Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Military History Visualized"
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Germany had no realistic ability to overrun the UK. The British knew what sort of chance the Germans had. The reason the Germans had no chance was that the British were ready and waiting with factories turning out the latest equipment 24/7. During the so-called Battle of Britain, the Royal Navy had a mass of ships at Gibraltar ready for offensive operations against the Italians, they took the invasion of Britain really so seriously.
The German Navy was near non-existent, being largely destroyed in Norway. The single battleship the British kept in Portsmouth was quite able to handle everything the Germans had on the surface, together with the four flotillas of destroyers. I'm not counting the Home Fleet, which had additional powerful ships. In other words, the British kept plenty of naval force at home. All they needed to deal with the Germans with a good deal to spare. Also, 55 Matilda 2 tanks, which was immune from German anti-tank guns, were sent to North Africa, the Brits took the invasion so seriously.
Admiral Raeder said he could not guarantee putting down an invasion force, even with German air superiority, when the Royal Navy was still there. General Jodl talked of his men going through a British _mincing machine_.
In Churchill's memoirs, he says that he was prepared to defeat tens of thousands of Germans if they invaded (take that as slaughter). Presumably even if they arrived with weapons and not half-dead from seasickness in a 24 hour sea trip in barges being attacked from sea, land and air. The British kept plenty of force at home, all they needed.
And what were the Germans supposed to do? Sortie with two or three heavy cruisers, and blast their way through the Home Fleet or the Channel defences? At that point in the war, Bismarck was still under construction, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were under repair from the Norway operation, two of six heavy cruisers sunk, two of six light cruisers sunk, and only five of those could be considered modern warships, a large number of their destroyers were sunk at Narvik. The repair status on the rest of the ships wasn't real good. The Germans never even had an effective torpedo plane. The Stuka dive bomber was predictable in that it dived vertically. It was easily shot down and suffered so many losses in the Battle of Britain it was withdrawn from the battle.
So, with the German navy whittled to almost nothing, and the army incapable of crossing with enough force to win, the only threats was the then small U-boats force and the Luftwaffe. The British were therefore sparing about sending the RAF overseas. I don't know of any significant deployment of Spitfires outside the UK until the second half of 1942, and escort vessels kept on being built. The RAF defeated the Luftwaffe over Dunkirk, so the Germans knew they were no push over.
If anyone thinks that operation Sealion was a serious attempt at an invasion they are deluded. Even German generals never took it seriously. An invasion in concrete barges towed by tugs and no navy to speak of? The Germans knew the UK had a large industry working 24/7, the same size as Germany's, and the largest navy in the world to their virtually none.
The RAF was large with a large bomber force, which the Germans could not knock out. Any invasion at the few suitable invasion beaches would be met at the beaches by all types of aircraft. These could be based out of Me 109 range. State-of-the-art fighters would still be produced 24/7. There would always be top line fighters around.
According to Guderian in "Panzer Leader", and by pretty much any historian to follow, Sealion (Zee Lowe?) could succeed only with complete air superiority over the invasion areas, and at least naval equality in the Channel. Hence the air Battle of Britain, hard fought and clearly won by Britain. Naval equality was a pipe dream for Germany, but a pipe smoked only if the Luftwaffe could attain a decisive victory. Given the failure of the prerequisite, there is really no point in debating the if Germans could invade the UK.
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Prof Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction
Page 371:
The German army that invaded France in May 1940 was far from being a carefully honed weapon of modern armoured warfare. Of Germany's 93 combat ready divisions on May 10 1940, only 9 were Panzer divisions, with a total of 2.438 tanks between them. These units faced a French army that was more heavily motorised, with 3,254 tanks in total.
Half the German tanks that invaded France and Low Countries in the west were armed only with a machinegun!! The German Army was not on equal footing with the French when in fact it was vastly inferior.
Tooze, page 371/372:
Nor should one accept unquestioningly the popular idea that the concentration of the Germans tanks in specialised tank divisions gave them a decisive advantage. Many French tanks were scattered amongst the infantry units, but with their ample stock of vehicles the French could afford to do this. The bulk of France's best tanks were concentrated in armoured units, that, on paper at least, were every bit a match for the Panzer divisions.
