Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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Monty did not plan Market Garden, coming up with the idea and broad outline only. Montgomery was largely excluded from the planning process. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF.
The failure points that two US para units, the 101st and the 82nd, failed to seize their bridges. It was Bereton and Williams who:
âȘ decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset;
âȘ rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet; chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges;
âȘ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity;
âȘ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of âpossible flak.â;
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made "remarkable" progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around, spending 2 hours in the village. The Germans blew the bridge when they finally reached it. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon, being right on time. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move.
The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. Browning and Gavin naturally did not want German troops between the LZ and the bridge, so the Heights had to be occupied and secure. The 508th CP would be established at the Heights.
Gavin understood the priorities in sending the 508th to the bridge and Groesbeek heights immediately, with Coln Warren's battalion of the 508th assigned the bridge. To get to the bridge from the DZ you have to pass the Groesbeek Heights, so any enemy at the Heights naturally had to be subdued, then secure the area, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge.
It took the 665 men of 508th a painfully slow 3.5 hours to march a few miles from the DZ to the heights, reaching the Groesbeek heights at 1730. They encountered only a few Labour troops in opposition. There were no Germans at the Groesbeek Heights as forward scouts relayed back the situation. Instantly, the Wall bridge became the priority. So, on route Coln Lindquist the head of the 508th could have sent Warren's A and B companies directly to the priority, the Waal bridge, bypassing the Groesbeek Heights, immediately via the riverbank as instructed by Gavin. The rest of the battalion could move to the empty Groesbeek Heights setting up defences at De Ploeg on the Heights. Dutch resistance men informed the 508th that the Germans had largely cleared out of Nijmegen with only 19 guards on the bridge. So all was easy and fine, so the two companies assigned the bridge could move immediately to their objective without a diversion in setting up shop on the Groesbeek Heights.
Despite hearing the good news from the Dutch Underground, Lindquist in command of the 508th was not moving at all, keeping all his men static at De Ploeg. Lindquist was waiting for a Divisional Order from Gavin informing him that the DZ was secure, then send Warren's battalion to the bridge. When Gavin found out Lindquist was static via a liaison officer he was livid, running over to De Ploeg in a Jeep telling Lindquist to get moving to the bridge. Even then, took Lindquist another two hours to send men in force to the bridge.
Three stray men from a forty man patrol sent to the bridge immediately by Warren to confirm what the Dutch Underground told them on reaching DePloeg, took the guards on the south end of the bridge prisoner. They left when no one turned up. When leaving they saw hundreds of Germans pour from the north onto the previously lightly guarded bridge. Later, a company of Warren's main force became lost when they eventually moved towards the bridge. By the time Warren's two companies did reach the bridge in force, the Germans had reinforcing the bridge with hundreds of men. Too late. The first attack on the bridge was just before midnight, 10.5 hours after landing.
âȘ The 82nd were expecting German resistance from the east, however it came from the north via the Nijmegen bridge.
âȘ Gavin was expecting Lindquist to secure the Groesbeek heights, which were devoid of enemy forces, then immediately move to the bridge, which meant sending Warren's battalion immediately.
âȘ Lindquist was expecting Gavin to notify him that the DZ was clear.
Gavin was expecting Lindquist to go to the bridge when it was obvious the Groesbeek heights, on the way to the bridge, were secure. As no Germans were about, the heights were naturally secure. Regarding Lindquist's expected clearing of the LZ before moving from DePloeg. Lindquist did write a Field Order for the 508th on 13 September copied to Gavin, stating that once the heights were secure he would wait for a Divisional Order [from Gavin] to move. Two days later at the jump briefing Gavin verbally overruled Lindquist's Field Order, using a map he told him that he should move to the bridge "without delay". Poor command communications by Gavin.
Poulussen, in Lost at Nijmegen discovered that the 508th jumped without any written offensive orders from Gavin. All was verbal from Gavin to Lindquist of the 508. Chester Graham, the 82nd liaison officer, was at the pre jump meeting in England. He said there was no ambiguity amongst anyone there that the Waal road bridge was the prime target.
