Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Historigraph"
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@nikolajkristensen5960 The bulk of the RN's anti-invasion forces, as I said before, were not in Rosyth, but much further south. The Admiralty didn't intend to use their heavy ships, because there was no need. The small, fast, destroyers and light cruisers were far better suited to the task.
'Germany still had a lot of destroyer u-boats bismarck, tirpitz.' Sorry, that is nonsense. Bismarck was undergoing trials in the Baltic, and was not declared fit for service until May, 1941. Tirpitz was declared operational in January, 1942. The Kriegsmarine had ten destroyers, of which four were refitting in September, 1940, and twenty seven operational U- boats, of which thirteen were at sea on any one day in September, 1940. It really wouldn't have been a good idea to send submarines into the Channel, by the way. The Kriegsmarine sent three in October, 1939, and all three were promptly sunk.
As to the invasion barges, you clearly haven't considered how much time it would take to get large numbers of towed barges out of a port, form them up into some sort of order, and set off for the Channel. The Kriegsmarine estimated that the largest of their convoys would require three days.
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You haven't heard of Dynamo, Aerial, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Arctic Convoys, the Naval War in the Mediterranean, or the defence of the Indian Ocean then? Nor of the various assault landings (Torch, Husky, Avalanche, Overlord, etc) largely planned and executed by the Royal Navy?
Certainly, there was a colossal struggle in the Pacific between the IJN & the US Navy. The US Navy could afford to devote the level of resources that it did to the Pacific precisely because the Royal Navy was everywhere else.
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@jddallas7274 Congratulations on getting so many facts wrong in so short a post. Quite an achievement.
The Germans had 27 operational U-boats by September, 1940, of which an average of 13 were at sea on any one day. At the same time, they had only seven operational destroyers. For comparative purposes, at the same time the RN had 70 or so destroyers and cruisers based within five hours steaming of Dover, and a further 40 or so destroyers in Home Waters if needed.
Magnetic mines might have caused problems in shallow waters, had the Luftwaffe not managed to drop a couple on mud flats near Shoeburyness in November, 1939. A team from HMS Vernon recovered them and determined how they worked. As early as 27 November, tests (successful ones) were carried out on HMS Manchester, and degaussing methods were rapidly introduced. By 9 March, 1940, over 600 vessels had been successfully treated, and the procedure was quickly gathering pace.
The RN didn't seem to have been 'afraid of getting shot to bits by the Luftwaffe in the channel' at Dunkirk when they evacuated over 323,000 men of the BEF & French 1st Army without serious losses. Nor did they seem deterred as they undertook daily destroyer, cruiser, and MTB patrols through the Channel for the rest of the summer. Out of interest, and because it is clearly another fact of which you are ignorant, in the whole of WW2 your mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship at all larger than a light cruiser.
'The Germans would have conducted the landing at night and the Royal Navy would not have responded till the day that is a head start. Every amphibious operation of WW2 succeeded and the British destroyers did not have the guns to shoot the German landing craft till 1942' This is idiocy on a masterful level. The Germans did not have any landing craft. They intended to transport their troops in barges towed in pairs by tugs or trawlers. The barges were to be towed in cumbersome block formations. For example, Barge Convoy 1, from Rotterdam, Ostend & Dunkirk heading for the area between Folkestone & New Romney consisted of 150 barges from Dunkirk & 50 from Ostend, together with a further 114 barges & 57 transports from Rotterdam.
Have you even considered how long it would take to extricate these barges from their ports, assemble them into some sort of formation, and then set sail? The quickest convoy required two days, and the largest three.
'The British destroyers did not have the guns to shoot the German landing craft till 1942 the Germans conducted a successful landing without control of the sea in Crete and they were intercepted by the Royal Navy and still all made so just saying your argument is weak not my.' What do you think that the 6 inch and 4 inch guns aboard British light cruisers, or the 4.7 inch, and 4 inch guns aboard British destroyers in 1940 were? Wooden mock ups? Or,of course, the 4 inch & 3 inch guns aboard supporting vessels, such as minesweepers, gunboats, sloops, and corvettes?
The salient point about Crete was that the Axis were not able be land troops from the sea, at least not until the British had decided to withdraw. Two convoys sailed from Greece, one bound for Maleme & one for Heraklion. The Maleme convoy was annihilated by a RN cruiser squadron, and as a result the Heraklion convoy turned back to Greece.
