Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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@Ivan Karaschuk
All you wrote are drivel, especially this..... "Patton’s forces who turned back the Ardennes offensive."
Patton was neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes. The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne saw few German forces, with Bastogne being on the very southern German flank, their focus being west. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage some German armour but not a great deal at all. Patton's ride to Bastogne was mainly through US held territory.
The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was not one of the best German armoured units with about 80 tanks, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had about 12 Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left, leaving Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back.
On the night of the 22 December 1944, Patton ordered Combat Command B of 4th Armored Division to advance through the village of Chaumont in the night. A small number of German troops with anti tank weapons opened up with the American attack stopping and pulling back. The next day fighter bombers strafed the village of Chaumont weakening the defenders enabling the attack to resume the next afternoon. However, a German counter attack north of Chaumont knocked out 12 Shermans with Combat Command B retreating once again. It took Patton almost THREE DAYS just to get through the village of Chaumont. Patton's forces arrived at Chaumont late on the 22nd December. They didn't get through Chaumont village until Christmas Day, the 25th! Hardly racing at breakneck speed.
Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual 'attack' towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. His start line for the attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, just 15km southwest of Bastogne and yet he still took him five days to get through to Bastogne.
Look at who stopped the German advance, preventing them crossing the Meuse:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvcJfXtkCW8
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+oldtanker2
Most of what you have written is pure opinionated ramblings with little fact. You are going on about Patton v Montgomery, Americans do as the propaganda of the USA since WW2 said Patton was a wonderful general, when the reality was that he was some average general amongst other average generals, and lacking on many points. He constantly overran his supply lines. Monty told his staff officers that Patton was 'a foul-mouthed lover of war'. US propaganda constantly went on about Montgomery being inept, and egotist, etc, when no such evidence is there. From mid-1942 onward he never suffered a reverse.
Montgomery was a general over generals. He planned Scilly and Normandy. In Normandy Patton was two levels beneath Montgomery. After WW2 the British interviewed all the German generals and most had never even heard of Patton. Why would they know this creation of US media, they never watched US newsreels.
The reality was that the US never had any top class generals. Many were inept and far too many were buffoons: MacArthur, Clark, Bradley, Admiral King. Look at the debacles at Hurtgen Forest with 33,000 casualties (Bradley) and the Lorraine 52,000 casualties (Patton) which served little whatsoever in a strategic sense and suffered horrendous casualties against inferior numbers. The US had no one like O'Connor. Many US generals would not make the grade in the British Army. The token British buffoon was Percival at Singapore who raised the white flag one day before the Japanese were to raise theirs.
From mid-1942 onwards the British Army was the best in the world. It took all before it never suffering a reverse. It's doctrine was superior to the US Army and discipline much harder. It was well equipped. The US army was an OK army but well equipped.
The US media for propaganda purposes at home elevated their own (Patton is an example), and when they failed blamed the British. The USA was embarrassed that Montgomery had to take control of two US armies to retrieve the situation when the Germans steamrolled them at the Bulge. They were openly hostile towards Montgomery.
Any analysis can see that it is just plain insulting to the British to be slurred over 70 years in such a manner, who had some top quality men and some of them just plain exceptional.
Churchill suggested an American take the top job in the European Campaign. This was to lever the Americans to get Germany First. It worked. If Alan Brooke had been in the job from the start, there is no doubt that there would not have been a Battle of the Bulge and debacles like the Lorraine Campaign and Hurtgen Forest. An experienced, strong central command was needed. From 1 September 1944 when Eisenhower took command from Montgomery he failed dismally with allied forces not having a strong focus.
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The Turning point of WW2 was the Battle of Moscow in Dec 1941. That was when Germany and Japan were doomed.
♦ Japan thought Germany would definitely win the battle defeating the
USSR soon after. The German defeat at Moscow would ensure
Germany would not defeat the USSR.
♦ The Japanese entered WW2 on a presumption they would be linking
up with Germany, transpiring they were alone fighting two massive
powers with another pinning their forces down in China and ongoing
fighting with China, and eventually fighting all three big powers and
China. Not what they wanted.
Japan would not attack the British empire, Dutch empire and the US unless Germany declared war on the USA. If Germany said no to declaring war on the USA, Japan would never have attacked and there would be no Pacific war. The two theatres were linked.
Japan did not want to face alone the USA and the British empire. the worst case scenario. And that is what happened. The Germans attempted to get the Japanese to attack the British in the Far East to divert the British away from Europe. The UK was amassing a large air fleet and also had the world's largest navy. They would not sit by for long only fighting in the desert. The reason Germany attacked the USSR was to get their resources to fight the coming air war with the British. The Japanese repeatedly refused to declare war. Only when the Japanese thought the USSR was about to fall they joined in. The USSR kept 40 divisions opposite the Japanese Kwantung army all though WW2. With superior armour to the Japanese.
Japan received assurances from Germany in the Spring of 1941. that they would declare war on the USA. Japan, economically could not sustain war of any length of time against any major power by itself, either the UK or the USA. Especially a war strung over a vast front. They imported most raw materials with their industry primarily artisan based, with little mass production. If going it alone, what the hell attacking the USA and British Empire was to achieve with no back up occupation force at Pearl Harbor defies belief. The Pearl Harbor attack was to fend off the US navy while they gain as much resource rich territory as possible in the south while the USSR threat is moved away from their north in China by the Germans. To Japan the key was the defeat of the USSR, which by Oct/Nov 1941 they thought was a foregone conclusion.
All through WW2 the Soviets had approx 40 divisions (most armoured) in Siberia and the Soviet Far East facing the Japanese. Without Germany fighting the USSR anticipating a quick German win, the Japanese would never had attacked the USA and the British Empire. It was madness to do so unilaterally and would entail certain defeat - even the Japanese knew that.
