Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Imperial War Museums"
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What US historian Harry Yeide wrote of what the Germans thought of Patton:
▪ for most of the war the Germans barely took notice [of Patton].
▪ on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton’s momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
▪ There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton’s enemies had any idea who he was at the time. Likewise, the immediate postwar accounts of the German commanders in Tunisia, written for the U.S. Army’s History Division, ignore Patton. Those reports show that ground commanders considered II Corps’s attacks under Patton to have been hesitant, and to have missed great opportunities.
▪ In mid-June [1943], another detachment report described Patton as “an energetic and responsibility-loving command personality”—a passing comment on one of the numerous Allied commanders. Patton simply had not yet done anything particularly noteworthy in their eyes.
▪ But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton’s troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, “The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations.” Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.
▪ General Hermann Balck, who took command of Army Group G in September, thus did not think highly of Patton—or any other opposing commanders—during this time. Balck wrote to his commander, Runstedt, on October 10, “I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans” Looking back on his battles against Patton throughout the autumn, in 1979 Balck recalled, “Within my zone, the Americans never once exploited a success. Often [General Friedrich Wilhelm von] Mellenthin, my chief of staff, and I would stand in front of the map and say, ‘Patton is helping us; he failed to exploit another success.’”
▪ The commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel, aimed a dismissive, indirect critique at Patton’s efforts at Bastogne, writing in his memoirs that the Americans did not “strike with full élan.” The commanders who fought against Patton in his last two mobile campaigns in the Saar-Palatinate and east of the Rhine already knew they could not win; their losses from this point forward were inevitable, regardless of the commanding Allied opponent.
▪ the Germans offered Patton faint praise during and immediately after the war.
▪ posterity deserves fact and not myth. The Germans did not track Patton’s movements as the key to Allied intentions. Hitler does not appear to have thought often of Patton, if at all. The Germans considered Patton a hesitant commanding general in the scrum of position warfare. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists.
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Many are so eager to assert that German technological advances were superior to the British, that they forget to read what the Germans actually made, and how useful it actually was.
The first jet engine to fly in a plane was von Ohain's project at Heinkel. He had substantial funding from a major industrialist. Von Ohain himself admitted that he studied very closely Whittle's jet engine patents before starting work on his own jet engine. His engine had a centrifugal compressor and turbine. It was not the axial-flow turbojet. It was unreliable, inefficient, low power and low life, despite having massive funding from Heinkel - a failure that was not continued. The German jet programme was dropped until they knew the British had prototype jet planes in the air, then it was revived.
Whittle concentrated his very limited funding on the centrifugal compressor because it was well-understood and less problematic than axial-flow designs. He was focused on making a war-usable, reliable and powerful engine - quickly - which would outperform the best piston engine planes of the day. All of these qualities the Jumo and BMW axial jet engines lacked. With limited funding, Whittle developed a reliable engine which was combat-ready near the end of the war. Within months of the first operational flight, production engines were also more powerful than any of the poor engines turned out by the rushed German programs to the enormous detriment of actual combat - Gloster Meteor's top speed of 600 mph in late 1945, 650mph in mid 1946.
No one can claim that an engine is combat ready with a service life of 10-12 hours, which cannot be rapidly throttled up or down otherwise it stalls, is prone to flame-out and terrifies its pilots. They were underdeveloped and unproven axial-flow jet engines, being near garbage. The British installed axial-flow engines in a Meteor, however dropping them as they were too problematic at the time, requiring years to put right. A war was on, with years in development they could not afford.
The problems with German jet engines were not caused by the scarcity of metals in Germany during WW2, as they had access to enough rare metals. To produce a high performing jet engine high-strength alloys are required resisting high temperature. No iron-based alloy is suitable. Germany had no programme to develop such alloys. The British did, developing the nimonic series of alloys, making use of them in the WW2 jet engine programme. That is one, just one, of the reasons why the British jet program had combat potential, with the German program doomed to failure.