One of your comments, however, is correct, that 'Every amphibious operation of WW2 succeded.' Do you know why that was? Because those in Europe & North Africa were planned and executed by the Royal Navy, and those in the Pacific by the United States' Navy.
I assume from your post that you are just an immature child. The other possibility, that you are a remarkably stupid or ignorant adult, does also exist, however.
Would you like me to recommend a few book for you to read, or have read to you?
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@jddallas7274 I presume you mean 'the book' on Sealion?
As I write this reply, the ones on the shelf immediately facing me, above my desk, are, in no particular order :-
Dunkirk. By John Harris.
Hitler's Naval War ( English edition) Cajus Bekker.
Churchill's Moat. The Channel War, 1939 -1945.
Invasion 1940. Derek Robinson.
Hitler's Armada. Geoff. Hewitt.
We Shall Fight on the Beaches. Defying Napoleon & Hitler. Brian Lavery.
Dunkirk The British Evacuation, 1940. Robert Jackson.
Operation Sea Lion. Peter Fleming.
The Evacuation From Dunkirk' Royal Navy Staff History.
Invasion of England 1940. (English edition) Peter Schenk .
The Miracle of Dunkirk. Walter Lord.
Crete 1941 David Thomas.
Silent Victory. Duncan Grinnell-Milne.
Operation Sealion. Leo McInstry.
Hitler Confronts England. Walter Ansel.
The Second World War, Vols. 1 & 2. Winston Churchill.
British & Empire Warships of the Second World War. H. T. Lenton.
Those are a selection, dealing primarily with the topic under discussion, but largely excluding associated topics such as Norway or even the Battle of Britain. Nor do I include documents and archives available to me, which are not readily accessible in book or electronic form.
Tell you what. Instead of simply posting insults, why don't you simply explain to me which parts of my original reply to you were, in your erudite opinion, either wrong, or even inaccurate?
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In point of fact, Admiral Drax, C-in-C at the Nore, where most of the anti-invasion destroyer flotillas were based, had an agreement with the Air Ministry that the RAF would not attempt to bomb German vessels at sea, but would leave the field clear for the Royal Navy.
Bomber Command began bombing barge ports from 5 September, and by the end of September had destroyed 21 transports, 214 barges, and 8 small boats. There were still 159 transports, 1859 barges, 397 tugs, and over 1100 motor boats available. Bomber Harris' post war claims that Sealion was prevented by Bomber Command did not stand up to scrutiny.
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The German plan anticipated that 9 divisions, plus a weak Paratroop Division (actually only about one third strength) would land, but that it would take ELEVEN DAYS to transport these across, using towed barges and small motor boats. Interestingly, the naval plan assumed that there would be no losses of towing vessels (because they had literally no reserves) and that, believe it or not, the Royal Navy would not intervene. This was at a time, by the way, (September, 1940) when the RN had over 70 destroyers and cruisers specifically allocated to anti-invasion duties, together with over five hundred smaller vessels such as sloops, minesweepers, gunboats, and armed trawlers, etc.
Supply by air would have been out of the question, because in late August, 1940, Luftwaffe archives show that there were precisely 226 operational transport aircraft.
Oh, and because of a lack of suitable shipping space, the divisions (all infantry or mountain divisions) would land without their divisional artillery or motor transport, although apparently some horses would have been included.
At the time, by the way, 'the stupidity of Hitler fighting the USSR ' making it possible for the British to hold on, is nonsense, as Hitler wasn't fighting the USSR in September, 1940. Therefore what, apparently, 'we all know' isn't true.
Try changing 'May have been risky' in your post to ''Would have been suicidal' for greater accuracy.
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@georgegonzalez-rivas3787 There was never any suggestion that the Home Fleet would 'rush down' to intercept an invasion. The Home Fleet was at Rosyth, and would only be sent further south if any (actually non-existent) German heavy ships were detected heading towards the Channel. Home Fleet heavy ships were not intended to operate against a ramshackle invasion fleet of towed barges for the same reason that duck hunters generally do not use field guns. The rapid firing 4 & 4.7 inch destroyer guns, backed up by the 6 inch of the cruisers, were far more suited to the task.
