Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Military History Visualized" channel.

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  12. The British BEF was only 9% of the total allied forces in France and the Low Countries. The German advance was halted in France as the British with a vastly inferior force stopped them at Arras. Some German soldiers turned and ran. Directive 13, issued by German Supreme Headquarters on 24 May 1940 stated specifically for the annihilation of the French, English and Belgian forces in the Dunkirk pocket. The Luftwaffe was ordered to prevent the escape of the British forces across the English Channel. The German advance was stopped at Arras by the British with a numerically inferior force. The Germans never moved much further after. The Germans could not have taken Dunkirk, they would have been badly beaten in and around the town. The Luftwaffe was defeated over Dunkirk by the RAF with the first showing of the Spitfire en-mass. More German than allied planes were destroyed in the Dunkirk pocket. The first defeat of the Nazis in WW2 was in the air by the British over Dunkirk. Only six small warships were sunk at Dunkirk by the Germans as the the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe blunted. The British were retreating after the French collapsed in front of them - a programme already in motion, a programme already in motion before the Germans showed up, as General Gort saw the disjointed performance of the French forces in front of him. If the French collapsed the small BEF had no hope against the large German force heading west. The French were still in front of the British when General Gort decided to take the men back to England, as he did not trust the French in a joint counter-attack. All armies retreat and regroup when the need is there. There happened to be a body of water in the line of the retreat. Were they to move down the English coast and enter France further west with more men from England? The Germans did not know what was to be the next British or allied move. The Germans could not have taken Dunkirk and they tried. The British retreat operation was carried out as planned and in orderly fashion. All bridges to Dunkirk were destroyed by the allies. The British counter-attack at Arras was with outdated Matilda 1 tanks, which only had machine guns, and a few of the brand new Matilda 2 tanks. The Germans fled in droves. In desperation the Germans turned a 88mm AA gun horizontal and it worked against the Matilda 2 - their conventional anti-tank weapons and tanks could not penetrate the tank. The Matilda 2 would roll over German gun emplacements killing the gunners. Rommel thought he had been hit by a force three times the size, which made them stop and rethink. The Germans countered with their superior numbers pushing back the British who fell back towards Dunkirk. The British resolve and the new Matilda 2 made the Germans sit up and think about a street fight in Dunkirk against a consolidated force still with its weapons and the new Matilda 2 - the 88mm would be useless in Dunkirk streets while the Matilda 2 would be in its element, and the Matlida 2 would have easily destroyed the Panzer mk3s. The Matilda 2 could knock out any German tank at the time, while no German tank could knock it out. The Germans were expecting the Matilda 2 to be shipped over in numbers and for all they knew many were in Dunkirk. The Germans could not stop the tanks coming as the British controlled the skies with a CAP and the waters of the Channel. Not a good prospect for the Germans. A Dunkirk street fight was a fight the German troops were untrained and unequipped for and unwise to get involved in. Von Rundstedt and von Kluge suggested to Hitler that German forces around the Dunkirk pocket cease their advance and consolidate and also to prevent an Allied break out from Dunkirk. Hitler agreed with the support of the Wehrmacht. German preoccupation rightly was with an expected attack from the fluid mainly French and some British forces to the south of the German line, not from dug-in Dunkirk which was too much of a formidable consolidated opponent, taking substantial resources to seize. The German column had Allied troops to each side and in front and there was soft marshland to the south west of Dunkirk unsuitable for tanks. If German forces had engaged in a street battle for Dunkirk, they would be vulnerable on their weak flank from the south. In short the fast moving panzers were now static; German forces attacking Dunkirk in a battle of attrition would have been largely wiped out. The Germans were consolidating their remaining armour and the important resupply from Germany, which was slow as it was via horses, for an expected attack by the British and French from the south. They had over-stretched their