The Me262 airframe had many serious faults:
▪ high landing speed:
▪ difficult to maneuver;
▪ no air brakes;
▪ centre of gravity too far back;
▪ Poor downwards pilot visibility;
Those faults made attacking other aircraft far more difficult - at a time when they were desperately short of pilots, particularly pilots with sufficient skill and experience to fly what was a very difficult plane to fly and fight in.
The sweep-back of the wing of the Me262 was minimal, only in the leading edge, with a part of the trailing edge of the wing being straight. The swept wing was an insufficient correction for the plane's centre of gravity problem, not aerodynamics, that prompted the slight wing sweep. It was not until years later that properly designed swept-back wings were introduced in combat planes. By contrast the Gloster Meteor was:
▪ handleable;
▪ maneuverable;
▪ a balanced combat plane.
The Meteor was deliberately designed to an airframe of known traditional qualities, as it had a new type of engine. If there was problems in handling they knew it would be the engine, not the airframe. Having an advanced airframe and new type of engine may give confusion and delays in R&D, delaying the final plane.
While the Meteor was being developed, the British were also working on the supersonic Miles 52 plane - the project was dropped with the plans given over to the USA, which resulted in Bell X-1. No one copied the Me262 in the post war rush to get fast jet planes into service. The British also produced new planes - the world's most advanced, in engine and airframe.
After WW2 the leading German plane designer Kurt Tank, and 62 other German engineers, went to Argentina to design and build the FMA IAe 33 Pulqui II jet plane. They used a RR Nene engine. The plane was a flop.
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@Dysfunctional_Reprint
The finest army in the world from mid 1942 onwards was the British under Montgomery. From Alem el Halfa it moved right up into Denmark, through nine countries, and not once suffered a reverse taking all in its path. Over 90% of German armour in the west was destroyed by the British. Montgomery, in command of all ground forces, had to give the US armies an infantry role in Normandy as they were not equipped to engage massed German SS armour.
Montgomery stopped the Germans in every event they attacked him:
◾ August 1942 - Alem el Halfa; October 1942 - El Alamein;
◾ March 1943 - Medenine;
◾ June 1944 - Normandy;
◾ Sept/Oct 1944 - The Netherlands;
◾ December 1944 - Battle of the Bulge;
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
◾ Battle of Alam Halfa;
◾ Second Battle of El Alamein;
◾ Battle of El Agheila;
◾ Battle of Medenine;
◾ Battle of the Mareth Line;
◾ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
◾ Allied invasion of Sicily;
◾ Operation Overlord - the largest amphibious invasion in history;
◾ Market Garden - a 60 mile salient created into German territory;
◾ Battle of the Bulge - while taking control of two shambolic US armies;
◾ Operation Veritable;
◾ Operation Plunder.
Montgomery not once had a reverse.
Not on one occasion were ground armies, British, US or others, under Monty's command pushed back into a retreat by the Germans. Monty's 8th Army advanced the fastest of any army in WW2. From El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 17 days. After fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. This was an Incredible feat, unparalleled in WW2. With El Alamein costing just 13,500 casualties.
The US Army were a shambles in 1944/45 retreating in the Ardennes. The Americans didn't perform well at all east of Aachen, then the Hurtgen Forest defeat with 33,000 casualties and Patton's Lorraine crawl of 10 miles in three months at Metz with over 50,000 casualties, with his Lorraine campaign being a failure. Then Montgomery had to be put in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies saving them from annihilation, aided by the British 21st Army Group, just to get back to the start line in the Ardennes, with nearly 100,000 US casualties.
Hodges, commander of the US First army, fled from Spa to near Liege on the 18th, despite the Germans never getting anywhere near to Spa. Hodges did not even wait for the Germans to approach Spa. He had already fled long before the Germans were stopped. The Germans took 20,000 US POWs in the Battle of the Bulge in Dec 1944. No other allied country had that many prisoners taken in the 1944-45 timeframe.
