Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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Islamic attacks:
2005: Central London bombings, 52 dead. No, riots, only outrage, no change.
2013: Lee Rigby hacked to death by two terrorists. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2017: Westminster attack, five dead. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2017: Manchester Arena bombing, twenty dead. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2017: London Bridge attack, two dead. No riots, only outrage. no change.
2019: London Bridge stabbing, two dead. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2020: Reading multiple stabbings, three dead. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2021: Liverpool Women's hospital bombing. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2021: Murder of David Amess MP. No riots, only outrage, no change.
2024: Southport. Three children butchered to death.
The people have had enough of the ineptitude and total disregard for its people by those in charge over the past 14 years, taking to the streets wanting change. Outgoing Sunak must be rubbing his hands with delight, saying about Starmer who has been in office for a matter of a few days, "he has to sort this out, not me".
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@ToolTimeTabor
The 508th were assigned the Waal road bridge. They have to pretty well go through the Heights to get to the bridge from their landing zone. Browning and Gavin did not want troops on the bridge and at the LZ with Germans between. Gavin put his CP on the Heights. Browning followed. Read what I wrote about the 508th advance.
Gavin did pull all his men out of Nijmegen.
Captain Millsaps:
One of the saddest, most touching experiences for me up to that time was that pull back from Nijmegen. The natives of the town, undoubtedly thinking the town was being liberated from German rule, came out in the streets shouting and dancing, kissing soldiers, and giving us fruit and handfuls of flowers. We dared not tell them, even if we could have spoken their language, that we were giving the city back to the Germans and moving back to start all over again.
- Lost at Nigmegen by Poulusson
I advise you to read this book, written by a Dutchman. He covers Nijmegen to Zon only with detail. He did get the odd thing wrong, which I gave him note on. One was that no US troops were on the Waal bridge when the British tanks seized it. One tank even stopped looking around for any 82nd men, not seeing any so rode on.
The tanks met some 82nd men 1km north at Lent. One group of 82nd was looking to surrender even after meeting Sgt Robinson's lead tank. Robinson wanted them to given them support but they slunk off - after Robinson allowed him to speak to top man Horrocks.
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ORDER
508- P-rcht Infantry will:
(a) Land on DZ "T"
(b) Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633) on order of Div Comdr.
Let us assume pre-jump in England Gavin did not verbally tell Lindquist to go for the Waal bridge overriding the Order, which Gavin and witnesses claim he did. So we have to go by the written Order which is freely available and a section copied above.
Regimental Liaison Officer of the 508th was Chester Graham: "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.'
Two battalions of the 508th were marching for just under three hours from the DZ to the empty Heights, arriving at 5 pm. One battalion remained at the DZ securing it. The DZ was secure when they left. As soon as they were in the Heights with no Germans in sight the Heights were secure. All secure. Lindquist should have had his two companies prepared which was written in the Order.
Lindquist should have contacted Gavin 'immediately', by radio or messenger, to get the Divisional Order to go to the bridge on reaching the vacant and secure Heights. Lindquist could not move to the bridge without it.
Lindquist:
1) was way too late in obtaining the Order to proceed by radio or messenger;
2) none of the two companies prepared to move to the bridge.
When informed Lindquist was not moving to the bridge, Gavin sped personally to Lindquist screaming at him to move to the bridge at 7 pm, two hours after the 508 arrived at the Heights. Half an hour later the Germans reinforced the bridge. It took another two hours to muster the two companies spread over the Heights under Cnl Warren before they started to march at 9 pm. Far too late.
Lindquist failed on two important points.
Again, this is all assuming Gavin never gave verbal orders to Lindquist in England, only going by the written Order.
Whichever way you cut it, Lindquist was amateurish and to blame. Gavin also takes blame as he never had Lindquist trained and alert enough.
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Initially there was four Baltic states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These were regarded as eastern countries. Finland is not in Scandinavia. Its language and history come from modern day Russia - the language is Uralic emanating from the Urals. The Finnish language has no relationship whatsoever with the other Scandinavian languages, which are more allied to the English and German languages.