In 1945 Historical Officer, Capt. John Westover of the US Army Centre of Military History, was wanting confirmation that if the capture of the Nijmegen bridge had been part of the objectives. In response, dated 25 July 1945, General Gavin was clear: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping well, I personally directed Col Lindquist, commanding the 508 PIR to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen Bridge without delay after landing but to keep a close watch on it in the event he needed to protect himself against the Reichswald and he was cautioned to send the battalion via the east of the city.
General Browning never knew men were static at De Ploeg. Like Gavin he was expecting men to be seizing the bridge. Being corps commander, he was busy attempting to communicate with all three parachute divisions. The 82nd did launch a few failed attacks on the bridge. In the afternoon of the next day, 18th, Gavin asked permission to launch another attack. Browning, seeing the bridge was well defended, and the failed attacks, refused, opting to wait for XXX Corps to arrive to seize the bridge. Inexplicably Gavin moved all his men out of Nijmegen town completely to the heights and DZ, giving the town back to the Germans. This made matters worse when XXX Corps arrived who had expended vital time, and ammunition, in flushing them out.
On page 162 of the U.S. Official History:
"many documents regarding the extensive combat interviews were conducted with personnel of the 508th Parachute Infantry, they are inexplicably missing from Department of the Army files."
Read:
1) Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History Of The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment In World War II by Phil Nordyke.
2) Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergström.
3) Market Garden, Then and Now by Karl Magry.
4) Lost at Nijmegen by R Poulusson
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â @flyoptimum
I prefer facts. In the official US History written by Charles MacDonald in 1963 noticed conflicting statements. Capt. Westover, a US Army historical officer, who had access to all the 82nd Divisional records could find no record of these orders. Official US history determined that Col Lindquist of 508 PIR, Lt Col Stanley of 508 PIR, Lt Col Warren of 1/508 PIR and Capt. Bestebreurtje, a Dutch Liaison officer were not aware of any pre jump orders. It noted the only guidance for the men of 508 PIR was Field Order No 1 which was defensive.
Regarding the shift in priorities from the bridge to Groebeeke Heights, Capt. Westover while preparing the official US history of the US divisions taking part in Market Garden, and who was in possession of after action reports, unit diaries and official reports, still found inexplicable discrepancies. Capt. Westover asked Gen Gavin: "What person, staff or headquarters made the decision to apportion the weight of the 82nd AD to the high ground rather than the bridge at Nijmegen?" Gavinâs reply: "This decision was made by myself and approved by my Corps Commander.". There is no record of the conversation on this matter. Gavin then wrote to Westover saying: "Even if we were driven off the low ground, around the bridges, if the high ground could be held, ultimately the Second Army could accomplish the mission."
Gavin assumed the Germans would not reinforce their troops around Arnhem and Nijmegen, and the British paras in Arnhem could hold on indefinitely. Gavin had chosen this course of action. No concentrated attempt to capture Nijmegen town or the bridge was made until XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen. XXX Corps successfully seized the bridge, albeit too late to save the British paras holding out on the Arnhem bridge.
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The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official AMERICAN Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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â @mgt2010fla
"The Allied armies closing the pocket now needed to liaise, those held back giving way to any Allied force that could get ahead, regardless of boundaries â provided the situation was clear. On August 16, realising that his forces were not able to get forward quickly, General Crerar attempted to do this, writing a personal letter to Patton in an attempt to establish some effective contact between their two headquarters and sort out the question of Army boundaries, only to get a very dusty and unhelpful answer. Crerar sent an officer, Major A. M. Irving, and some signal equipment to Pattonâs HQ, asking for details of Pattonâs intentions intentions and inviting Patton to send an American liaison officer to the Canadian First Army HQ for the same purpose.
