 clearly demonstrates.
There were no British capital ships reliant on coal in WW2, by the way.
If Churchill was 'able to stir and keep the drums of war beating' between the wars, he couldn't have been much good at it, given the appeasement policies followed by a series of British governments at the time, could he? He did consistently argue that a resurgent, re-arming, Germany, after 1933, was a threat to European stability. Was he wrong?
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RN bases were at the Nore (25 destroyers), Portsmouth (20 destroyers) and Plymouth (12 destroyers). Steaming at 20 knots, although even a 'Hunt' class could manage 25, and the rest were capable of 30+, this means that after receiving an invasion alert, boats from the Nore could reach Dover in 3.5 hours, from Portsmouth in 3.5 hours, and from Plymouth in 8 hours. Additionally, four light cruisers could accompany them.
As to mining the Channel, how would you suggest the Germans achieved that, with only seven converted freighters to use as minelayers? Certainly, the Germans did have an elaborate plan to undertake the laying of eleven mine barriers, which would commence nine days before Sealion was attempted. However, as the go-ahead was never given, neither did the minelaying commence. Probably just as well, as the Royal Navy carried out nightly destroyer patrols, and the effects of a 4.7 or 4 inch HE shell exploding on a laden mine deck could not be taken lightly.
Actually, the British mined the Channel heavily, sinking three U-Boats there as early as October, 1939.
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@koookeee By 'sanguine' I mean his confidence that the Germans could actually achieve a landing at all. The source for the losses suffered by the Maleme convoy which Forczyk uses is questionable (Vincent O'Hara) and the vast majority of other sources do not agrees. Park, 'The Battle for Crete' Annapolis Naval Institute Press, as an American example, for one. There are several others.
'A handful of old destroyers between Harwich and Portsmouth.' Which is why I referred to the Pink List of 16 September, 1940. This shows 16 destroyers and a light cruiser at Portsmouth, and 24 destroyers and two light cruisers at Sheerness (both ports were 3.5 hours from Dover at 20 knots, by the way). He seems to have forgotten Plymouth, as well, by the way, where there were 16 destroyers and two light cruisers. Mr. Forczyk, if he thought this represents 'a handful' must have had large hands. I would be happy to list every one of these vessels, by the way. I DO have the Pink List for 16 September, 1940.
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@koookeee As I understand it, Mr. Forzcyk questioned the ability of the RN to deal with convoys. I have simply corrected this misconception. As the earliest actions against axis convoys took place in the Mediterranean in early 1941, then upon what did Mr. Forzcyk base his claim?
Moreover, the Sealion vessels were actually towed barges, moving at little over walking pace, not convoys in any real sense at all. The Royal Navy by the way, was the best trained in the west in night operations. At the time, only the distant Japanese were their equals.
It appears that you prefer Mr. Forzcyk's alternative approach to that of most authors writing on the subject today. Fair enough, but please don't be so confident in his 'critical analysis,' as you describe it, when there are significant flaws in it.
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@koookeee The Royal Navy already carried out patrols of the Channel from both ends on a nightly basis, usually involving four destroyers from Plymouth and four from Sheerness. During the day, any concentration of barges heading into the Channel would actually be visible from Admiral Ramsay' headquarters at Dover Castle.
What German shipping did pass through the Channel at the time was usually comprised of small groups of ships keeping close to the French coast, and able to retire into any of the many ports in the event of any perceived threat. In point of fact, barge concentrations in French & Belgian ports only really began in early September. In September, the Royal Navy began attacks as opposed to patrols. Such attacks took place on 7/8 September (4 MTBs attacked shipping in Calais, supported by four destroyers from DF1 out of Portsmouth), 8/9 September ( 3 MTBs attacked a small group of ships near Ostend, before entering Ostend harbour and attacking shipping with torpedoes and machine guns, whilst 2 cruisers & 6 destroyers entered Boulogne & shelled the inner harbour, and four destroyers supported an attack by MTBs on Dunkirk harbour), 9/10 September (6 destroyers shelled Calais & Boulogne harbours, supporting attacks by 4 MTBs) 10/11 September (3 destroyers of DF 16 engaged and sank a number of tugs & barges off Ostend) 11/12 September (destroyers from Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Sheerness swept the coast from the mouth of the Meuse to Cherbourg, shelling shipping in several of the ports) 12/13 September ( 3 destroyers of DF 16 swept from Boulogne to Cap Gris Nez, but found nothing at sea) and 13/14 September ( the same destroyers of DF 16 sank or damaged a number of German patrol trawlers). That is a summary of the operations for the first half of September. I haven't listed patrols where nothing was detected.
Of the destroyers in Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Sheerness, there were 4 V&Ws at Plymouth, 4 V&Ws and old S class at Portsmouth, & 17 V&Ws at Sheerness. Of the remainder, the oldest were 3 ten years old B class, whilst 6 were brand new J/K class destroyers ( 6 x 4.7 inch guns, specifically moved to Plymouth to counter the German destroyers at Cherbourg) and the others six years old at most.
The V&Ws were mixed, by the way. Some, the Modified V & Ws, carried 4.7 inch mark 1 guns, capable of 5-6 rounds per minute, whilst the older V & Ws were fitted with 4 inch mark Vs. These, when introduced in 1918, did indeed have separate ammunition, but used fixed ammunition by 1939, and had rate of fire of 8-10 rounds per minute. Most V & Ws carried one or two x 0.5 inch pom poms, and a 3 inch AA gun (which could also be used as a low angle weapon) in place of one set of tubes.