supply lines. The Germans had no option but to stop. The Germans were more concerned at defending from the mainly French forces in the south which were viewed as a greater threat than Dunkirk. French general Weigand implemented his creation of hedgehogs to attack German lines from the sides, with success - hedgehogs were a part of NATO tactics until the 1970s. The German were thinking, are the British retreating to England from Dunkirk to move down the English coast and re-enter France further south with fresh forces, including Canadians and the new Matilda 2 tanks, which they feared, and join up with the French forces there? The British could easily do that as they controlled the Channel. This would create one large difficult to combat force. German generals were trying to figure out what was happening. None thought that British troops would retreat to England and stay there. The British never did that sort of thing. The Germans could divert most of their forces south and risk a Dunkirk breakout and then risk being attacked from their rear fighting on two fronts, or stay and consolidate, which they needed to do, awaiting a French/British attack from the south and use some forces and the Luftwaffe to attack Dunkirk, which they did. German forces resumed their attack on Dunkirk for 6 days failing to seize the port and the surrounding pocket. There was a British plan to break out of the Dunkirk Pocket using British and French forces which was abandoned as Gort had no confidence in the French. All military school studies since, knowing what the German and allied positions and situations were, have shown it would have succeeded. This sounds strange, but the Germans were defeated at Dunkirk. They tried militarily to seize it but failed. Only because the British did not trust the French and moved back to England did the Germans eventually occupy the town. The Germans did not let the British get away that is misguided myth, they tried and simply could not seize Dunkirk.
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  24. The Battle of Britain was an attempt to establish German air superiority in daylight over Southern England, with a view to either: ♦ Allow Operation Sealion, the invasion of England to proceed; ♦ To force the British government to ask for peace terms by the loss of that air superiority over their own soil. The German aim was to obliterate RAF Fighter Command, which meant engaging them in the air. The German view of gaining air superiority gradually changed because of Luftwaffe losses,. Their decisions confirmed their change of stance:: ♦ Withdrawing Stuka ground attack dive bombers from combat on August 19 because of heavy losses. ♦ On September 3, Kesselring presented the case for attacking London in mass as the last attempt at forcing the British to the decisive air-to-air engagement, being the Luftwaffe's last chance for air superiority in a short time. ♦ On September 16, Goering still wanted to believe that Fighter Command could not sustain the fight. On September 23, Speidel's report to the OKW could not avoid acknowledging that the Germans would be using fighters during the day and bombers only at night. This precluded German total air superiority of fighters and bombers during the day. German fighters during the day had little chance of achieving the destruction of Fighter Command, because the British would not scramble for German fighter sweeps leaving German fighters flying around by themselves. The RAF would scramble for fighter-bomber attacks, but these would not cause mass combat leaving the RAF with ample planes, doing little to establish total German daylight air superiority for seaborne invasion purposes. The Germans being matched, and exceeded, in fighter technology made matters even worse for them. Lee Mallory's air defence system was the world's first 'intranet', on which all current air defence systems are based. It located, intercepted and engaged German bomber formations before they reached land. The threat of Sealion was over by September 15, having begun in August 1940. The British had more planes at the end of the battle than at the beginning, while German stocks of planes dwindled fast. On October 12, orders by Hitler made it clear that the preparations for an attempted invasion would only be carried on as a means to exercise pressure, however without damaging the German economy. In short, this order acknowledges that assuming Operation Sealion had not always been a bluff, it was from then on. By October 27, Enigma intercepts, aerial photos of the barge fleet being sent back into the German economy, the season, and the winding down of the Luftwaffe's daylight air activity convinced Churchill that Sealion wasn't coming and that the Luftwaffe was shifting to the siege strategy of night bombing, dropping sea mines, etc.