Finland was made a part of Russia in the early 1800s. Mannerheim, the Finnish leader, was in the Russian army most of his life, needing an interpreter to communicate in Finnish. After the Russian revolution Finland managed to gain her independence in the confusion of revolution, which many in Russia viewed as a crass act. A vicious civil war followed in Finland, with 12,000 dying in captivity and firing squads. Finland lobbied to join the Nordic Council, making it a Nordic state, looking west not east, giving the impression the country was in Scandinavia. Finland managed to wrench itself from being viewed as a small Russian satellite Baltic state, with heavy Russian influences due to proximity and culture.
The Soviet German pact gave the Soviets eastern Poland and the four Baltic states merging Finland back into Russia. After the USSR occupied the eastern third of Poland, after the Germans crushed the country in late 1939, the Soviets moved into Finland to take back its old territory which a part of Russia only 20 years previously, merging it with the now USSR.
The Finns fought back killing a large amount of poorly led and trained Soviet troops. The shear manpower and massed tanks of the USSR eventually overran Finland. The USSR allowed Finland to exist, recognising the country. However the Soviets wanted the borders taken back taking Finnish land back into Russia, as Leningrad was within artillery gun range from Finland. To the Soviets this was sensible - they could have taken the whole country back but never. Finland accepted the new borders, relieved they were not taken back into Russia. They both signed a peace agreement recognising the new borders and that Finland remained an independent country.
When the opportunity arose for Finland to attack the USSR, with German assistance, to retake the territory ceded to the USSR in 1940, they committed an unprovoked act of aggression, as the two countries were at peace with each other. Finland was not being threatened by the USSR. Finland was not allied to Germany, however fought alongside Germany against the USSR. Britain viewed Finland as a co-belligerent declaring war on Finland, which was in contrast to attempting to get arms to Finland when the Soviets invaded in 1939. It is one of the few occasions a democratic country declared war on another, although Finland to many was not a democracy with certain political parties banned.
Was it worth Finland fighting alongside the Germans? In my opinion, in 1941 it was not. It was a high risk gamble, as Germany could have been defeated, which it was, and Finland then being re-merged with Russia. Luckily for the Finns the Soviets left the country alone, apart from a base on the Gulf of Finland, which the Soviets gave back in 1956. This was a strange move by the USSR as they seized many eastern European countries after WW2 ended, with Finland attacking the USSR when not under any threat from the USSR, causing many Soviets deaths, prolonging the war.
The Finns were lucky they were not taken back into Russia, being made a part of the USSR. To this day the Finns try not to provoke the Russians, not even joining NATO when all the other Baltic states did.
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@davemac1197
Groesbooek Height were between the landing zone and the Waal bridge.
In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the bridge must be held. Browning did not say prioritize one over the other.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads. Order 1, of 13 September, written by Lindquist of the 508th, states he will wait at the high ground for a Division Order to move from the Heights to the bridge. In short, wait for an Order from Gavin to move.
The heights near De Ploeg, which are really pretty flat being a wooded area but high for Holland, are pretty well between the Drop Zone (DZ) and bridge. The 508th would go through the Heights to reach the bridge. They could not help take the Heights which they did with zero resistance. In an interview with Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission in Washington, in 1955, General Browning said the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges must be seized "as soon as possible", although the wooded Groesbeek Heights on the route to the Waal bridge must be held. Browning is saying to Gavin do not allow the Germans to be established between your men on the bridge and landing zones. Common sense.
Field Order 11 of 13 Sept is clear in section 2 a), putting the bridges first in the writing, that they were to be seized, then the high ground secured and then the roads.
Browning did not deprioritise the Waal bridge - that was Gavin of the 82nd after the failure to seize the bridge on d day.
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Browning did not prioritize the Heights over the bridge. He gave them equal priority. Gavin de-prioritized the bridge after he failed to seize it, ordering all his men out of Nijmegen town.
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend."
- Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 55, excerpt in OCMH.
The American post war version of events is one that attempts to whitewash their failure at Nijmegen, to capture the bridge on the first day. The film A bridge Too Far, made when Browning had already died, only cemented the false narrative in the minds of the public. Since then many researchers have uncovered the real facts.