Page 378:
if Allied bombers had penetrated the German fighter screen over the Ardennes they could have wreaked havoc amongst the slow moving traffic with highly inflammable fuel tankers were interspersed with the fighting vehicles at the very front with the armoured fighting vehicles. The plan called for the German armoured columns to drive for three days and nights without interruption.
The drivers were put on speed pills.
Page 380:
_because it involved such a concentrated use of force, Manstein's plan was a one-shot affair. If the initial assault had failed, and it could have failed in many ways, the Wehrmacht as an offensive force would have been spent. The gamble paid off. But contrary to appearances, the Germans had not discovered a patent recipe for military miracles. The overwhelming success of May 1940, resulting in the defeat of a major European military power in a matter of weeks, was not a repeatable outcome.
Tooze, page 373:
In retrospect, it suited neither the Allies nor the Germans to expose the amazingly haphazard course through which the Wehrmacht had arrived at its most brilliant military success. The myth of the Blitzkrieg suited the British and French because it provided an explanation other than military incompetence for their pitiful defeat. But whereas it suited the Allies to stress the alleged superiority of German equipment, Germany's own propaganda viewed the Blitzkrieg in less materialistic terms.
Tooze page 380:
In both campaigns [France & Barbarossa], the Germans gambled on achieving decisive success in the opening phases of the assault. Anything less spelled disaster.
If the Blitzkrieg's belt broke the whole movement stopped. The Germans thought they had formulated a version of Blitzkrieg in France that was a sure-fire success. They used this in the USSR, just scaling up forces. They did not have the intelligence to assess properly, that the reason for their success was allied incompetence not anything brilliant they did. Germany never had the resources to fight a sustained war.
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@manilajohn0182
Yes, me again.
As to the wondrous German army I will let others say it for me. Attacking France...
Prof Adam Tooze, Wage of Destruction:
"There’s always a problem in history of determining after something’s happened what the balance of probabilities was before it happened. And the German plan is a plan which is again a spectacular gamble, and it succeeds because the forces in the German offensive are concentrated in an extraordinarily tight pack which is going to drive through the Ardennes in a single offensive move all the way across northern France to the Channel. This is an operation of unprecedented logistical risk and gives the opponents of Germany - Britain, France, Belgium and Holland - the chance, if they’re sufficiently well organised, to mount a devastating counterattack on Germany and on the pincer moving across northern France. And for this reason the Germans fully understand that if this plan fails they’ve lost the war. So it’s, rather than simply the result of a series of coincidences, more that the Germans are simply taking a very, very high risk gamble. The gamble bears the possibility of total victory, which is what they ultimately achieve over France, but also a risk of catastrophic defeat which they’re fully conscious of."
Wages of Destruction, Page 371.
"The German army that invaded France in May 1940 was far from being a carefully honed weapon of modern armoured warfare. Of Germany's 93 combat ready divisions on May 10 1940, only 9 were Panzer divisions, with a total of 2.438 tanks between them. These units faced a French army that was more heavily motorised, with 3,254 tanks in total."
....Half the German tanks that invaded the west were armed only with a machine gun!! The German Army was not on equal footing with the French when in fact it was vastly inferior.
"By May 1940 Britain had 7 regiments equipped with 28 light tanks plus 44 scout carriers each. There was also 1 regiment of armoured cars with 38 Morris light reconnaissance cars. There was also an Army Tank brigade with two regiments of infantry tanks. That gave a total of 308 tanks 23 of which had a 2pdr gun the rest had machine guns. Ist Armoured Division started to arrive in France from late May. However many of the Cruiser tanks were so recently issued that their crews had only been half trained on them and many lacked wireless sets, sighting telescopes and even armour piercing ammunition."
-Source The Great Tank Scandal, David Fletcher
Dutch, Belgian, UK & French tanks in total were 4,200 tanks.
Prof Tooze, page 371/372.
"Nor should one accept unquestioningly the popular idea that the concentration of the Germans tanks in specialised tank divisions gave them a decisive advantage. Many French tanks were scattered amongst the infantry units, but with their ample stock of vehicles the French could afford to do this. The bulk of France's best tanks were concentrated in armoured units, that, on paper at least, were every bit a match for the Panzer divisions."
Page 377
"The Germans not only committed "all" their tanks and planes. In strictest conformity with the Schwerpunkt principle, they committed them on an astonishingly narrow front"
"the Luftwaffe sacrificed no less than 347 aircraft, including virtually all its transports used in the air landings in Holland and Belgium".
