Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
-
2
-
Germany's biggest mistake was declaring war in the first place. Once they waged war when was the point they could not win? That was when the British refused to make peace in June 1940. With Britain still in the war the Royal Navy blockade starved Germany, and the Axis, of vital resources, including food (animal & human) and oil. Britain was even buying up rare metals from Turkey to ensure the Germans did not have them.
The Royal Navy controlled and freely sailed the eastern Atlantic and the eastern Mediterranean, controlling both entrances to the Mediterranean. They even had Malta all through WW2, on the doorstep of Axis Italy. Britain's land forces were from Turkey to Libya. Essentially the British surrounded Europe, controlling the sea lanes.
The Royal Navy ensured the conflict with Germany would continue. Germany could not win from June 1940 onwards. Being a largely landlocked country, Germany's forces were heavily based on its army, while Britain's was heavily based on its navy and air force with a small highly mobile army. Geography dictated the forces makeup of each country. Germany could not remove Britain from the war having pretty well no surface fleet to Britain having the largest navy in the world. However, Britain could remove Germany from the war.
Britain's approach was that every operation was to bleed Germany of resources, especially oil. Operations in Norway and Greece forced the Germans to deploy troops to these areas but also its surface fleet, which mainly was destroyed in Norway. The German occupied countries were also under the blockade, which were also a drain of German resources.
The British, because of its armed forces structure of massive navy, large air force and small highly mobile army were unable to engage the Germans on the European land mass, on which Germany had a massive army. Apart from the air, the two countries could not get at each other directly. Britain's war then was partially an economic war. Every German operation against the British had to be decisive whereas the British could lose to the Germans while still asserting economic pressure in its favour. This was the British way of war being very good at it. Britain used similar tactics against Germany in WW1 to devastating effects. This approach was used against the French on multiple occasions over 200 years. Smaller nations in Europe would follow Pax Britannica due British naval dominance. Britain could dictate any war's outcome by blocking trade and resources to one side or another.
The Germans like most of Europe relied on imported oil, raw materials and food (animal & human). For the Germans these resources can only come from two regions - the USSR or the rest of the world. By removing the rest of the world from the grasp of the Axis, the British forced the Germans to acquire Soviet oil - Romania did not produce enough. Hitler had no choice but to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 because of the resources situation. He needed the resources of the USSR to fight the coming air war with Britain. In May 1940 Roosevelt stated the USA would produce 50,000 planes per year. Most of these would be directed towards Germany with British production on top.
Germany greatly expanded its U-Boat fleet to reciprocate, also launching a partial economic war on Britain. The popular view was that this fleet was to starve Britain into submission. That was partly valid but a high hope given the naval resources of the two nations. It was also to divert and lock up Royal Navy resources in a defensive role of convoy protection and U-Boat hunting, allowing merchant ships to enter Germany and the occupied countries more freely.
Germany had been forced into a situation by the British that they knew they could not escape from. Even if Germany had seized the Caucuses' oil fields intact (the Soviets sabotaged them to the point new deep bore holes would need to be drilled) the British would have focused them for their bombing campaign operating from the Middle East - there were plans to bomb them as Britain held nearby Iraq and occupied Iran. This was to drain Germany of vital oil. Every British victory in Africa was decisive and every German victory was not, even if Germany won an operation, they were still being bled. Unless Germany could seize the Suez Canal and beyond, the British could just come back year after year and counter attack with new tanks and new men, with resources not being a problem for them.
Germany knew that they could not invade Britain as the royal Navy was just too powerful. The RAF could replace losses far quicker than they could, as they found out in the air Battle of Britain. Germany could not put their large army on British soil.
After June 1940 Germany had an enemy it couldn't defeat, not entertaining peace, and economically throttling them every day of the war. Germany never had time, the British did. The German invasion of the USSR with an army short of resources due to the Royal Navy blockade and RAF bombing of Germany, may have quickened the war's end for Germany, however it was not the point that Germany was doomed. Germany had already lost the war, it was just a matter of time when Germany collapsed.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Bob Finkenbiner
Only one blame as that goes to Gavin who never went for the bridge immediately.
Gavin was supposed to get to the bridge as soon as landing. He failed too. Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. Because the 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. They were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by 19 guards. Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began
to fall from the sky." Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, _the
1st Battalion marched off towards their objective,
De Ploeg, three miles away." Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing recon
in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their
newly constructed regimental command post, which
they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist
"was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move
into Nijmegen." Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared
to move towards Nijmegen at all. Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his
Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ
of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the
underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send
a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small,
just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a
radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's
original position, and placed him in the middle of the town.
It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt
to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up
due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the
next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and
was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge
yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were
attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from
Nijmegen completely. - Poulussen
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
"on 16 November, Patton’s attack, from which so much had been expected — and been promised — had already stalled. Since the end of August Patton had been promising that he would have Metz, the Saar, the West Wall, and probably the Rhine in a matter of days. Two and a half months later none of these objectives had been taken or were in any danger of being taken."
"The reasons for this failure are much the same as those given for the failure of other parts of Eisenhower’s broad front strategy: Eisenhower’s constant vacillation; logistics; the weather; failure to concentrate; the enemy’s resistance; the lack of a strategic plan. The point here is that, in spite of all his bluster, Patton had done no better than anyone else — and weakened Eisenhower’s strategy in the process. This is not chauvinism. The Lorraine campaign is widely regarded as a disaster, even among US historians. Patton’s biographer, Carlo d’ Este, writes that Patton:
"... had failed to concentrate his forces for
a decisive attack that might have taken Metz,
then refused to accept that he had anything to
do with that setback. A series of piecemeal attacks
were nothing more than a return to the penny-packet
warfare that had fared so badly in North Africa. In short,
instead of the hoped for triumph, Lorraine became
Patton’s bloodiest and least successful campaign."
Nor were the Germans any more charitable. When Metz finally fell on 22 November, after heavy fighting in the streets of the town and the tunnels of the fortifications, the commander of the defenders, Lieutenant General Hermann Balck of Army Group G declared that the German success in defending the city for so many weeks was due to ‘the bad and timid leadership of the Americans’, a comment that would have cut Patton to the bone. There was also the cost; the three-month Lorraine campaign cost the Third Army no fewer than 50,000 casualties, about one third of all the casualties Third Army sustained in the entire European war."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2