Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Imperial War Museums"
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BZZZZZT! Wrong answer.
doktorbimmer, the man who wrote:
"The first patent of a turbojet engine, which was later developed and produced, was that of Frank Whittle, now Sir Frank. His patent was applied for in January 1930. This patent shows a multistage, axial-flow compressor followed by a radial compressor stage, a combustor, an axial-flow turbine driving the compressor, and an exhaust nozzle. Such configurations are still used today..." and "From the beginning of his jet propulsion activities, Frank Whittle had been seeking means for improving the propulsive efficiency of turbojet engines. He conceived novel ideas for which he filed a patent application in 1936, which can be called a bypass engine or turbofan. To avoid a complete new design, Whittle sought an interim solution that could be merely "tacked on" to a jet engine. This configuration was later known as the aft fan. Whittle's work on fan jets or bypass engines and aft fans was way ahead of his time. It was of greatest importance for the future or turbopropulsion." and "In April 1937, Whittle had his bench-test jet engine ready for the first test run. It ran excellently; however, it ran out of control because liquid fuel had collected inside the engine and started to vaporize as the engine became hot, thereby adding uncontrolled fuel quantities to the combustion process. The problem was easily overcome. This first test run was the world's first run of a bench-test jet engine operating with liquid fuel.".
was ....
🍾🎉🎊 German engineer, Ohain 🍾🎉🎊
Zero points bimmer. Zero. Better luck next time.
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@freddieclark
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move. The Heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Gavin overrode any written Order, and fully emphasized verbally to Lindquist in England that the bridge was to be priority. Chester Graham, witnessed this.
Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights. Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, which could take time, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the Heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition.
There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the Heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion via the Groesbeek Heights. Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg.
Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge. Three stray men from a forty man patrol led by Trooper Atkins sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek Heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately. Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear. Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city." General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions.
The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out. On page 162 of the U.S. Official History: "many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulussen
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@chainz8573
XXX Corps never had red berets. The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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The Mustang was basically a British plane they had made in an American factory as UK factories were working 24/7. The British Air Ministry directed a six year old inexperienced company, North American Aviation, to the design points they wanted for their plane. British engineers assisted North American engineers who formulated the design in the British office in New York City over three months. Its prime aim was range so large fuel tank were designed as a part of the plane's structure. The Mustang was a British plane made by an American company for them. There was no US forces involvement in the concept, specifications or design. Many Americans lose sight of these fundamental points.
The Rolls Royce Merlin engine made the Mustang perform superbly. The plane initially used an Allison engine, which was only good at low level. The US were behind the British in engine supercharging with the Tizard Mission giving the USA details of advanced super charging. Also the cylinder head design of the Alison was not good enough for full supercharging. Stanley Hooker of RR developed the auto controlled twin-speed twin-charger supercharging technology which was given free to the USA. The first use of the Mustang by the US military was for ground attack because of the poor high level performance of the Allison engine.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by4lH2whhjk
In the early stages of WW2, the U.S. government allowed the British & French to by-pass them, allowing direct approaches to U.S. aircraft makers, as would the British government approach say Hawker. The British needed all types of planes urgently, even the P-40 which was inferior to their own front line planes. But warplanes they were, being useful in certain theatres and for training.
In early February 1940 the British asked North American Aviation's President Dutch Kindelberger to supply P-40s made under licence from Curtiss, as Curtiss could not supply demand. Unlike Curtiss, North American's factory was far from operating at full capacity. Kindelberger told the British, without any detailed design drawing, "I can build you a better airplane, and I can get it built fast". Contrary to popular belief in the USA, North American did not have a prototype ready design which the Brits just happened to have snapped up under the noses of the US military. The design was developed over three months with British engineers at the British Air Ministry's offices in New York City.
