Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Historigraph" channel.

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  21.  @jimmiller5600  'Slow to detect an invasion?' The time taken to extract the towed barges from harbour, form them up into some sort of box formation, and send them down the Channel at little more than walking pace meant that the sailing time, from the extrication of the first barge to arrival off the landing beach was three days, in the case of the largest convoy. 'Slow to detect an invasion?' As the barges supposedly passed down Channel, Admiral Ramsay would be able to see the things from Dover Castle, for Heaven's sake! The Royal Navy sailed regular destroyer patrols every night through the Channel from Plymouth and Sheerness, often pausing to shell a barge port or two. Moreover, the Germans had seven minelayers, mainly converted merchantmen, available to them, possibly supported by a small number of minelaying destroyers. The British had, by contrast, several hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers, largely courtesy of their huge fishing fleet. Finally, the minelaying could only take place at night, when the destroyer patrols were active. The effect of a 4.7 inch high explosive shell landing on a laden mine deck was likely to be quite dramatic. The Germans sent three U-Boats into the Channel in late 1939. They, and their crews, are still there. The Channel was a death trap for such boats, which is why the Germans avoided sending any there until after D-Day when, of course, the British & Canadian Escort Groups inflicted heavy losses on them. The German plan for Sealion envisaged that 11 days would be required to land the first wave. Cerberus involved three heavily protected fast modern warships fleeing west to east through the Channel in a matter of a few hours, at a time when the invasion threat had long passed, and the concentrated RN forces of late 1940 had long dispersed to other duties. Can you really not understand the difference between the two?
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  27. You make the common mistake of all Sealion enthusiasts, in that you apparently believe that the Luftwaffe was on a par with the Imperial Japanese Air Force. Just to correct you, please note that Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by torpedo bombers, whereas the Luftwaffe didn't acquire similar aircraft until mid 1942. The Luftwaffe had just failed to prevent the evacuation from Dunkirk, largely because it had had no training in anti-shipping operations. In fact, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank no RN warship larger than a light cruiser, and a total of 'only' 31 RN destroyers. To put that into perspective, the RN started the war with 193 destroyers (ending it with over 400) and in September 1940 had around 70 light cruisers & destroyers within five hours steaming of Dover, over 100 in total in Home Waters, and supporting forces of around 500 smaller warships. Good luck, by the way, with the U-Boats. Generally, U-Boats sought to avoid attacking fleet destroyers, as it tended to end badly for them. In any case, in September, 1940, the average number of boats at sea on any one day was 13. The Germans did try to operate U-Boats in the Channel in October, 1939. The three they sent were promptly sunk. Finally, surface attack. What with? The German navy had, in September, 1940, one heavy & three light cruisers, seven operational destroyers, and precisely thirteen S Boats. The probability is, indeed, of slaughter in the Channel, but of towed German barges, not of the (huge) Royal Navy.
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  30. What makes you think that this was a Japanese 'offensive?' It wasn't. As the title suggests, it was a 'raid,' intended to ensure the safety of a large Japanese troop convoy from Singapore. There was no wider ambition on the Japanese part, no large landing force intended to occupy Ceylon or Madagascar. You apparently feel able to talk glibly about the destruction of the Eastern Fleet as being acceptable if in exchange a Japanese warship or two might have been damaged. How would this have been acceptable? What strategic benefit to the Allied cause would have been accrued if Somerville had sought a surface action, when only one of his battleships and two of his carriers were modern or modernised, whilst his four old 'R' class ships, although marvels of WW1 technology, were utterly obsolete, and fit for nothing except Atlantic convoy escort duty, acting as a Fleet in Being, or, as they later demonstrated, use as naval artillery in support of assault landings? How could the Eastern Fleet have made any significant contribution to defence of Colombo from bombing? Perhaps you feel able to make such damning judgements from a comfortable chair 80 years after the event. Perhaps you might answer the questions I asked above without waxing lyrical about 'cowardice?' Oh, and it seems you are in ignorance about Dunkirk as well. Perhaps you might explain what a BEF of 13 divisions was supposed to do after the Belgian army had capitulated, and most of the French army had begun to collapse? Perhaps you would recommend the same action as you require Somerville to have taken, charging blindly into certain disaster? In point of fact, Dynamo was far from panic. Ramsay's plan brought out 336,000 troops, of which around 120,000 were French, and the British had begun landing new divisions in Cherbourg until told by General Weygand that the French army was no longer capable of organised resistance. The French and Belgian armies, by the way, totalled just over 100 divisions. As I said, the BEF consisted of 13. Still, well done for making a comment about the Indian Ocean raid. Even if it was a facile and ill-reasoned one.
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  32. The German fleet was built as part of the Franco- German naval race, and not as a challenge to the Royal Navy. Put simply, the Weimar Republic came up with the panzerships to intercept French troop convoys. The French responded with the Strasbourgs. The Germans responded with the Scharnhorsts, the French with the Richelieus, and the Germans with the Bismarcks. If Germany started building U-boats, then these could only be aimed at Britain. The British response would be to commence an enhanced programme of escort vessel construction. Should the Germans focus on anti-ship capability for the Luftwaffe, then firstly, how do these aircraft even approach the Royal Navy, and secondly how does the invasion of France succeed without the airborne artillery close support that was the Luftwaffe. Serious planning against Britain could only commence after a successful invasion and conquest of France. The Germans had no choice other than to pause after Dunkirk? How could they possibly consider an invasion of Britain with no assault ships, or landing craft. Indeed, without even the towed barges they later assembled. Moreover, the completion of the invasion of France required another two weeks. Mine the Channel? With the seven auxiliary minelayers they actually had available? Mining in daylight was not a realistic option, if for no other reason than minefields are of limited use if your enemy (with over 400 available sweepers) knows where they are. At night, of course, what happens when the layers run into one or other of the regular RN destroyer patrols through the Channel? Fix Enigma? First, they need to know that it wasn't totally secure. Win the Battle of Britain. Didn't they try? In short, none of the 'creative' ways have any basis in reality.
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