The Japanese were to eliminate the US Pacific fleet. The US Atlantic fleet would be occupied by the German U-Boats. The carriers got away at Pearl Harbor. If the carriers were sunk, they would not have been on the defensive by June 1942, giving them far more breathing space and lots more with the anticipated defeat of the USSR within months by the Germans. If the US carriers were sunk along with the US Pacific fleet, and the USSR defeated by summer 1942 by the Germans, Japan would be in very strong position.
The Japanese gained far more territory than they gambled on. They were one day away in Singapore from surrendering, but the British beat them to the white flag. They were expecting more protracted battles in Malaya/Burma and even maybe in the Philippines.
Using some common sense tells you the Japanese were not banking on being alone fighting the world's two largest economic powers. They were expecting at least the USSR to be neutralised or eliminated. And then some military aid from the Germans would be nice if it came. The link was enacted with 41 U-Boats operating from Penang. The Germans then would engage the British diverting them away from fighting the Japanese in Burma. Getting rid of the British and the Soviets was a major prize for Japan, and Germany could do the latter and both they thought the former. So was the notion.
Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze in quotes:
• The tripartite pact was signed in Sept 1940. If one is attacked the
others come to their aid.
• "The real nightmare of German strategy was the possibility that
Japan might come to terms with the United States, leaving Germany
to fight Britain and maybe America alone. To forestall this possibility,
Hitler had offered to declare war on the United States in conjunction
with Japan already in the Spring of 1941."
• Germany had offered to declare war on the US before the June 1941
attack on the USSR.
• "But the Japanese had refused to commit themselves and instead
entered into a last round of negotiations with the USA."
• "It was not until October and the fall of the Konoe government that
Berlin could feel sure that the Japanese-USA talks were going nowhere."
• "When in November 1941 Tokyo began to signal that Japan was about
to commit itself against the West, it was the cause of relief, bordering
on euphoria in Berlin. Finally Hitler and Ribbentrop had the chance to
complete the global strategic alliance they had been hoping for since
1938. And they did not hesitate."
• The Germans immediately started to revise the Tripartite pact, knowing
of the Japanese commitment to war, at the German's insistence.
• "Without prior knowledge of the Japanese timetable for a surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor, Hitler pledged himself to following Japan in a declaration
of war on the United States."
• 7 Dec 1941, Japanese attack the USA at Pearl Harbor and British territories
in Malaya and Hong Kong.
• The amended Tripartite pact was signed by all, between the 7 Dec 1941,
the attacks on the USA and British Empire, and Germany declaring war
on the USA on 11 Dec 1941.
• 11 Dec 1941 Germany declares war on the USA.
Wages of Destruction is clear that the Germans were informed by the Japanese in November 1941 that they were to declare war. The attacks on the US and British Empire was no surprise to Hitler.
Wages of Destruction also states that Germany was repeatedly attempting to get Japan to declare war on the British empire. The Japanese knew exactly what the Germans wanted and what they would do. It all fits.
As it turned out:
♦ The USSR was not defeated and maintained a large army opposite the
Japanese - the Japanese had already been mauled by the Soviets in
Manchuria in 1939.
♦ Japan was facing the worst case scenario, the scenario it feared - fighting
alone against the British empire and USA, the world's two largest economic
superpowers.
♦ This was not in the forecasting. The German army defeated militarily superior
France within weeks and since June 1941 were mauling the USSR so badly it
was obvious to the Japanese in late 1941 the USSR would be defeated.
♦ The week in which the Japanese attacked the USA and British Empire, the
Soviets counter attacked at Moscow with a battering ram of superior T-34
tanks pushing the Germans back taking 30,000 prisoners, so ending any
chance of Germany defeating the USSR in one swoop. A protracted war
against the USSR would ensue.
♦ In Spring 1941, the Germans feared fighting the USA & the British alone - a
worst case scenario for them. They were desperately worse off, fighting the
British, USA and the USSR alone.
♦ If the Soviet counter attack had been one month earlier the Japanese would
not have attacked the British and the USA - and most probably signed a pact
with the USA which was in ongoing talks virtually to the attack on the British,
Dutch and Americans.
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@flyoptimum
Browning did not prioritize the Heights over the bridge. He gave them equal priority. Gavin de-prioritized the bridge after he failed to seize it, ordering all his men out of Nijmegen town.
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."
- Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH.
The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen, to capture the bridge on the first day. The film A bridge Too Far, made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts.
The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge. Three stragglers from the patrol of 40 men took prisoner seven of the 18 guards prisoner, including their cannon guarding the southern end of the bridge. If the 82nd had bothered to turn up at the bridge two hours earlier rather than hanging around DePloeg they would have hopped and skipped onto the bridge whistling Dixie.
When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving to the bridge, he was livid, expecting them to be moving to the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the troop of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured seven Germans and also their small artillery gun. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9.SS-Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem.
These few scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge just before the 9th SS recon, reached the bridge about an hour before the 9th SS. Joe Atkins in The 508th said, "at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." That was the 9th SS arriving.
US Official History, page 163:
Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol
After around 4.5 hours after landing a patrol of 40 men were sent.
Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at 1900 and move with the Dutch guide to the bridge. Company C, a platoon of which already had gone into the city as a patrol, was withheld in regimental reserve. Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city. Some seven hours after H-Hour, the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began.
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight.
As Company A formed to attack, the men heard the noise of an approaching motor convoy emanating from a side street on the other side of the traffic circle. Enemy soldiers noisily dismounted (the 9th SS now in the town)
No one could have said so with any finality at the time, but the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of mostly low quality troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
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