Comments by "Mitch Richards" (@mitchrichards1532) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
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I read it, along with several books by Glantz, Stahel, Keegan, etc. Suvorov/Rezun wrote a simplistic story based on a theory and his facts are mostly just anecdotal evidence while at the same time he ignores far better sources and information.
He lists divisions and corps that the Soviets supposedly had but really only existed on paper. How does a Soviet tank corps that has 40% fill of personnel, 30% of its equipment, is mostly untrained, and is missing key personnel fight a war? Many Soviet units fit that description and were in danger of evaporating in space as they left their assembly areas without proper leadership, proper communications gear, and no ability to coordinate logistical support, artillery, or even communicate with higher. They didn't fight poorly because they were surprised, they fought poorly because that is all you could expect from any unit in that early state of development.
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@davemac1197 Your idea of military strategy is demonstrating concepts better applied to the operational level, not the strategic level which 100% involves politics. SHAEF G4 is just one staff component, one war fighting function that gets a say in informing the Commander. In this situation of what to do in Aug/Sep of 1944, the G2 and G5 would be far more influential in shaping the decisions of leadership. G2 provides the enemy situation, their capabilities, etc. and the G5 is taking that into consideration against Allied capabilities (which includes G4 statistics, etc.) within the confines of an overall strategy.
After Falaise, German transportation and logistics were a shambles, and the opportunity to liberate France on the cheap was there to be had as a result. The broad front was a low risk/high reward proposition that put great pressure on the Germans everywhere at the same time while also serving the political agenda in regard to restoring France as a power.
Monty's ideas are sound at the operational level and make sense given the situation, but they are riskier, remain below the level of grand strategy, not synced with the Tehran agreements, and inferior to the broad front in terms of coalition warfare.
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It's interesting to watch people who think they are so intelligent and discerning about history, propaganda, etc. fall for the most basic and elementary sales tactics. In regard to a sales hook, or simply the laws of supply and demand, people remain prone to falling for "secret" information, or since it claims to be suppressed, censored, or controversial, it MUST be true. This defies logic, but human psychology isn't about logic, it's about emotion.
Irving knew this, it was his style and how he captivated an audience. Academic criticism of his work only makes his audience defensive of him. His career is better as a case study in psychology than it is history. He was a great salesman who knew his customers.
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