Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Military History Visualized"
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Germany had no realistic ability to overrun the UK. The British knew what sort of chance the Germans had. The reason the Germans had no chance was that the British were ready and waiting with factories turning out the latest equipment 24/7. During the so-called Battle of Britain, the Royal Navy had a mass of ships at Gibraltar ready for offensive operations against the Italians, they took the invasion of Britain really so seriously.
The German Navy was near non-existent. The single battleship the British kept in Portsmouth was quite able to handle everything the Germans had on the surface, together with the four flotillas of destroyers. I'm not counting the Home Fleet, which had additional powerful ships. In other words, the British kept plenty of naval force at home. All they needed to deal with the Germans with a good deal to spare. Also, 55 Matilda 2 tanks, which was immune from German anti-tank guns, were sent to North Africa, the Brits took the invasion so seriously.
Admiral Raeder said he could not guarantee putting down an invasion force, even with German air superiority, when the Royal Navy was still there. General Jodl talked of his men going through a British mincing machine.
In Churchill's memoirs, he says that he was prepared to defeat tens of thousands of Germans if they invaded (take that as slaughter). Presumably even if they arrived with weapons and not half-dead from seasickness in a 24 hour sea trip in barges being attacked from sea, land and air. The British kept plenty of force at home, all they needed.
And what were the Germans supposed to do? Sortie with two or three heavy cruisers, and blast their way through the Home Fleet or the Channel defences? At that point in the war, Bismarck was still under construction, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were under repair from the Norway operation, two of six heavy cruisers sunk, two of six light cruisers sunk, and only five of those could be considered modern warships, a large number of their destroyers were sunk at Narvik. The repair status on the rest of the ships wasn't real good. The Germans never even had an effective torpedo plane. The Stuka dive bomber was predictable in that it dived vertically. It was easily shot down and suffered so many losses in the Battle of Britain it was withdrawn from the battle.
So, with the German navy whittled to almost nothing, and the army incapable of crossing with enough force to win, the only threats was the then small U-boats force and the Luftwaffe. The British were therefore sparing about sending the RAF overseas. I don't know of any significant deployment of Spitfires outside the UK until the second half of 1942, and escort vessels kept on being built. The RAF defeated the Luftwaffe over Dunkirk, so the Germans knew they were no push over.
If anyone thinks that operation Sealion was a serious attempt at an invasion they are deluded. Even German generals never took it seriously. An invasion in concrete barges towed by tugs and no navy to speak of? The Germans knew the UK had a large industry working 24/7, the same size as Germany's, and the largest navy in the world to their virtually none.
The RAF was large with a large bomber force, which the Germans could not knock out. Any invasion at the few suitable invasion beaches would be met at the beaches by all types of aircraft. These could be based out of Me 109 range. State-of-the-art fighters would still be produced 24/7. There would always be top line fighters around.
According to Guderian in "Panzer Leader", and by pretty much any historian to follow, Sealion (Zee Lowe?) could succeed only with complete air superiority over the invasion areas, and at least naval equality in the Channel. Hence the air Battle of Britain, hard fought and clearly won by Britain. Naval equality was a pipe dream for Germany, but a pipe smoked only if the Luftwaffe could attain a decisive victory. Given the failure of the prerequisite, there is really no point in debating the if Germans could invade the UK.
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Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze: page 442:
"Shipments of oil to Britain peaked at more than 20 million tons, nine times the maximum figure ever imported by Germany during the war. In January 1941, when Germany is sometimes described as being 'glutted' with oil, stocks came to barely more than 2 million tons. In London, alarm bells went off whenever stocks fell below 7 million tons. So great was the disparity that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, charged with assessing Germany's economic situation, had difficulty believing its highly accurate estimates of German oil stocks. To the British it seemed implausible that Hitler could possibly have embarked on the war with such a small margin of fuel security, an incredulity shared by both the Soviets and the Americans, who agreed in overestimating Germany's oil stocks by at least 100 per cent."
During 1941, Italy was only able to import 600,000 tons of fuel with 163,000 tons given to the navy. At this point the monthly consumption had to be reduced to 60,000 tons. The total amount of oil fuel available at the end of the year was about 200,000 tons. During this period it was decided to remove from service the older battleships. After the November British attack in Egypt, the high command and Mussolini requested that the Italian fleet defend the Libya-bound convoys. This paid off and was only possible by the special shipment of 80,000 tons of German oil fuel delivered at the end of the year.