Page 378
"if Allied bombers had penetrated the German fighter screen over the Ardennes they could have wreaked havoc amongst the slow moving traffic"
"highly inflammable fuel tankers were interspersed with the fighting vehicles at the very front with the armoured fighting vehicles"
"The plan called for the German armoured columns to drive for three days and nights without interruption".
....The drivers were put on "speed" pills.
Page 379
"success would not have been possible had it not been for the particular nature of the battlefield. The Channel coastline provided the German army with a natural obstacle to pin their enemies, an obstacle which could be reached within few hundred kilometres of the German border."
"the Germans benefited from the well made network of roads"
"In Poland in 1939 the Wehrmacht had struggled to maintain the momentum of its motorized troops when faced with far more difficult conditions."
"a close analysis of the of the mechanics of the Blitzkrieg reveals the astonishing degree of concentration achieved, but an enormous gamble that Hitler and the Wehrmacht were taking on May 10."
Page 380
"because it involved such a concentrated use of force, Manstein's plan was a "one-shot affair". If the initial assault had failed, and it could have failed in many ways, the Wehrmacht as an offensive force would have been spent. The gamble paid off. But contrary to appearances, the Germans had not discovered a patent recipe for military miracles. The overwhelming success of May 1940, resulting in the defeat of a major European military power in a matter of weeks, was not a repeatable outcome"
Tooze, page 373:
"In retrospect, it suited neither the Allies nor the Germans to expose the amazingly haphazard course through which the Wehrmacht had arrived at its most brilliant military success. The myth of the Blitzkrieg suited the British and French because it provided an explanation other than military incompetence for their pitiful defeat. But whereas it suited the Allies to stress the alleged superiority of German equipment, Germany's own propaganda viewed the Blitzkrieg in less materialistic terms."
Tooze page 380.
"In both campaigns [France & Barbarossa], the Germans gambled on achieving decisive success in the opening phases of the assault. Anything less spelled disaster".
....If the belt broke the whole movement stopped. The Germans thought they had formulated a version of Blitzkrieg in France that was a sure-fire success. They used this in the USSR, just scaling up forces. They did not have the intelligence to assess properly, that the reason for their success was allied incompetence not anything brilliant they did.
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War Production:
Keegan, World War Two, chapter War Production:
♦ Germany was third behind the USA, then the UK in GDP,
in 1939. Germany = UK in capital goods production in 1939.
♦ UK economy grows 60% during WW2.
♦ Hitler says to Guderian, re: USSR, "had I known they had so
many tanks as that, I would have thought twice before
invading"
Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze, Preface, xxiii:
"Combined GDP of the UK and France exceeded Germany & Italy by 60%."
Tooze, page 454:
"It was poor because of the incomplete industrial and economic development of Germany".
Interesting:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/publications/twerp603.pdf
Snippets:
"Soviet exceeded German GDP in 1940"
"The Allies won the war because their economies supported a greater volume of war production and military personnel in larger numbers. This was true of the war as a whole, and it was also true on the eastern front where the Soviet economy, of a similar size to Germany's but less developed and also seriously weakened by invasion, supplied more soldiers and weapons."
"the technological key to Soviet superiority in the output of weapons was mass production. At the outbreak of war Soviet industry as a whole was not larger and not more productive than German industry. The non-industrial resources on which Soviet industry could draw were larger than Germany's in the sense of territory and population, but of considerably lower quality, more far-flung, and less well integrated. Both countries had given considerable thought to industrial mobilisation preparations, but the results were of questionable efficacy. In both countries war production was poorly organised at first and productivity in the military-industrial sector had been falling for several years. The most important difference was that Soviet industry had made real strides towards mass production, while German industry was still locked into an artisan mode of production that placed a premium on quality and assortment rather than quantity. Soviet industry produced fewer models of each type of weapon, and subjected them to less modification, but produced them in far larger quantities. Thus the Soviet Union was able to make considerably more effective use of its limited industrial resources than Germany.
"Before the war Soviet defence industry was in a state of permanent technological reorganisation as new models of aircraft, tanks, and other weapons were introduced and old ones phased out at dizzying rate."
The USSR had access to oil from the British refinery in Iran, more natural resources and far more men. Making their ability to produce far greater than Germany, which actually happened.
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