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  25. Germany had no realistic ability to overrun the UK. The British knew what sort of chance the Germans had. The reason the Germans had no chance was that the British were ready and waiting with factories turning out the latest equipment 24/7. During the so-called Battle of Britain, the Royal Navy had a mass of ships at Gibraltar ready for offensive operations against the Italians, they took the invasion of Britain really so seriously. The German Navy was near non-existent. The single battleship the British kept in Portsmouth was quite able to handle everything the Germans had on the surface, together with the four flotillas of destroyers. I'm not counting the Home Fleet, which had additional powerful ships. In other words, the British kept plenty of naval force at home. All they needed to deal with the Germans with a good deal to spare. Also, 55 Matilda 2 tanks, which was immune from German anti-tank guns, were sent to North Africa, the Brits took the invasion so seriously. Admiral Raeder said he could not guarantee putting down an invasion force, even with German air superiority, when the Royal Navy was still there. General Jodl talked of his men going through a British mincing machine. In Churchill's memoirs, he says that he was prepared to defeat tens of thousands of Germans if they invaded (take that as slaughter). Presumably even if they arrived with weapons and not half-dead from seasickness in a 24 hour sea trip in barges being attacked from sea, land and air. The British kept plenty of force at home, all they needed, two million regular soldier and one million Home Guard. And what were the Germans supposed to do? Sortie with two or three heavy cruisers, and blast their way through the Home Fleet or the Channel defences? At that point in the war, Bismarck was still under construction, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were under repair from the Norway operation, two of six heavy cruisers sunk, two of six light cruisers sunk, and only five of those could be considered modern warships, a large number of their destroyers were sunk at Narvik. The repair status on the rest of the ships wasn't real good. The Germans never even had an effective torpedo plane. The Stuka dive bomber was predictable in that it dived vertically. It was easily shot down and suffered so many losses in the Battle of Britain it was withdrawn from the battle. So, with the German navy whittled to almost nothing, and the army incapable of crossing with enough force to win, the only threats was the then small U-boats force and the Luftwaffe. The British were therefore sparing about sending the RAF overseas. I don't know of any significant deployment of Spitfires outside the UK until the second half of 1942, and escort vessels kept on being built. The RAF defeated the Luftwaffe over Dunkirk, so the Germans knew they were no push over. If anyone thinks that operation Sealion was a serious attempt at an invasion they are deluded. Even German generals never took it seriously. An invasion in concrete barges towed by tugs and no navy to speak of? The Germans knew the UK had a large industry working 24/7, the same size as Germany's, and the largest navy in the world to their virtually none. The RAF was large with a large bomber force, which the Germans could not knock out. Any invasion at the few suitable invasion beaches would be met at the beaches by all types of aircraft. These could be based out of Me 109 range. State-of-the-art fighters would still be produced 24/7. There would always be top line fighters around. According to Guderian in "Panzer Leader", and by pretty much any historian to follow, Sealion (Zee Lowe?) could succeed only with complete air superiority over the invasion areas, and at least naval equality in the Channel. Hence the air Battle of Britain, clearly won by Britain. Naval equality was a pipe dream for Germany, but a pipe smoked only if the Luftwaffe could attain a decisive victory. Given the failure of the prerequisite, there is really no point in debating the if Germans could invade the UK.
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  49. The Turning point of WW2 was the Battle of Moscow in Dec 1941. That was when Germany and Japan were doomed. ♦ Japan thought Germany would definitely win defeating the USSR soon after. The German defeat at Moscow would ensure Germany would not defeat the USSR. ♦ The Japanese entered WW2 on a presumption they would be linking up with Germany. It transpired they were alone fighting two massive powers with a third pinning their forces down and eventually fighting all three. Not at all what they wanted. ♦ Germany needed the Japanese to fight the British to keep them away from him as they were building up a massive air fleet to attack him. ♦ Germany needed US production, primarily aircraft, diverted away Germany. Japan would not attack the British empire, Dutch empire and the US unless Germany declared war on the USA. If Germany said no to declaring war on the USA, Japan would never have attacked and there would be no Pacific war. The two theatres were linked. Japan did not want to face alone the USA and the British empire. the worst case scenario. And that is what happened. The Germans attempted to get the Japanese to attack the British in the Far East to divert the British away from Europe. The UK was amassing a large air fleet and also had the world's largest navy. They would not sit by for long only fighting in the desert. The reason Germany attacked the USSR was to get their resources to fight the coming air war with the British. The Japanese repeatedly refused to declare war. Only when the Japanese thought the USSR was about to fall they joined in. The USSR kept 40 divisions opposite the Japanese Kwantung army all though WW2. With superior armour to the Japanese. Japan received assurances from Germany in the Spring of 1941. that they would declare war on the USA. Japan, economically could