On January 10th, 1942 the Italians informed the Germans that their navy’s supplies of fuel had dropped to 90,000 tons. During these months, the bottom was hit with reserves down to 14,000 tons. The situation deteriorated by the shipment of 9,000 tons of German oil fuel of quality too low to use. At the end of April, it was possible to import 50,000 tons of fuel oil per month from Romania. Suspending escort and mining missions by Italian cruisers reduced consumption. These cuts and new shipments allowed for the deployment of the whole Italian fleet during the battle with the British of mid-June. The Germans supplied fuel oil of only 10,000 tons in July 1942 and 23,000 tons in September. At the end of November 1942 the oil fuel reserve was about 70,000 tons plus all which was stored aboard the ships, This was enough for one sortie of the whole fleet. At the end of December, the old battleships Cesare, Duilio and Doria were removed from service.
The allied landing in North Africa in 1943 put the Italian navy in another state of fuel crisis. New missions were made possible by the shipment of 40,000 tons of quality German fuel oil. In January 1943, the fuel oil crisis reached its climax and the three modern battleships had to be removed from service eliminating the Italian battle force. The only naval division still operating was in Sardinia. Only 3,000 tons were received in February 1943 and in March and April the modern destroyers had to be removed from escort missions. By the 10th of April, the only major naval force was annihilated when the Trieste was sunk and the Gorizia seriously damaged by allied air attack. Expecting a possible Allied invasion, the remaining destroyers were reactivated along with the battleships which had only half their bunkers filled with diesel fuel.
In April 1943, the Italian navy was partially active and destroyers were used in escort missions. But there was no reserves of fuel oil left. The Germans "loaned" 60,000 tons of fuel oil captured from the French fleet at Toulon, allowing the three battleships to be reactivated with some cruisers. When Italy surrendered on September 8th 1943, their fleet only had enough fuel to reach Malta to surrender.
Such was the effect of the Royal Navy blockade, the most effective and forgotten operation of WW2.
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Nice find from the German archives. As David Fletcher said about the Churchill, "it came back to haunt the Germans". Its design was flawed in many aspects, however its assets were outstanding. It was a vastly underrated tank, as its overall performance showed.
The Churchill was a rushed together infantry tank design. They never had a proper tank engine for it, using two joined together bus engines creating a flat boxer engine (giving an advantage of a lowered centre of gravity). The tracks ran all around the tank's body, like a WW1 tank. The Germans saw it thinking it was just that, as it looked outdated in many ways, and outdated to other British tanks. It was viewed as an old expendable tank design, probably only used for one raid. The Churchill was introduced one month before the Tiger 1. The Churchill was similarly armoured to the Tiger 1, but weighed far less at 39 to the Tiger's 50 tons.
It is clear the German assessment was poor, in getting some matters wrong and also missing some unique aspects of the tank. They never tested it fully for sure, as if they did they would have discovered its amazing climbing ability. It could even turn on its own axis. Mark Felton did a good vid on its climbing ability, with a few of them wiping out a whole German column in Tunisia by climbing big hills the Germans never expected a tank could climb. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2p-izpDBZv4
The German assessment failed to full appreciate the Merrit-Brown gearbox, which was also used in the Centurion, which also climbed mountains in Korea to the amazement of the Americans. The throw away Churchill tank was also used in Korea.
No tank in WW2 had its climbing ability and none were better in beach shingle. Well over half the tanks at Dieppe got over the high beach wall, something the Germans seemed to miss. none got into the town as roads were blocked with large concrete blocks. As this vid points out, only a few were bogged down on the beach due to the shingle. The Germans tested their own tanks in beach shingle and all got bogged down. The tracks running all all around the tanks body gave the Churchill superior beach handling properties.
Only a few months after Dieppe, the Churchill was to be phased out, however it performed excellently at El Alemein, so kept on. Its unique properties came to the fore in the mountains of Tunisia. It was kept on with 400 of them being up-gunned in Tunisia.
The last version of the Churchill was a match for a Tiger 1, as the 6-pouder gun using APDS shells could knock out any Tiger 1 - and not with a lucky shot. Its armour was similar. The Tiger 1 was faster but the manoeuvrability and go anywhere nature of the Churchill gave it the edge. The Churchill could run over bridges the heavier Tiger could not. The Churchill did not need a tank transporter to get it around.