Irving located but could not find Patton; he did, however, reach the First Army HQ and delivered Crerarâs letter which was duly relayed to Third Army HQ. Pattonâs response is encapsulated in the message sent back by Irving to Canadian First Army; âDirect liaison not permitted. Liaison on Army Group level only except corps artillery. Awaiting arrival signal equipment before returning.â Irving returned to Crerarâs HQ on August 20, with nothing achieved and while such uncooperative attitudes prevailed at the front line, it is hardly surprising that the moves of the Allied armies on Trun and Chambois remained hesitant."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
Patton refused to liaise with other allied armies, exasperating a critical situation.
"This advance duly began at 0630hrs on August 18 which, as the Canadian Official History remarks, âwas a day and a half after Montgomery had issued the order for the Canadians to close the gap at Trun, and four and a half days after Patton had been stopped at the Third Army boundaryâ. During that time, says the Canadian History, the Canadians had been âfighting down from the north with painful slownessâ and the Germans had been making their way east through the Falaise gap. They were not, however, unimpeded; the tactical air forces and Allied artillery were already taking a fearful toll of the German columns on the roads heading east past Falaise.
Pattonâs corps duly surged away to the east, heading for Dreux, Chartres and OrlĂ©ans respectively. None of these places lay in the path of the German retreat from Normandy: only Dreux is close to the Seine, Chartres is on the Beauce plain, south-east of Paris, and OrlĂ©ans is on the river Loire. It appears that Patton had given up any attempt to head off the German retreat to the Seine and gone off across territory empty of enemy, gaining ground rapidly and capturing a quantity of newspaper headlines. This would be another whirlwind Patton advance â against negligible opposition â but while Patton disappeared towards the east the Canadians were still heavily engaged in the new battle for Falaise â Operation Tractable â which had begun on August 14 and was making good progress."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
Instead of moving east to cut retreating Germans at the Seine, Patton ran off to Paris. John Ellis in Brute Force described Patton's dash across northern France as well as his earlier âmuch overratedâ pursuit through Sicily as more of âa triumphal procession than an actual military offensive.â
Read: Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds and_Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies_ by Harry Yeide
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@mgt2010fla
There has been a tradition in the world of downgrading Britain's contribution to WW2, especially in the USA. The British fought a highly technological and industrial war and did so very efficiently. Britain used not only her vast empire but her even larger trading empire to great effect - an army of 2.6 million marched into Burma - the US had nowhere near that many ground troops against the Japanese. The British, with its massive navy, surrounded the Axis, from the Med (cutting off both entrances to the the Med) to the Eastern Atlantic, starving them of food, natural resources and oil, and ensuring where the battles would be fought.
Steel not flesh was the slogan. The British assessed that having massive armies is highly inefficient. The larger the army the higher the casualties. Britain deliberately chose to keep numbers of front line troops as low as possible building machines and using technology advances instead - the BEF in France was the first army were men never marched - fully motorised. The Kangaroo was the first armoured personnel carrier developed in WW2 from adapted tanks, saving many lives, in contrast to the horrendous US casualties. The policy worked, despite fighting for the duration, the only major country to do so, and all around the globe, the country had only lost around 440,000, which is half the British dead of the 1914-1918 war, which lasted two years less. Germany and the USSR lost considerably more troops than they had in WW1.
From the war came amazing British inventions: the cavity magnetron, electronic computer, the worldâs most advanced jet engines, anti-submarine electronics, the proximity fuse, as well as the Liberty ship (a Sunderland design), to name but a few. Massive developments in manufacturing, with a staggering 132,500 aircraft and over one million military vehicles. Canada alone produced more wheeled vehicles than Germany.
From the first American servicemen arriving in Britain in 1942, until VE Day, the British provided the USA with 31% of all their supplies in the European Theatre of Operations. Britain's war effort was astonishing â backed by their insistence in continuing the fight in 1940. The British made an enormous contribution to winning the war, being the key agents. This had a positive effect on the future of the world. The declinist view of Britain in the war must be dispelled for good.
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@thevillaaston7811
Montgomery gave the end time of Normandy, which came in ahead of schedule, the bits between were put in by his planners, who needed something to fill in. Monty allowed them to puts some in. Caen was strategically unimportant.
