Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Historigraph"
channel.
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Perhaps you are unaware that, at the time, Pound was suffering from a brain tumour which killed him less than 18 months later, and which almost certainly warped his judgement? Certainly, Cunningham would have left the decision to Hamilton and Broome, ther men on the spot, but for the actual response of the Royal Navy to Arctic Convoy defence, perhaps you should read about JW51B?
Or consider the statistics? Of 78 Arctic convoys, involving just over 1,400 merchantmen, 85 were lost. Or, in % terms, 6%. Perhaps the Royal Navy was getting something right?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Actually, it takes 23 hours for a destroyer to steam from Scapa Flow to Dover. HMS Codrington did precisely that earlier in the war. Not that this matters, firstly because the bulk of the Home Fleet was at Rosyth anyway, and secondly because by September 1940 the Admiralty had already positioned around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours' steaming of the Straits anyway, at bases such as Portsmouth/Southampton and the Nore. These were, by the way supported by around 500 smaller warships, such as fleet minesweepers, sloops, corvettes, gunboats, and armed trawlers.
If it takes 'five minutes to sink a battleship when you have air superiority' please reinforce this point by replying with details of which British battleship was sunk in such a manner by the Luftwaffe in WW2.
'People who think a landing was impossible are just imbeciles with zero idea of military matters and this opinion is a recent one not something taken seriously back then.' Oh? If this opinion is a recent one, why did Churchill send a troop convoy to North Africa, including three full armoured regiments, on 22 August, 1940, when myth would have us believe that Britain's fate was on a knife edge? Look up the 'Apology' convoy for yourself. Why, furthermore, did the C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes argue with Churchill & the Admiralty (correctly, in my assessment) that too much emphasis had been placed on naval anti-invasion resources, when many of the lighter vessels could have remained on convoy duty throughout, only being recalled when (if) they were needed? Being right isn't always wise, by the way, as Forbes found when he subsequently lost his job!
Right after the fall of France, on 20 June, by the way, Admiral Raeder, head of the Kreigsmarine, attended a meeting with Hitler, Keitel, & Jodl, informing them that his navy had no landing craft, but hoped to have assembled 45 seaworthy barges within a fortnight. I hope that your German assault were excellent long distance swimmers or, alternatively, had access to Montgolfier balloons!
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@ablethreefourbravo You should read 'Invasion of England, 1940' by the German author Peter Schenk, for full details of the German plan.
'It's a mistake to think the Germans would drive their boats straight to the beach and run directly into machine gun fire like we did.' True enough, because the German troops were to be landed from (mainly unpowered) barges, which were to be pushed slowly onto the landing beaches by small motor boats. Assuming, of course, that they could find a way past the RN anti-invasion forces in the first place.
You seem to have a charmingly naive idea that Sealion, or some form of alternative Sealion, would have been successful, without having the faintest idea about how it might overcome the vast number of problems it, in reality, faced.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
'Germany could afford to sustain vast losses of all kinds and still win a direct conflict with England. If the entire first wave of 150,000 men were lost it wouldn't mean anything.' Aside from the fact that the first wave was likely to have been around 60,000 men, I suggest that winning a war against and island when your own country has no fleet would be more than a little difficult.
Sealion was, at best, a one shot weapon, hamstrung by the inability of the Kriegsmarine to assemble sufficient barges.All 400 were to be committed to the first wave. Once they, or most of them, were lost, there could be no second attempt. The Admiralty had no intention of committing the heavy ships (battleships, battlecruisers, & heavy cruisers) to anti-invasion operations in any case, asd they deemed it unnecessary unless German heavy ships appeared.The only operational German heavy ship at the time, of course, was a single heavy cruiser.
'attacked by U-Boats and E-Boats and aircraft the whole time.' Oh dear. In September, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had 27 operational U-boats, of which 13 were at sea on any one day. The last attempt to operate any boats in the Channel had been in October 1939 when three Type IIs were sent there, and were promptly sunk. Moreover, U-boats in WW2 tried to avoid contact with destroyers or escorts. Now you suggest that they would actively seek them out? 'S Boats?' You presumably mean the 13 the Germans had in service in 1940?
'Aircraft?' The Luftwaffe had little experience of attacking shipping, hence their failure at Dunkirk. In the whole of WW2, they sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. They did not, by the way, even have an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942.
'And once the Germans had a foothold on the coast, they can recover downed pilots, put every airfield within 20 miles of the coast out of action, all the RADAR and early warning posts are gone.' The key word here is 'once.' When is that? After the loss of the first wave of tugs and barges, what is left? Plenty of barges, certainly, but nothing to tow them, and nothing to escort them.