The Churchill was not used for tank v tank engagements, as its versatility and manoeuvrability were better used in other roles. The tank's ability to be adapted for various roles was seen by Hobart who developed it into many of the Funnies.
If you were a general of an army with adequate anti-tank guns to destroy enemy tanks, given the option of having 400 Tiger 1s (the tank many have a strange fascination about) or 400 Churchills, you would go for the Churchill as it was far, far, more versatile filling many roles an army needs. Bare in mind that most tanks were not knocked out by other tanks.
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"Even more remarkable, however, was the fact that, at key points in the line, the Soviets were able to back their superiority in manpower with a similar preponderance of guns, tanks and aircraft. The fact was that despite the optimistic newsreel propaganda, Speer and Milch were losing the battle of the factories. Even leaving aside the British and Americans, who produced under far more favourable circumstances, Germany was being outdone by the embattled Soviet Union. If there was a true 'armaments miracle' in 1942 it occurred, not in Germany, but in the armaments factories in the Urals. Despite having suffered territorial losses and disruption that resulted in a 25 per cent fall in total national product, the Soviet Union in 1942 managed to out-produce Germany in virtually every category of weapons. The margin for small arms and artillery was 3:1. For tanks it was a staggering 4:1, a differential compounded by the superior quality of the T34 tank. Even in combat aircraft the margin was 2:1. It was this industrial superiority, contrary to every expectation, that allowed the Red Army, first to absorb the Wehrmacht's second great onslaught and then in November 1942 to launch a whole series of devastating counterattacks."
-Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze:. Page 588
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The British won the Battle of Dunkirk. No miracles involved. The British BEF was only 9% of the total allied forces in France and the Low Countries. The huge French army collapsed in front of the British small army, which manned mainly the coastal areas. Nevertheless the German advance was halted in France as the British with a vastly inferior force stopped them at Arras. Some German soldiers turned and ran. Directive 13, issued by German Supreme Headquarters on 24 May 1940 stated specifically for the annihilation of the French, English and Belgian forces in the Dunkirk pocket. The Luftwaffe was ordered to prevent the escape of the British forces across the English Channel.
The German southern advance was stopped at Arras by the British with a numerically inferior force. The Germans never moved much further after. The Germans could not have taken Dunkirk, they would have been badly beaten in and around the town. The Luftwaffe was defeated over Dunkirk by the RAF with the first showing of the Spitfire en-mass. More German than allied planes were destroyed in the Dunkirk pocket. The first defeat of the Nazis in WW2 was by the British in the air battle over Dunkirk. Only six small warships were sunk at Dunkirk by the Germans as the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe blunted.
The British were retreating after the French collapsed in front of them - a programme already in motion, a programme already in motion before the Germans showed up, as General Gort saw the disjointed performance of the French forces in front of him, and the exceptionally poor leadership. If the French collapsed the small BEF had no hope against the large over two million strong German force heading west. French forces were amongst the British when General Gort decided to take the men back to England, as he did not trust the French in a joint counter-attack. French General Wiegand held a meeting to arrange a counter-attack not inviting General Gort head of the BEF. Gort was under the command of Weigand. Gort heard of the meeting rushing to be there. He got there after the French and Belgians had left. He ordered the evacuation, having no faith in the elderly French leaders.
All armies retreat and regroup when the need is there. There happened to be a body of water in the line of the retreat. Were the BEF to move down the English coast and enter France further west with more men from England? The Germans did not know what was to be the next British or allied move. The Germans could not have taken Dunkirk trying for nearly a week failing in the process. The British retreat operation was carried out as planned and in orderly fashion. All bridges to Dunkirk were destroyed by the allies.
The British counter-attack at Arras was with outdated Matilda 1 tanks, which only had machine guns, and a few of the brand new Matilda 2 tanks. The Germans fled in droves. In desperation the Germans turned a 88mm AA gun horizontally successfully against the Matilda 2 - their conventional anti-tank weapons and tanks could not penetrate the tank. The 88mm had hard shell shells made for it, to use against the Maginot Line's bunkers. The Matilda 2 would roll over German gun emplacements killing the gunners, not even using the guns. Rommel thought he had been hit by a force three times the size, which made them stop and rethink. The Germans countered with their superior numbers pushing back the British who fell back consolidating towards Dunkirk.