I would agree that the old V & Ws were not suited to fight major fleet action by WW2, but in this case they were actually intended to be used against barges & tugs, where a rate of fire of 5 or 6 rounds per gun per minute for the modified V&Ws, and 8-10 rounds for the V&Ws, was probably more than adequate.
A pity Mr. Forczyk didn't do his research on the V & Ws (and the Scott and Shakespeare class leaders which accompanied them) as these are a particular interest of mine.
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Perhaps you should actually read what the terms of the Total Exclusion Zone were. They stated that any sea vessel or aircraft from any country entering the zone may be fired upon without further warning.
Rear Admiral Allara, who commanded the Belgrano Task Force, later said, "After that message of 23 April, the entire South Atlantic was an operational theatre for both sides. We, as professionals, said it was just too bad that we lost the Belgrano". The message of 23 April, of course, was the British declaration of the TEZ.
On the same day, a message was passed via the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentine government, that the British Government had determined that any Argentine ship or aircraft that was considered to pose a threat to British forces anywhere in the South Atlantic would be attacked.
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This was not the 'worst naval decision of WW2.' For that, simply look at Admiral King's refusal to set up a convoy system for the East Coast of the United States, despite being warned that, after the German declaration of war, U-boats were on their way, as part of Operation Paukenschlag. The result? Over 600 merchant ships, mainly American, sunk, and around 5,000 merchant seamen killed, often within sight of the (still fully lit) lights of the US coast.
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@nickdanger3802 Oddly, enough, it didn't. My research only uncovered real facts. Such as how the 'little help' against the Japanese involved the campaign in Burma, culminating in the defeat of the U-Go offensive and the 55,000 casualties suffered by the Japanese army during that one battle.
Or the fact that escorting North Atlantic supply convoys was almost entirely the responsibility of RN & RCN Escort Groups. From the winter of 1942, there were eleven Escort Groups responsible for SC, HX and ON convoys, of which six were British, four Canadian, and one American Look up 'Mid-Ocean Escort Force' and you will discover that, by the summer of 1943, United States Atlantic escorts had focused on the faster CU convoys and the UG convoys between Chesapeake Bay and the Mediterranean Sea; and only British and Canadian escorts remained on the HX, SC and ON convoys.
Specifically, there were seven British, four Canadian, and one US Escort Groups, (B1-B7, C1-C4, and A3), after the Britsh B5 group had returned from detached service. Even then, this is misleading, as A3 consisted of two US Coastguard Cutters and a number of Canadian corvettes. Indeed, when the cutters were detached, the Group became a fully Canadian one, renumbered C5.
The enormous contribution of US industry to the war effort has never been denied, but this fixation you and others seem to have for listing it is on a par with giving the credit for a Home Run to the bat, rather than the batter wielding it. Moreover, I notice that you neglect to refer to the range of technological advances which the British developed, and which were made available to their American allies. The trade, despite your evident fixation, was not one-sided.
You write as if the British Commonwealth and Empire were mere bystanders, gratefully accepting the noble generosity of US largesse. This odd insistence by some that only the United States played any relevant role in WW2 is an odd and strangely perplexing one. National pride is one thing, but not when it degenerates into one-eyed jingoism. I correspond with a number of American historians as part of what could perhaps be considered my 'day job.' Most of them are equally puzzled.
Oh, and how is any of this relevant to 'The Worst Naval Decision of WW2?'
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@Andy-ub3ub No you are totally missing the point. Your first post read 'If germany had invaded, Britain wouldve never gone to north africa.' However much you refuse to accept it, there were already British forces in North Africa before WW2 began. Why do you find this simple fact so difficult to grasp?
Your posts are riddled with 'would haves.' You assume that Germany had the resources to attempt an invasion (she didn't) and you assume no supplies 'would have' been sent to North Africa. Actually, supplies and reinforcements were being sent in August, 1940, when the possibility of an invasion attempt still existed.
Then you fantasise about convoys to Russia (only begun in August 1941), and Operation Pedestal (August, 1942). The British actually maintained Malta throughout the war. You might find it difficult to accept, but the British were fully aware of the importance of the middle eastern oilfields.
'Yes, the british army had escaped at dunkirk, but it had lost all of its heavy equipment.' Yet, by the time the Germans were even notionally able to attempt anything (September) the British had 34.5 operational divisions in the UK alone.
Had Sealion been attempted, and failed, the British could actually have been as well, if not better, placed to support the Soviet Union from June 1941.
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@larryclemens1850 Glorious, as the time of her last voyage, was being used as a ferry carrier. Of her usual 48 aircraft air group, she had left behind in Scotland all but 12 Sea Gladiators (802 Squadron) and 6 Swordfish ( part of 823 Squadron). Her role was to re-embark 263 Squadron's 10 RAF Gladiators from Norway. In the event, the commander of 46 Squadron, decided to try to save his 6 remaining Hurricanes by attempted to land them aboard Glorious. Ark Royal had a longer flight deck, but at the time was carrying her full air group, and Glorious' lifts were wider, which meant that the larger Hurricanes could be taken into the hangar.
Glorious' normal operations shouldn't have been compromised, although her only offensive capability was 6 Swordfish. These could have been kept at immediate readiness, or even ranged on the flight deck, ready for launch, but they weren't. Indeed, a survivor subsequently reported an 'end of term' atmosphere aboard Glorious, and that torpedo warheads were in the process of being removed and placed into secure storage.
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