not sustain war of any length of time against any major power by itself, either the UK or the USA. Especially a war strung over a vast front. They imported most raw materials with their industry primarily artisan based, with little mass production. If going it alone, what the hell attacking the USA and British Empire was to achieve with no back up occupation force at Pearl Harbor defies belief. The Pearl Harbor attack was to fend off the US navy while they gain as much resource rich territory as possible in the south while the USSR threat is moved away from their north in China by the Germans. To Japan the key was the defeat of the USSR, which by Oct/Nov 1941 they thought was a foregone conclusion. All through WW2 the Soviets had approx 40 divisions (most armoured) in Siberia and the Soviet Far East facing the Japanese. Without Germany fighting the USSR anticipating a quick German win, the Japanese would never had attacked the USA and the British Empire. It was madness to do so unilaterally and would entail certain defeat - even the Japanese knew that. The Japanese were to eliminate the US Pacific fleet. The US Atlantic fleet would be occupied by the German U-Boats. The carriers got away at Pearl Harbor. If the carriers were sunk, the Japanese would not have been on the defensive by June 1942, giving them far more breathing space and lots more with the anticipated defeat of the USSR within months by the Germans. If the US carriers were sunk along with the US Pacific fleet, and the USSR defeated by summer 1942 by the Germans, Japan would be in very strong position. The Japanese gained far more territory than they gambled on. They were one day away in Singapore from surrendering, but the British beat them to the white flag. They were expecting more protracted battles in Malaya/Burma and even maybe in the Philippines. Using some common sense tells you the Japanese were not banking on being alone fighting the world's two largest economic powers. They were expecting at least the USSR to be neutralised or eliminated. And then some military aid from the Germans would be nice if it came. The link was enacted with 41 U-Boats operating from Penang. The Germans then would engage the British diverting them away from fighting the Japanese in Burma. Getting rid of the British and the Soviets was a major prize for Japan, and Germany could do the latter and both they thought the former. So was the notion. Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze in quotes: • The tripartite pact was signed in Sept 1940. If one is attacked the others come to their aid. • "The real nightmare of German strategy was the possibility that Japan might come to terms with the United States, leaving Germany to fight Britain and maybe America alone. To forestall this possibility, Hitler had offered to declare war on the United States in conjunction with Japan already in the Spring of 1941." • Germany had offered to declare war on the US before the June 1941 attack on the USSR. • "But the Japanese had refused to commit themselves and instead entered into a last round of negotiations with the USA." • "It was not until October and the fall of the Konoe government that Berlin could feel sure that the Japanese-USA talks were going nowhere." • "When in November 1941 Tokyo began to signal that Japan was about to commit itself against the West, it was the cause of relief, bordering on euphoria in Berlin. Finally Hitler and Ribbentrop had the chance to complete the global strategic alliance they had been hoping for since 1938. And they did not hesitate." • The Germans immediately started to revise the Tripartite pact, knowing of the Japanese commitment to war, at the German's insistence. • "Without prior knowledge of the Japanese timetable for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler pledged himself to following Japan in a declaration of war on the United States." • 7 Dec 1941, Japanese attack the USA at Pearl Harbor and British territories in Malaya and Hong Kong. • The amended Tripartite pact was signed by all, between the 7 Dec 1941, the attacks on the USA and British Empire, and Germany declaring war on the USA on 11 Dec 1941. • 11 Dec 1941 Germany declares war on the USA. Wages of Destruction is clear that the Germans were informed by the Japanese in November 1941 that they were to declare war. The attacks on the US and British Empire was no surprise to Hitler. He never knew the date or where. Wages of Destruction also states that Germany was repeatedly attempting to get Japan to declare war on the British empire to get them away from him. The Japanese knew exactly what the Germans wanted and what they would do. It all fits. As it turned out: ♦ The USSR was not defeated and maintained a large army opposite the Japanese - the Japanese had already been mauled by the Soviets in Manchuria in 1939. ♦ Japan was facing the worst case scenario, the scenario it feared - fighting alone against the British empire and USA, the world's two largest economic superpowers. ♦ This was not in the forecasting. The German army defeated militarily superior France within weeks and since June 1941 were mauling the USSR so badly it was obvious to the Japanese in late 1941 the USSR would be defeated. ♦ The week in which the Japanese attacked the USA and British Empire, the Soviets counter attacked at Moscow with a battering ram of superior T-34 tanks pushing the Germans back taking 30,000 prisoners, so ending any chance of Germany defeating the USSR in one swoop. A protracted war against the USSR would ensue. ♦ In Spring 1941, the Germans feared fighting the USA & the British alone - a worst case scenario for them. They were desperately worse off, fighting the British, USA and the USSR alone. ♦ If the Soviet counter attack had been one month earlier the Japanese would not have attacked the British and the USA - and most probably signed a pact with the USA which was in ongoing talks virtually to the attack on the British, Dutch and Americans.