The British resolve and the new Matilda 2 tank made the Germans sit up and think about a street fight in Dunkirk against a consolidated force still with its weapons and the new Matilda 2 - the large 88mm would be useless in Dunkirk streets while the Matilda 2 would be in its element, with the Matilda 2 easily destroying the Panzer MkIII & MkIVs. The Matilda 2 could knock out any German tank at the time, while no German tank could knock it out. The Germans were expecting the Matilda 2 to be shipped over in numbers and for all they knew many were in Dunkirk, and some were. The Germans could not stop the tanks coming as the RAF controlled the skies with a CAP and the RN the waters of the Channel. Not a good prospect for the Germans. A Dunkirk street fight was a fight the German troops were untrained and unequipped for and unwise to get involved in.
Von Rundstedt and von Kluge suggested to Hitler that German forces around the Dunkirk pocket cease their advance, consolidating preventing an Allied breakout from Dunkirk. Hitler agreed with the support of the Wehrmacht. German preoccupation rightly was with an expected attack from the fluid south of the German lines, by mainly French and some British forces, not from dug-in Dunkirk which was too much of a formidable consolidated opponent, taking substantial resources to seize. The German column had Allied troops to each side with soft marshland to the south west of Dunkirk unsuitable for tanks. If German forces had engaged in a street battle for Dunkirk, they would be vulnerable on their weak flank from the south. In short the fast moving panzers were now static; German forces attacking Dunkirk in a battle of attrition would have been largely wiped out.
The German columns were consolidating their remaining armour for an expected attack by the British and French from the south, and the important resupply from Germany, which was slow as it was via horses - or maybe a combined attack from the south and the Dunkirk pocket. The Germans attacked on a remarkably narrow front. They had over-stretched their supply lines. The Germans had no option but to stop, being more concerned at defending from the mainly French forces in the south which were viewed as a greater threat than Dunkirk. French general Weigand implemented his creation of hedgehogs to attack German lines from the sides, with success - hedgehogs were adopted post war by NATO being a part of the tactics until the 1970s.
What were the Germans thinking? Are the British retreating to England from Dunkirk to move down the English coast and re-enter France further south with fresh forces, including Canadians and the new Matilda 2 tanks, which they feared, and join up with the French forces there to hit the Germans from the south? Are the British going to reinforce the Dunkirk pocket supplied by the Royal Navy with a 24/7 air CAP? The British did reinforce Dunkirk by taking over from England the 30th Tank Regiment and 20th Guards Brigade on the 25th and 26th May, with the Germans fully aware of this. Canadians landed further south. The British could easily do any of these as they controlled the Channel.
Reinforcing Dunkirk would create one large difficult to combat force. The Germans also saw the resolve of outnumbered British forces at Arras. German generals were trying to figure out what was happening. None thought that British troops would retreat to England and stay there. The British never did that sort of thing.
The Germans could divert most of their forces south to engage the French forces, then risk a Dunkirk breakout. This would mean being attacked from their rear fighting on two fronts. Or stay and consolidate, which they needed to do anyhow, awaiting a French/British attack from the south and use some forces and the Luftwaffe to attack Dunkirk. Which what they did. German forces resumed their attack on Dunkirk, after only a 36 hour delay, for over 6 days failing to seize the port.
The plan to break out of the Dunkirk Pocket using British, Belgian and French forces was abandoned as Gort had no confidence in the French. All military school studies since, knowing what the German and allied positions and situations were in 1940, have shown it would have succeeded.
The Germans were defeated at the Battle of Dunkirk. They tried militarily to seize the port but failed. Only because the British did not trust the French and moved back to England did the Germans eventually occupy the town. The Germans did not let the British get away that is misguided myth, they tried for a week simply not able to seize Dunkirk.
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As to the massive gamble of the German army in 1940, I will let others say it for me. Attacking France...
Wages of Destruction, Prof Adam Tooze:
"There’s always a problem in history of determining after something’s happened what the balance of probabilities was before it happened. And the German plan is a plan which is again a spectacular gamble, and it succeeds because the forces in the German offensive are concentrated in an extraordinarily tight pack which is going to drive through the Ardennes in a single offensive move all the way across northern France to the Channel. This is an operation of unprecedented logistical risk and gives the opponents of Germany - Britain, France, Belgium and Holland - the chance, if they’re sufficiently well organised, to mount a devastating counterattack on Germany and on the pincer moving across northern France. And for this reason the Germans fully understand that if this plan fails they’ve lost the war. So it’s, rather than simply the result of a series of coincidences, more that the Germans are simply taking a very, very high risk gamble. The gamble bears the possibility of total victory, which is what they ultimately achieve over France, but also a risk of catastrophic defeat which they’re fully conscious of."