"the timings, when all this was going to happen. The answer is again found in the strategic plan, which states that the Allied armies would have driven the Germans back to the Seine on or about D plus 90, say September 1. Various intermediate targets â phase lines â were introduced into the plan but these were largely, as stated above, for administrative reasons, to give the logistical planners some time frame. Indeed, when Lt Colonel C. P. Dawnay, Montyâs military assistant, was helping his chief prepare for the first presentation of plans on April 7, 1944, eight weeks before D-Day, he asked Montgomery where the phase lines should be drawn between D-Day and D plus 90?
Monty replied, âWell, it doesnât matter, Kit â draw
them where you likeâ. âShall I draw them equally, Sir?â,
asked Dawnay. âYes, thatâll doâ, replied Montgomery.
Montgomery knew that whatever was intended two months before the landing would be altered the minute the troops went ashore. Even so, two other points need explaining. The first is that changes in plan in the course of the battle were only to be expected â and hardly matter if the overall aim of the campaign is kept broadly on track.
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
"The ground force plan for Overlord had been drawn up by Montgomery â and approved by Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff â and in that plan the city of Caen was to be taken â or effectively masked â on D-Day"
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
"The Second Army plan states âThe capture and retention of Caen is vital to the Army plan.â This intention is confirmed when the final Army plan for D-Day â Order No. 1, was issued on April 21. âI Corps will capture Caenâ.
Then matters grow cloudy. The orders issued by I Corps do indeed restate that the capture of Caen is vital to the Army plan and confirm that âthe task of 3 British Division is to capture Caen and secure a bridgehead over the river Orne at that placeâ, which could hardly be more definite. However, the detailed order goes on to state that, â3 Brit Inf Div should, by the evening of D-Day, have captured or effectively masked Caen, and be disposed in depth with brigade locations firmly established, north-east of BĂ©nouville in support of 6th Airborne Division ... having taken over the BĂ©nouvilleâRanville crossing ... and north-west of Caen, tied up with the left forward brigade locality of 3 Cdn Inf Divâ.
So far so good, but the order goes on: âShould the enemy forestall us at Caen and the defences prove to be strongly organised, thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event, 3 Brit Inf Div will contain the enemy in Caen and retain the bulk of its forces disposed for mobile operations outside the covering position. Caen will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit its usefulness to the enemy and make its retention a costly business.â
This is, in fact, what actually happened and it is interesting that this counterproposal was made well before 3rd Infantry Division went ashore. It therefore appears that the major unit most directly concerned with the capture of Caen on D-Day â Lieutenant-General Crockerâs I Corps â already had an alternative strategy in place to that of the Allied Commanders, Eisenhower and Montgomery but only should the defences prove too strong. This again seems sensible â no plan survives the first contact with the enemy etc."
-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
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@mgt2010fla
Of the 46 antiquated, leaking, rusting and hardly operational WW1 destroyers supplied to Britain by the USA, few were ever used being scrapped. The few used, taking valuable and considerable shipyard time to get into use antiquated junk, were given to the USSR, France, Poland and Norway. They were given to the UK as a political ploy, to hide the that the US was demanding, and getting, territory to help the British. For which the British were paying.
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@vandeheyeric
Tooze looks at the war from an economic stance. He was right, Germany's economy was far too small. Tooze says that in 1939, Germany taking on just the British empire would mean German defeat. Looking at the state of play then, he was right.
Germany's victory in France was a shock, even to the Germans. A gamble that paid off. As Tooze points out, a gamble that could have easily gone the other way meaning the end of Germany. That put them in an artificial position of superiority. After France, the Germans never had a campaign victory over the British (the British were minor players in France having only 9% of allied forces).
Germany had spectacular gains, but nothing conclusive, however were continually being pushed back - in short, they were always losing but putting up a good fight. Geography played to their advantage, in that the British could not get at them on the Continent, apart from the air. The time they did lock horns on the ground was in the desert which the Germans, despite being with their allies, lost.
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