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  50. The RAF was defeating the Luftwaffe with the Royal Navy vastly superior to anything the Germans and Italians combined could put to sea. The British were able to out-produce the Germans in aircraft even prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Although Germany had access to the industrial plant of Northern Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands they were not able to use it to match either the Soviets or the British in war production. Ironically, the 1940 conquests only burdened the German war economy since Western Europe was a net importer of food (animal & human), and raw materials burdening Germany to support them - the Royal Navy blockade was effective. French aircraft production aimed for Germany was minuscule. France had access to manufacturing plant and supplies of bauxite however was not able to produce as it imported coal from Britain for its electricity production. With the RN blockade the main source of coal for France became Germany. However Germany was not able to increase its production sufficiently to overcome the short fall. The amount of food produced in Europe fell. Previously the production of meat and dairy products in countries such as Denmark had been dependant on the import of grain and animal feed from the Americas. That was not available and the amount of food available for the dairy industry collapsed as did food production. In the rest of Europe food production had been based on the widespread use of chemical fertilizer. Apart from the issues of the RN blockade huge amounts of the chemicals used for fertilizer production was diverted to the making of explosives affecting agriculture. On January 10th, 1942 the Italians informed the Germans that their navy’s supplies of fuel had dropped to 90,000 tons. During these months, the bottom was hit with reserves down to 14,000 tons. The Italian navy at no time had enough fuel to perform all operations they wanted. French workers were moved on to subsistence rations and as the country had been dependant on motorized transportation. Most of France's oil imports came from abroad. Agricultural produce could not be distributed because of no fuel, and vehicles taken by the Germans, with milk being literally being poured away. In Germany on the outbreak of war the only available oil products came from Romania or from synthetic oil made in Germany. This was barely enough for the needs of the German armed forces and not enough to keep the Italian Navy operational. France reverted to a pre-petroleum transport economy. This economic background partially influenced Hitler's decision to invade the USSR. The USSR had the natural resources, including vital oil, that would enable European industry to out-produce Britain and America and face the coming air war with Britain. The two of them could only really get at each other in a big way by air. Roosevelt in May 1940 stated the US would build 50,000 planes a year - they built over 90,000 in 1944 alone. Hitler knew the lead time was approximately 18 months for a plane and that these planes, plus British production, which was greater than Germany's, would be coming his way. The British empire would not talk peace and would not sit back with Hitler knowing that. He had to be prepared with an equal air force. Even as German forces moved into the USSR in June 1941, German industry was moving over from army production to Luftwaffe production in preparation. Had Hitler won against Stalin, he would have gained unrestricted access to resources he needed to fight the British in an air war. The conquest of the Soviets was a key step in Hitler's strategy and not irrational. However the Soviets were able stand up to an invasion and better able to marshal their resources outlasting the Germans. The USSR in 1942 out-produced the USA in arms. Germany had 2.5 times the per capita GDP of the USSR. Invading the USSR was critical because Western European industry was dependent upon exports, with the RN blockade cutting them off.
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