The USA retreat at the Bulge, again, was the only allied army to be pushed back into a retreat in the 1944-45 timeframe. Montgomery was effectively in charge of the Bulge having to take control of the US First and Ninth armies. Coningham of the RAF was put in command of USAAF elements. The US Third Army constantly stalled after coming up from the south. The Ninth stayed under Monty's control until the end of the war just about. The US armies were losing men at unsustainable rates due to poor generalship.
Normandy was planned and commanded by the British, with Montgomery involved in planning, with also Montgomery leading all ground forces, which was a great success coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. The Royal Navy was in command of all naval forces and the RAF all air forces. The German armour in the west was wiped out by primarily the British - the US forces were impotent against massed panzers. Monty assessed the US armies (he was in charge of them) giving them a supporting infantry role, as they were just not equipped, or experienced, to fight concentrated tank v tank battles. On 3 Sept 1944 when Eisenhower took over overall allied command of ground forces everything went at a snail's pace. The fastest advance of any western army in Autumn/early 1945 was the 60 mile thrust by the British XXX Corps to the Rhine at Arnhem.
You need to give respect where it is due.
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A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower. Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt.
Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, and was actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all. SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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@lordrexus
Wrong! For you.......
The state of play on the 17th, D-day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) 18 musicians of a German 'band' were guarding the Waal bridge;
5) a few Germans scattered about along the road;
6) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, spending over 2 hours in the village instead of moving to the bridge. The Germans blew the bridge when they finally reached it. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would most likely have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88mm south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In a time critical operation, in this gift of a time window for the Germans they were running armour towards Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon, being right on time. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the Waal bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British 1st AB at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
The Waal bridge as the critical bridge The failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Waal bridge at Nijmegen immediately upon jumping precluded a bridgehead across the Rhine. A bridge they could have walked on whistling Dixie. The bridge was so undefended, a lost British Jeep with four men in it rode over the Waal bridge unopposed.
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@ErikExeu
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of four Guards tanks crossed the Waal road bridge at 1830 hours. Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred Germans high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: “They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”
Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report:
“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."
The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at 1915 hours. 45 minutes. after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at 1938 hours. This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, one hour 8 mins after the first tank crossed. The records state at 1938 hours:
Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at 1830, or at 1915 when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at 1830 hours.
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In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, wanting confirmed if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the prime objectives. In response – dated 25 July 1945 – Gen Gavin was clear:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, Commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city."
A straight verbal order to immediately capture the bridge with one battalion. The rest of the regiment were to defend against a possible attack from the Reichswald and clear the LZ. They were to approach the bridge via the flat ground east of the city. Two companies went into Nijmegen with one disobeying orders getting completely lost. Two hours later when they finally rendezvoused, the attack was called off and the battalion called back into defence. In 1947 in his book ‘Airborne Warfare’ Gavin was vague regarding the failure:
"Just before take-off, I discussed the situation with Col Lindquist and directed him to commit not more than one battalion to the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as possible after landing, so as to take advantage of surprise and darkness"
Gavin created the illusion that it had been the responsibility of the cautious Col Lindquist to decide when to send troops to the Nijmegen bridge, by writing as ‘soon as possible’. Gavin successfully created the myth that the failure to immediately attack the bridge was a misunderstanding. Gavin failed to issue written offensive orders to Lindquist.
In the official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 he also noticed the conflicting statements. Capt. Westover had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could find no record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist of 508 PIR, Lt Col Stanley of 508 PIR, Lt Col Warren of 1/508 PIR and Capt. Bestebreurtje, a Dutch Liaison officer were not aware of any pre jump orders. It noted the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was defensive. This was written by Col Lindquist.
Regarding the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeke Heights, Capt. Westover while preparing the official US history of the US divisions taking part in Market Garden, and who was in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports, still found inexplicable discrepancies. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin: "What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavin’s reply: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.". There is no record of the conversation on this matter. Gavin then wrote to Westover saying: "Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission."
