Comments by "Barrie Rodliffe" (@barrierodliffe4155) on "Real Engineering"
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@Sevastous
Maybe you can give a few examples of this in real combat reports because I have not seen any such thing and of course Rolls Royce was working on the problem which was much improved by the Battle of Britain and completely solved in 1941.
RAF pilots did not seem to have much trouble either and it was hardly just the Spitfire. It was never a fatal flaw, just a small problem and a compromise since the smaller Merlin engine gave more power than the Db 601.
Who wants to talk about the Bf 109 fatal flaws?
..Longitudinally the aeroplane is too stable for a fighter. There is a large change in directional trim with speed. No rudder trimmer is fitted; lack of this is severely felt at high speeds, and limits a pilot's ability to turn left when diving.
.......Aileron snatching occurs as the slots open. All three controls are far too heavy at high speeds. Aerobatics are difficult.
.......The Bf 109 is inferior as a fighter to the Hurricane or Spitfire. Its manoeuvrability at high speeds is seriously curtailed by the heaviness of the controls, while its high wing loading causes it to stall readily under high normal accelerations and results in a poor turning circle.
RAF pilots seem to have managed rather well, maybe you should read a few German reports.
Albert Kesselring " The Spitfire was the main reason the Luftwaffe failed to stop the Dunkirk evacuation"
Adolf Galland " I am very impressed by the Spitfire"
This was in the Battle of Britain.
This is from an RAF report.
The pilot of the Spitfire reduced his revolutions to 2,650 rpm and was then able to overtake and outclimb the Bf 109. At 4,000 ft, the Spitfire pilot was 1,000 feet above the Bf 109, from which position he was able to get on its tail, and remain there within effective range despite all efforts of the pilot of the Bf 109 to shake him off.
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Kirthe Avenger.
262 never fought the Spitfire?, How about the 27th of September 1944, a Me 262 damaged by a Spitfire Mk IX, 30th September another Me 262 also damaged by a Spitfire, both were not near the Me 262 bases. 5th of October an Me 262 which tried to dive away from a flight of Spitfires, a couple of the Spitfires followed , the Me 262 pilot then tried to climb but he met the other couple of Spitfires still up at 13,000 feet, the wreck of the Me 262 fell into allied territory.
23 December a Spitfire chased an Me 262 from Antwerp to Eindhoven, damaging the Me 262.
25 December a Spitfire shot down an Me 262, another Spitfire also shot down an Me 262 the same day.
26 December a Spitfire Mk IX damaged an Me 262. near Julich, another Me 262 was also damaged by a Spitfire near Syavelot
27 December an Me 262 damaged by a Spitfire Mk IX near Aachen.
This is just a small incomplete list and just 1944 when the Me 262 was not encountered often.
Not one Spitfire was ever shot down by any Me 262`s, not even the unarmed photo reconnaissance Spitfires, Me 262`s were used to chase these since Germany had no other fighter able to catch one except the Me 163 which was more dangerous to it`s own pilots.
The Spitfire range was increased by extra internal fuel, the Spitfire Mk VII had 124 gallons as standard but could carry up to almost 200 and could carry a 90 or even 170 gallon drop tank, some Mk IX were fitted with up to 171 gallons internal fuel and again with a drop tank, escort missions of USAAF bombers were happening before the P 51 was able to escort a thing.
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Little Blockhead.
Hitler did not issue the halt order of Army group A, he merely confirmed it. Army group B had no such order.
There is just a little of the history of the Dunkirk evacuation below, I would suggest reading.
The German decision to halt the advance of the Panzers for three days. This let-off has given rise to the bizarre idea that it was a deliberate decision by Hitler to provide a ‘golden bridge’ for Britain, consciously choosing not to utterly humiliate his opponent in the hope of reaching a negotiated peace.
How could the most formidable military machine on the planet at this time, which was on the verge of shattering what had previously been seen as the greatest military power in Europe, have made such an elementary mistake? Why would it voluntarily choose to leave the trap open, allowing the prey to escape? It must have been a deliberate decision… hence the golden bridge theory. This was initially propagated by Hitler to explain how he let strategic victory against Britain slip through his fingers; the refrain was eagerly taken up after the war by some surviving German generals who were quite happy to shift responsibility on to the conveniently dead führer – and was spread by Basil Liddell Hart, who was perhaps a little too inclined to take the word of captured German officers, especially when they talked up the influence upon them of his interwar ideas. Nonetheless, the idea really is the most ridiculous nonsense.