'It's airpower and land power that decides the fight for the Germans.' No, it isn't. At least, not in 1940. Land power is irrelevant unless it can be magicked across the Channel, which it cannot. The Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce, intended to support advancing troops. It is more or less irrelevant when there are no troops to support.
I really wish you Sealion 'would haves' would do a little reading before pronouncing so apparently sagely about what your mighty Germans 'would have' done in 1940. Oddly, you then struggle to explain why they didn't (actually, couldn't) do it.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Actually, there was a reason, of sorts, for the seemingly pointless raid. As I recall reading quite recently :- 'The Japanese struck again on 9 April, sinking 23 ships in the Bay of Bengal. However, Japan did not want to invade Ceylon; the offensive was a defensive manoeuvre to raid the British forces and provide cover for their own troop reinforcements being sent to Rangoon by sea. As a result, the Japanese then withdrew and, for the most part, left India and the Indian Ocean alone for the rest of the war.'
So, the Japanese weren't going to invade Ceylon, but, in your mind, were going to invade Madagascar? Could you explain how, logistically, the Japanese could have executed and maintained such an operation? Again, I await with eager anticipation.
4
-
4
-
This would be the same Ernest King who refused to consider a convoy system off the US East Coast because convoys were a British idea, and Ernie was Anglophobic because apparently he had not been treated politely enough when, as a junior officer, he served with a US Battle Squadron attached to the Grand Fleet in WW1, would it?
How many US merchant seamen were lost just because Ernie didn't like Limeys?
Fortunately, the RN & RCN provided enough escorts to permit the establishment of a convoy system until US new construction arrived, but, seriously, for an opinion on the RN in WW2, Ernie is not the authority to pick.
One of his daughters said of him "he is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage." He even instituted the court-martial of Captain McVay of USS Indianapolis in 1945 because McVay's father had reprimanded him early in his career. To be fair to him, though, apparently he detested the US army almost as much as he detested the British!
4
-
@julianmarsh8384 Actually, if you had bothered to read a German historian, Peter Schenk ('Invasion of England, 1940 - The Planning of Operation Sealion) you could have answered your own questions.
The landings between Folkestone & New Romney involved 150 barges from Dunkirk and 50 from Ostend. These had to be towed out of the ports in pairs, and formed up into a cumbersome box formation. This was a particularly difficult task where Dunkirk was concerned, as the harbour facilities had been largely destroyed during Dynamo.
Those between Rye & Hasting required a further 200 barges from Calais, which again needed to be extricated from the port and formed up, but this time in full view of observers at Dover.
Those for Bexhill & Eastbourne involved 330 barges from Boulogne & a further 50 from Le Havre.
The final force, in 300 motor boats, was to sail from Le Havre to Beachy Head & Brighton.
You ask how long? From the first barge leaving Boulogne harbour, forming up, being towed to, and arriving at, Folkestone/New Romney, the Kriegsmarine estimated three days. The other barge convoys required two days. The barges were to be towed in pairs, at approximately five to six knots.
'The Germam Air Force would have had a field day' You mean like during Operation Dynamo, when it failed totally to prevent the evacuation?
I hope you took in my details about RN forces within five hours of Dover. In point of fact, in the whole of WW2, your mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser. Indeed, the Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping techniques in 1940, didn't even acquire a torpedo bomber until mid 1942.
'A screen of U-Boats?' Like the three which were sent to operate in the Channel in late 1939? The ones (U12, 8 October, U14, 13 October, & U40, 24 October) which are still there, encasing the bodies of their crews after promptly being sunk?
If you had any actual knowledge of Sealion, you would know that the Channel was a deathtrap for a WW2 submersible. By the way, in September, 1940, the Germans had 27 frontboote (Operational boats) of which, on average, 13 were at sea on any one day. Is that your wonderful U-boat screen? Moreover, normal U-boat operating procedure involved trying to avoid close encounters with escorts, and especially fleet destroyers. Do you suggest that on this occasion they should actively seek them out? It would not end well. For the U-boats, that is.
I do enjoy reading the poorly informed nonsense you Sealion 'Would Haves' post, by which I mean your amusing certainty about what the wonderful Luftwaffe & the mighty Kriegsmarine 'would have' done.
Odd, then, that you are never actually able to explain why, in reality, they never managed to get remotely near to achieving any of it, isn't it?
You should read Schenk's book. You might, even if belatedly, actually learn soimething.
4
-
4
-
4
-
3