There were 61 U-boats in commission in September, 1940. 34 were older training boats, or new boats working up. Of the remaining 27, only 13 were operational on any one day. The rest were either en route to, or returning from, patrol areas, or refitting/repairing after completing patrols.
Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by torpedo bombers, flown by crews who had been trained in anti-shipping techniques. In September, 1940, the Luftwaffe had had no such training, and until mid 1942, didn't even have torpedo bombers. Why do you think the Luftwaffe failed so badly at Dunkirk. Furthermore, on what basis do you think they would do any better against fast moving warships, when three months earlier they had proved themselves largely ineffective against ships stopped close inshore? In the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. In September, 1940 the RN had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within 5 hours of Dover, and a further 40 or so more destroyers in Home Waters.
The status of the German navy in September, 1940 :- Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were both under repair, which wasn't completed until November 1940. Bismarck was completing trials in the Baltic, followed by modifications in Hamburg until early 1941. Tirpitz did not even commission and commence trials until early 1941. Prinz Eugen's construction only completed in December, 1940. The only heavy ship available at the time was a single heavy cruiser, with three light cruisers and six destroyers also operational at the time.
Finally, I don't do war games, but I did do a degree in Modern History, specialising in WW2 Naval History, and came away with a first.
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@myclearwater1471 America wasn't 'holding back' the destroyers at all. As early as 15 May, the US Ambassador in Paris had spoken to the French Admiralty concerning the supply of twelve such vessels to France. At the same time an approach was made, on the initiative of the US, to Britain, concerning the provision of '50 or 100 such ships' to the RN.
On 1 August, FDR, via the British Ambassador in Washington, suggested that 50 such ships could be sold to Canada, or in exchange for British bases. Churchill rejected the first option, but described the second as 'undesirable but acceptable.' The first destroyers began arriving in Canada on 1 September. The British saw them as useful stop-gaps for convoy escorts until their own new construction of better equipped escorts began to appear in early-mid 1941, but the initiative for the transfer was from the US, not Britain.
Britain was not 'getting ready' for invasion in August, 1940, unless you consider sending a troop convoy including three armoured regiments with full supporting artillery & transport an appropriate preparation. This was the 'Apology' convoy, which left the UK on 22 August.
The Italian 'invasion' of Egypt began in September, 1940. Far from attempting to take the Suez Canal, 10th Army advanced about 65 miles, then stopped, setting up a series of fortified camps. In December, 1940 the British, using the reinforcements from the 'Apology' convoy, counter-attacked, totally destroying 10th Army and for losses of 1900 men killed & wounded, took over 133,000 prisoners, and captured over 400 tanks and 800 artillery pieces.
Put simply, the Vichy French & 'the Arabs' were hardly close friends, and there was no threat to the oil fields at the time.
Air fields in Britain at the time generally had grass strips. Certainly, attacks did temporarily reduce their efficiency, but for brief periods only. A far more serious problem might have been a determined attempt to destroy the Chain Home radar stations, but no such concerted effort was made. Of course, if the RAF had been temporarily withdrawn from the Home Counties, all the towed canal barges of the Sealion invasion fleet needed to do was find a way past the seventy of so destroyers and light cruisers, with the support of five hundred or so smaller warships, which represented the force the Admiralty could deploy to meet them in the Channel!
The RAF was never short of pilots. Post-War studies of RAF records actually demonstrate that there were more qualified pilots in non-flying roles during the battle than were actually in aircraft.
Finally, there was a shortage neither of food nor of fuel at the time.
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@myclearwater1471 Indeed, Churchill worked with Stalin, just as FDR did. Both regarded Soviet Russia as the lesser of two evils, and the British worked on the principle that 'My enemy's enemy is my friend' or, as Churchill put it himself, 'If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least one favourable comment about the devil in the House of Commons.'
Of course Churchill sought help from the U.S. Who wouldn't want the support of a great industrial power, and FDR give that support because it was in the interests of the U.S. to assist the last surviving democracy in Europe.