First, even on its own terms, it does not make any sense. While there is room to doubt the coherence of Hitler’s strategy towards Britain in 1940, it is not implausible to suggest that he would have welcomed a negotiated peace. His prospects of achieving this would have been immeasurably improved by the additional bargaining chip of a quarter of a million British prisoners, to say nothing of the psychological blow to Britain of losing the best-trained part of her small army.
Second, the theory does not fit the facts. If the Germans really were trying to allow the British Expeditionary Force to escape, then they displayed an unusual level of incompetence: only Army Group A actually paused – and only in part, as it still captured Calais and Boulogne – and only for three days before continuing. Army Group B and also the Luftwaffe continued to attack the Allies with all of their strength. This hardly amounts to a free pass or allowing the British to slip away.
Third, there is a perfectly good explanation available that does not require a far-fetched conspiracy theory – and which, incidentally, is whole-heartedly accepted by every serious work on the subject that uses German sources. Many senior German officers were nervous from the outset about the bold changes made to the original, more traditional plan for the attack on France, and in particular about the envisaged rapid advance of the Panzers that would involve outpacing their infantry, artillery and logistic support. This bold vision was undoubtedly risky; the advancing armour could have faced a serious defeat if the Allies had been able to launch a coherent counter-attack against its flanks or rear. We now know that the German offensive had precisely the effect it was designed to in paralysing the Allied high command, shattering its will and ability to devise and execute an effective counter stroke; but this was not known to the Germans in May 1940. Moreover, there had been a warning sign of precisely what some of the more cautious German commanders feared when the British launched a small-scale counter-attack near Arras on 21 May. This limited and short-lived success played into a growing sense of unease among those German officers inclined to worry that their success was too good to be true, and wary of pushing their attack beyond its culminating point. The Arras counter-attack achieved only local tactical success, but it exerted a decisive influence on a debate that was already underway in the German high command.
The Panzers badly needed a pause to rest, repair and reconstitute, and to bring forward support and supplies. There was no need to risk them in unfavourable terrain, when there was a perfectly good alternative in the form of Army Group B and also the Luftwaffe, whose leadership (not least the influential Göring) were keen to seize their place in the sun – a rare case where the overclaiming of air power enthusiasts was to the benefit of the Allies. The tanks would be needed for the rest of the campaign and the push to Paris, taking on the bulk of the French Army, which still comprised a large and powerful force. The Allied armies in the north had been defeated, were nearly encircled and only needed to be mopped up. Why take a risk in rushing these closing moves of the first stage of the operation?
This last question suggests an important point about the whole debate: there is actually far less of a puzzle here than has been suggested. Why on earth would it occur to a continental power that evacuation on any significant scale was possible? After all, even the British Admiralty believed at the outset of the operation that at best, maybe 45,000 men could be rescued. There is no mystery in the fact that Germany was not alert to this possibility. The British were trapped and there was no reason for the Germans to suspect that their fate would be anything other than what would, three years later, befall Axis forces after their defeat in North Africa: without a Navy that was willing and able to go to such lengths to rescue them, 230,000 Axis troops were captured and only a few hundred escaped. It is only hindsight and the knowledge it presents of the stunning success of the Allied evacuation that raises the question in the first place with respect to Dunkirk. Considered in this light, the apparent mystery simply melts away.
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David Siebert.
The Spitfire which was used for dive bombing and attacking many places that required high accuracy, did far more than you think. German planes, trains, trucks, V 1 and V 2 launch sites, even far more V 1`s than the P 51, the P 47 was not fats enough for that job. CAP over the front line was the Spitfires job, The Mediterranean, invasion of Sicily ( Seafires provided cover for that), Italy, it was Spitfires, D Day when 55 squadrons of Spitfires assured air superiority and all the way into Germany the Spitfire was flying from airfields close to the front. The short range Spitfire which do missions of over 4 hours or over 1,000 miles and fight.
In fact without Spitfires D Day would have been much harder, Spitfires flew photo reconnaissance all along the coast and they attacked radar sites to confuse the Luftwaffe, even spotting for the ships guns was done by Seafire since it could do the job and look after itself.
The F 4F, F 6F and F 4U in particular could only fly from large aircraft carriers, the Seafire was flown from small escort carriers.
The Spitfire was the best fighter the allies had from before the war, it was still in front line service well after the war. Israel used both the Spitfire and P 51 but the pilots preferred the Spitfire.
Many air forces used the Spitfire after the war, including the RAF. The Seafire was still in use in Korea.
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