Wages of Destruction, Page 371.
"The German army that invaded France in May 1940 was far from being a carefully honed weapon of modern armoured warfare. Of Germany's 93 combat ready divisions on May 10 1940, only 9 were Panzer divisions, with a total of 2.438 tanks between them. These units faced a French army that was more heavily motorised, with 3,254 tanks in total."
....Half the German tanks that invaded the west were armed only with a machine gun!! The German Army was not on equal footing with the French when in fact it was vastly inferior.
"By May 1940 Britain had 7 regiments equipped with 28 light tanks plus 44 scout carriers each. There was also 1 regiment of armoured cars with 38 Morris light reconnaissance cars. There was also an Army Tank brigade with two regiments of infantry tanks. That gave a total of 308 tanks 23 of which had a 2pdr gun the rest had machine guns. Ist Armoured Division started to arrive in France from late May. However many of the Cruiser tanks were so recently issued that their crews had only been half trained on them and many lacked wireless sets, sighting telescopes and even armour piercing ammunition."
-Source The Great Tank Scandal, David Fletcher
Dutch, Belgian, UK & French tanks in total were 4,200 tanks.
Prof Tooze, page 371/372.
"Nor should one accept unquestioningly the popular idea that the concentration of the Germans tanks in specialised tank divisions gave them a decisive advantage. Many French tanks were scattered amongst the infantry units, but with their ample stock of vehicles the French could afford to do this. The bulk of France's best tanks were concentrated in armoured units, that, on paper at least, were every bit a match for the Panzer divisions."
Page 377
"The Germans not only committed "all" their tanks and planes. In strictest conformity with the Schwerpunkt principle, they committed them on an astonishingly narrow front"
"the Luftwaffe sacrificed no less than 347 aircraft, including virtually all its transports used in the air landings in Holland and Belgium".
Page 378
"if Allied bombers had penetrated the German fighter screen over the Ardennes they could have wreaked havoc amongst the slow moving traffic"
"highly inflammable fuel tankers were interspersed with the fihting vehicles at the very front with the armoured fighting vehicles"
"The plan called for the German armoured columns to drive for three days and nights without interruption".
....The drivers were put on "speed" pills.
Page 379
"success would not have been possible had it not been for the particular nature of the battlefield. The Channel coastline provided the German army with a natural obstacle to pin their enemies, an obstacle which could be reached within few hundred kilometres of the German border."
"the Germans benefited from the well made network of roads"
"In Poland in 1939 the Wehrmacht had struggled to maintain the momentum of its motorized troops when faced with far more difficult conditions."
"a close analysis of the of the mechanics of the Blitzkrieg reveals the astonishing degree of concentration achieved, but an enormous gamble that Hitler and the Wehrmacht were taking on May 10."
Page 380
"because it involved such a concentrated use of force, Manstein's plan was a "one-shot affair". If the initial assault had failed, and it could have failed in many ways, the Wehrmacht as an offensive force would have been spent. The gamble paid off. But contrary to appearances, the Germans had not discovered a patent recipe for military miracles. The overwhelming success of May 1940, resulting in the defeat of a major European military power in a matter of weeks, was not a repeatable outcome"
Tooze, page 373:
"In retrospect, it suited neither the Allies nor the Germans to expose the amazingly haphazard course through which the Wehrmacht had arrived at its most brilliant military success. The myth of the Blitzkrieg suited the British and French because it provided an explanation other than military incompetence for their pitiful defeat. But whereas it suited the Allies to stress the alleged superiority of German equipment, Germany's own propaganda viewed the Blitzkrieg in less materialistic terms."
Tooze page 380.
"In both campaigns [France & Barbarossa], the Germans gambled on achieving decisive success in the opening phases of the assault. Anything less spelled disaster".
....If the belt broke the whole movement stopped. The Germans thought they had formulated a version of Blitzkrieg in France that was a sure-fire success. They used this in the USSR, just scaling up forces. They did not have the intelligence to assess properly, that the reason for their success was allied incompetence not anything brilliant they did.
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