Comments by "Mitch Richards" (@mitchrichards1532) on "TIKhistory"
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@aloz52 Nope, the physical evidence is the Red Army on 22 June 1941. Regardless of a dubious story about a secret document, what was actually carried out is tangible physical evidence. MP41 and DP41 as carried out are what matters, not a supposed document that claims something that is essentially facts not in evidence. The Red Army in the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union is Summer of 1941 was not capable of strategic action. The men, material, logistical base and tactical dispositions do not support Suvorov's or any other Soviet offensive plans theory. What part of this isn't clear. The Red Army's offensive striking power was their Tank Corps, have you bothered to look up where they were and what state they were in as of June 22 1941???? Only 2 of them were near combat capable, the rest were still being formed. The process of forming tank corps takes months, and thats before they can even start training for corps level operations! Seriously...the conspiracy BS is like crack to you people. You don't know what you don't know, so you avoid actual critical analysis and go for the easy answer. Join a real military history forum, be humble. I did that literally 20 years, an MA in WWII military history and several visits to former Eastern front battle sites later. Stop drinking the conspiracy kool aid.
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@AK-qy5iw Skydiving was a youth sport? Ya ok...
The Red Air Force had no drop aircraft. Solve that issue.
The 25k tanks were obsolete, worn out, very few worked, they were no longer being produced and had no spare parts production. That just a few issues... Now throw in that the Tank Corps were only forming up in 1941, and had no trained crews, supporting arms, logistics support, etc. The few T34 and KV tanks were brand new, lacked crews, lacked ammunition, radios, spare parts, etc.
David Glantz makes all of this clear and used Red Army documents that you can actually check...unlike Rezun's BS.
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user-wj6dt5bq3w What exactly is there to disagree with when looking at Red Army strength, dispositions, and force readiness is Summer of 1941? I'm talking specifics by unit, by personnel and equipment. I know how long it takes to train personnel, train a unit, equip, deploy, and what it takes to sustain a unit in the field. A thorough investigation of the Red Army in 1941 reveals beyond any doubt whatsoever that they were not going to attack in 1941. I will debate anyone face to face on that... Anyone. I have 30 years in the military, studied Russian doctrine, have an MA in WWII military history, etc. I trained Ukrainians last year... I'm a professional, not an amateur. Just putting that out there to avoid low level banter on the topic.
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user-wj6dt5bq3w I did not cite a bogus point, I referenced THE point. Military capability of what is possible or not possible is THE point. In the Khalkin Gol campaign of 1939 it took the Red Army about 6 weeks to build forces and overcome a single Japanese Infantry division. It took them 4 weeks to build up a reinforced Corps to do the job. Now look at the Western Mil Districts with their 76 Corps that were understrength, underequipped, undertrained, under supplied, and in many cases still forming. Key indicators include war time establishment of trucks was below 30%, which means Red Army logistics cannot function in the field or support operations (offensive or defensive). Logistical hubs, nodes, and requisite stockpiles for offensive operations were not established or even in the process of being established and no order for that purpose has ever been found or mentioned anywhere.
You or the authors you mention cannot deny these indicators, and the Red Army of 1941 could not conduct offensive operations without them being addressed, its physically impossible, and it takes time measured in months to address.
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