Gavin assumed the Germans would not reinforce their troops around Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the British paras in Arnhem could hold on indefinitely, it seems that Gavin had chosen this course of action. No real concerted attempt to capture Nijmegen bridge was made until XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen. XXX Corps successfully seized the bridge, delayed 36 hours, too late to save the British paras holding out on the Arnhem bridge.
Note: From US Official History:
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 3 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
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In 1941 the British were concurrently fighting in all theatres of war, in all corners of the globe and against better prepared forces of greater numbers. Germany’s war was regional, extending from their borders - all logistics went directly over land back to Germany, apart from North Africa where the Italians provided the sea transport back to nearby Italy. Italy and Vichy France too. Japan’s war was confined to a radius around Japan. Taking on all these countries and securing wins for the free World was pure brilliance. As well as achieving the first three victories against the ‘unstoppable’ German military war machine, Britain achieved that which no other nation in the world could even possibly dream of accomplishing in the early 1940s.
Britain fought a global war in the:
▪ Middle East;
▪ Far East;
▪ Indian subcontinent;
▪ Pacific;
▪ North Africa;
▪ West Africa;
▪ East Africa;
▪ North Atlantic;
▪ South Atlantic;
▪ North Sea;
▪ Barents Sea;
▪ Arctic Sea;
▪ Mediterranean;
▪ Adriatic;
▪ Mainland Western Europe;
▪ Eastern Europe;
▪ Scandinavia.
The British were the only military power in human history to fight in such globally spread theatres of conflict. For the third year running, Britain was propping up an ally - France, USSR, then the USA. The incompetence of US Navy to provide convoy protection on its east coast almost lost the allies the Battle of the Atlantic. Six hundred ships off the US eastern seaboard were lost in the first six months of 1942. Shipping losses climbed to a level that undermined British ability to supply themselves, keep the Soviets in the war, and keep reinforcements flowing to the Middle East and Asia. The British quickly deployed 60 escort vessels to cover the US coast. In 1942 the USA was a liability. For most of 1942 the British Commonwealth held the line, kept back the combined efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan, with minimal input from the USA compared to her potential power, keeping the Atlantic and Indian oceans open with supplies flowing to the vital armies in the Middle East and Asia, and to the USSR. No other empire in the history of the world has been capable of such a sustained multi-continent and multi-ocean operation.
In 1942 the British Commonwealth was fighting a three continent, four ocean campaign, against three major powers and keeping the USSR supplied The thousands of tanks and aircraft sent to the USSR would have saved Singapore.
The total British losses of territory and people in the early war were:
▪ One third of the territory the Soviets lost;
▪ Half of the people the Americans lost - mainly Philippines;
Yet those nations were fighting only on one front and only against one of the three powers. The British Commonwealth had far more ground troops in action against the Japanese than the Americans. Also the British were maintaining sea control over the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. And then provided aircraft carriers and cruisers to help in the Pacific - while the USA concentrated on just one of those theatres.
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Eisenhower's “in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine“
- Hamilton Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944
The above showed he had not much of a clue.
Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’: “I drew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously.
I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front.’ The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’ Brooke noted in his diary.
- Hamilton Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944
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@johnlucas8479
Monty didn’t plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery was largely excluded from the planning process.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
▪decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
▪rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
▪chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
▪Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
▪ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry....
These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, not Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning.
They took and kept 100km of ground up that road i.e. 90% of it. They NEARLY did it. They were not stopped where they set off, or even halfway up it. They got 90% of the way, within touching distance. Had the operation been planned a bit better by the air commanders and with more resources it would have worked.
Monty’s idea was actually a good one, as nearly all the relevant personnel involved agreed. Including the Americans. They (Eisenhower and Brereton) were the ones who had to agree with it and give it the go ahead. They very much liked the idea.
Eisenhower....
“I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.”
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