As to 'nothing to stop an invasion.' Are you aware that, in the whole of WW2, the mighty Luftwaffe sank 31 British destroyers, and no British warship larger than a light cruiser. In September, 1940, there were over 100 RN destroyers in Home Waters alone, of which over 60 were within five hours steaming of the Channel. The Luftwaffe, by the way, had had no training in anti-shipping operations at the time, had no operational high performance torpedo bombers (in fact, didn't get any until early 1942) and had just failed badly to prevent the Dunkirk evacuation. Even senior commanders like von Richtofen & Dinort were outspoken in their beliefs that the Luftwaffe could not protect an invasion 'fleet' of canal barges towed at walking pace by tugs.
Of course, as a Sealion 'would have' (i.e., an enthusiast full of what the Luftwaffe 'would have' done, but utterly unable to explain why it never actually 'did' it) I suspect that you didn't previously know any of this.
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Presumably, naval warfare isn't your strong point. Firstly, when an 11 inch gunned ship encounters an eight inch gunned ship, supported by two 6 inch gunned ships whose guns cannot penetrate the armour anyway, there should really only be one winner. Secondly, the Graf Spee used up so much ammunition that she would have been unable to fight a successful surface action against Cumberland had she left Montevideo. Thirdly, her fuel purification had been disabled, and she had only enough fuel available for 24 hours in any case.
All in all, the first of a series of failures by the German surface fleet in WW2. In this case, a ship supposedly armoured well enough to resist 8 inch shellfire proved herself to be nothing of the kind.
You are, however, correct about Exeter. Langsdorff should have completed her sinking. Not because of your immature comment about body count, but because of the problem this would have given Harwood concerning whether to disengage and pick up survivors, or continue his pursuit of Greaf Spee.
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@WorshipinIdols 1). Hardly a wild success. A nuisance, in that the Allies needed to send Hunting Groups to seek & destroy her. But, there again, that is what the British & French fleets existed for anyway, and the inconvenience was short-lived.
2). An armoured cruiser which couldn't handle the attentions of three smaller cruisers can hardly be considered to have 'outperformed' them. Neither light cruiser was badly damaged, both remained operational, and were willing to continue the action, which was more than Graf Spee was, by the way. Certainly, Exeter was badly damaged, but during the course of the action, Graf Spee expended most of her ammunition, and could not have continued the action after the better armed (than Exeter) Cumberland arrived. In cold military terms, the Germans had three armoured cruisers, the British & French navies had 83 cruisers. The Allies would have happily have exchanged all three of Harwood's ships in exchange for Spee. In the event, they lost none.
3). Casualties are less significant than the attainment of objectives. Do you think that Stalingrad was a Russian defeat, for example? In any case, the point is irrelevant. Langsdorff didn't sink Exeter but, at least in your mind, flushed with the exhilaration of his triumph, he promptly took refuge in Montevideo, destroyed his ship, and shot himself. What do you think he would have done had he been defeated!?
You posted something exactly similar to this drivel a day or two ago. Had you forgotten?
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@fdumbass As the German plan (Read 'Invasion of England, 1940' by Peter Schenck, for full details) required eleven days to land the first nine divisions of the invasion force, and as one of the barge convoys required three days to form up, proceed down Channel, and land the leading elements of that force, a few hours of fog would not help much. Furthermore, as, for example, the initial landings between Bexhill & Eastbourne involved 380 barges being towed in pairs by 190 tugs and trawlers, the chaos likely to have occurred as these vessels, with inexperienced crews without radar or even wireless, proceeding down the Channel in thick fog at 6 knots can only be imagined.
The Germans only ever, until 1944, sent three submarines into the Channel. All three were immediately sunk by the British mine defences.
The British had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers, supported by around 500 smaller warships, in the immediate vicinity of the Channel. The Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping operations, and having just failed at Dunkirk, didn't even have torpedo bombers until mid-1942. In fact, in the whole of the war, even after receiving the necessary training, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN ship larger than a light cruiser.
The only way the Germans could fake an invasion would be by sending their barges to sea, risking running into the regular RN patrols from Plymouth & Sheerness. Frankly, the RN didn't really much care whether barges they sank were laden or empty. Moreover, the Germans only managed to assemble around 400 tugs, and had no reserves at all.
By the way, in September, 1940, the operational German navy consisted of 1 heavy & 3 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, 7 escort destroyers, 13 S boats, and less than 20 fleet minesweepers.
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