North American were first approached in Jan 1940, who had no "detailed drawings or plans". The British gave this young inexperienced company, who had never designed and built a complete combat plane a chance, but they would have to hold their hands. In Feb 1940 North American still never presented any detailed plans, mailing a design concept drawings to the British delegation in New York. This never had the famed laminar flow wings. The Air Ministry accepted the concept starting the Mustang project. The British Air Ministry accepted the inferior Allison engine as Rolls Royce were working flat out 24/7 unable to meet demand for Merlins. New Merlin shadow factories were being set up, and one in the USA, but not yet fully on-line.
In the interim from Feb to May, three months, the British Air Ministry were forming the fundamentals of the design concepts directing North American to Curtiss and NACA the developer of the laminar flow wings, to ensure a fighter with some leading edge design points, not produce another P-40 fly-alike wasting valuable time. The Air Ministry directed NAA to the Curtiss XP-46 experimental plane with all the leading edge design points of top European designs, with a few of their own, rolled into one.
NAA were ordered by the British Air Ministry to buy the plans and test results of the XP-46 plane from Curtiss and study them as they had never built a fighter, if they wanted the job, at a whopping $56,000, a lot of money at the time. Curtiss engineers always said the Mustang was their design. Not quite as the British Air Ministry had a lot to say in the leading design points - they were paying and calling the shots as it was their plane. There was a danger the Mustang may end up the same way as the XP-46 - a plane with leading edge points that never performed as expected. The plane needed to have long range built into the design. The British Air Ministry took a major gamble with NAA so were active in approving the emerging design points.
The Ministry wanted something better than the poor P-40, being prepared to wait, but realistically never expected Spitfire performance. Initially that was the case with the first deliveries using the Allison engine - better than a P-40 but no Spitfire. The initial Allison engined Mustangs filled an RAF niche, so no problems for the British at that point. A niche the plane filled was that the RAF needed a long range reconnaissance plane that could also perform ground attack being able as a low level fighter if the need was there. The Spitfire was a short range fast interceptor. With the fall of France the RAF needed a plane with range to penetrate over the German border from English air bases, they would now have one.
Reading many US books on the Mustang you would think the concept of the plane was to escort US bombers. That is way off from the truth. The last thing the British Air Ministry were thinking of when laying down the points of the plane was US bomber doctrine. The US were not even in the war. Initially the US military overall didn't want to know the plane. The British gave a handful to the Soviets before the USA was in the war who turned their noses up at it. The Mustang was not even in U.S. service when it was shooting down FW-190s by the RAF over France. The Air Ministry gave the U.S. military two planes which were left in the corner of a hangar for a long period, initially not assessed it. Quite amazing, as the USA never had a decent front line fighter at the time.
The excuse not to take up the plane by U.S. forces was that it was liquid cooled and vulnerable in frontal attack. This was a poor excuse to reject the plane because it wasn't theirs. What went over their heads was that the world's two best fighters locked horns in the Battle of Britain, both with liquid cooled engines. With British support, the Mustang finally was noticed by the U.S. Army Air Force. The US military had to go to England to fully assess the plane as it was finished off in Liverpool being flow by the RAF. They did eventually adopt the plane calling it the Apache and P-51 when in U.S. service.
UK and U.S. Mustangs for the European war theatre were finished off in Liverpool. They were test flown then delivered to the units by young English girls, many of them teenagers. The Mustang was built to British specification and design guidance without a doubt. They specified and paid for it. It never performed at all like the short range interceptor the Spitfire, not having the maneuverability of the Spitfire and was about useless above 15,000 feet. It was 'fine' and reasonably fast at low altitude with the Allison engine. It could operate over France and even Germany at a push, escorting bombers because of the longer range that the British Air Ministry specified. The Mustang filled an initial niche role for the British. continued......
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...Continued...
Rolls Royce. Rolls engineers under Ron Harker went to North American to advise on how to install a Merlin engine in the Mustang. They also gave advice from their work with the RR Mustang X. Rolls-Royce made the first proposal to North American regarding a Merlin 45 engine Mustang in 1940, after Stanley Hooker improved the power by 30%. This was before the plane was operational an still in the R&D stage. The RR Merlin was superior to the Alison engine, also to what it was in February 1940 when North American were first approached by the Air Ministry. The later Merlin 61 had the two-stage auto controlled supercharging developed by again by Stanley Hooker. This gave an extra 70 mph and 15,000 feet of operation to the Merlin. A quantum leap. The pilot just went where he liked without degradation in performance.
RR sent three engineers led by James Ellor to supervise the adaption and manufacture of a Merlin 61, built under licence in Detroit, the same type that was already being considered for the Rolls Royce Mustang X experimental series.
On 9 June 1942, the first memos from W/C I.R. Campell-Orde of the RAF Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford, revealed that an effort was being made to convince North American to adopt a Merlin-powered Mustang. Work in the US was setback due to an initial lack of interest and also to mechanical failures of the first Merlin engines built under licence in the USA. Both projects commenced at nearly the same time with the first Mustang X in the air about a month earlier than the North American XP-51B.
The RR Mustang-X programme was 5 or 6 airframes each with different experimentation. RR attempted to have North American accept British Merlin 61s (the two-stage superchargers) in American airframes, it is clear that the prime contractor (NAA) wanted to control the project as control was looking like it was to move over to the UK. NAA was essentially building production-standard aircraft rather than the experimental series that saw each of the RR Mustang Xs trying out new variations of design. An offshoot was the mid-engine RR Griffon engined Mustang that actually made it to the mock-up stage, albeit with a Merlin installed amidships. On the success of the RR Mustang-X built in Nottingham, the Air Ministry ordered hundreds from RR, who declined wanting to remain specialising in engines. NAA remained the prime contractor.
Rolls Royce mass produced Merlins in Crewe, Manchester and Glasgow, also licensing Packard in the USA, using idle US industry. The US made Merlins were to supply the Canadian aircraft factories - to avoid a two-way trans-Atlantic trip and give extra manufacturing when the engine proved very popular with many airframe makers. An agreement was reached in September 1940, with the first Packard built Merlin engine running in August 1941.
Early in 1944 the P-38, P-51B Mustang and P-47C, were dived by the British for compressibility testing at the RAE Farnborough, England at the request of the USAAF. They had trouble when these planes dived onto attacking German fighters when providing top cover for the bombers. The results were that the Mach numbers, the maneuvering limits, were Mach 0.68 for the P-38, Mach 0.71 for the P-47, and Mach 0.78 for the Mustang. The corresponding figures for the FW-190 and Me109 was Mach 0.75. The tests resulted in the Mustang being chosen for all escort duties. - Page 70, Wings On My Sleeve by Eric Brown, who did the test.
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@johnho7422
◾Market Garden was planned badly by mainly Americans, Brereton and Williams.
◾US 82nd failed to seize vital the Waal bridge
◾US 101st failed to seize the vital Zon bridge
◾British 1st Airborne moved onto the Arnhem bridge denying its use to the Germans.
◾XXX Corps powered up the road from Belgium reaching the Waal bridge at Nijmegen on schedule.
The British hardly put a for wrong having to take the Waal bridge for the 82nd. Ever since the operation the Americans have tried to whitewash their incompetency. In the US Official history they noted documents were inexplicably MISSING on Market Garden. They obviously smelled something and mentioned it in the history. ......
"Although extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files. The story has been reconstructed from unit records; Gavin's letters to Westover and OCMH; letters to OCMH from Colonel Warren, 5 July 1955, Colonel Lindquist, 9 September 1955, Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley formerly Executive Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry, 2 Sep 55, and Rev. Bestebreurtje, 25 Oct 56; a postwar interview with Colonel Lindquist by Westover, 14 Sep 45, copy in 82d Airborne Division Combat Interview file; and Westover, The American Divisions in Operation MARKET, a preliminary narrative written in the European theater shortly after the war, copy in OCMH. Captain Westover had access to all the combat interviews when writing his narrative."
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