The 508th did launch some patrols into Nijmegen. A patrol from the 3rd Battalion almost reached the bridge. Three stragglers from the patrol of 40 men took prisoner seven of the 18 guards prisoner, including their cannon guarding the southern end of the bridge. If the 82nd had bothered to turn up at the bridge two hours earlier rather than hanging around DePloeg they would have hopped and skipped onto the bridge whistling Dixie.
When Gavin found out the 508th were not moving to the bridge, he was livid, expecting them to be moving to the bridge, if there was no opposition. The 508th did send a recon patrol. According to Phil Nordyke’s Put Us Down In Hell (2012) three lead scouts of the troop of 40, were separated making it to the vicinity of south end of the road bridge approaches, not the main steel span. They captured seven Germans and also their small artillery gun. They waited about an hour for reinforcements that never arrived, having to withdraw then observed the 9.SS-Panzer recon battalion arriving from Arnhem.
These few scouts that reached the southern end of the Nijmegen bridge just before the 9th SS recon, reached the bridge about an hour before the 9th SS. Joe Atkins in The 508th said, "at the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon... The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark and none of our other troops showed up. We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." That was the 9th SS arriving.
US Official History, page 163:
Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol
After around 4.5 hours after landing a patrol of 40 men were sent.
Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at 1900 and move with the Dutch guide to the bridge. Company C, a platoon of which already had gone into the city as a patrol, was withheld in regimental reserve. Although Company A reached the rendezvous point on time, Company B "got lost en route." After waiting until about 2000, Colonel Warren left a guide for Company B and moved through the darkness with Company A toward the edge of the city. Some seven hours after H-Hour, the first real move against the Nijmegen bridge began.
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight.
As Company A formed to attack, the men heard the noise of an approaching motor convoy emanating from a side street on the other side of the traffic circle. Enemy soldiers noisily dismounted (the 9th SS now in the town)
No one could have said so with any finality at the time, but the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of mostly low quality troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
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Eisenhower stated this a communication to Monty on 5 Sept. I have always given priority to the Ruhr - rpt Ruhr - and the northern route of advance, as indicated in my directive of yesterday, Eisenhower was deluded. "My intention is initially to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr and by the time we have done this Havre and Antwerp should both be available to maintain one or both of the thrusts".
Antwerp had not been taken when he wrote the above. He had no idea of logistics, thinking he had enough supplies to support two main thrusts over a broad front.
"On 10 Sept Eisenhower met Monty in Brussels and said that his broad front policy would continue despite Monty objecting.
Montgomery was urged to press on with his plan to use the Allied Airborne Army in one powerful, full-blooded thrust to the Lower Rhine at _Arnhem — a thrust that just a week later would become Operation Market Garden.
- Neillands.
"Therefore, since the air planners — specifically [American] Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command — had the casting vote over the air element in Market, the decision was made for Arnhem"
- Neillands
Horrocks’ orders to XXX Corps for Garden were quite specific:
"XXX Corps will break out of the existing bridgehead on 17 September and pass through the airborne carpet which has been laid down in front of us, in order to seize the area Nunspeet-Arnhem and exploit north to the Zuider Zee... the Corps will advance and be supplied down one road - the only major road available - 20,000 vehicles will be involved. Tough opposition must be expected at the break out and the country is very difficult. Speed is absolutely vital as we must reach the lightly equipped 1st Airborne Division, if possible in forty-eight hours."
"The orders of the Airborne Army commander, American Lieutenant General Brereton specify, these bridges were to be taken ‘with thunderclap surprise’. That meant on D-Day, 17 September, for after D-Day the vital element of surprise would be lost. The bridges must be taken on D-Day — not when the various airborne divisional commanders got around to it."
- Neillands
Gavin moved on the Nijmegen bridge when he got around to it, ignoring his orders of "thunderclap surprise". The bridge was actually taken by the British.
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There is a myth that the Germans were way ahead of the British in jet engines and planes in WW2, when the opposite is true. The WW2 German jet engines were extremely unreliable with low performances and very high fuel consumption. The German axial-flow turbojets never worked properly being developed up to 1953 by the French to obtain a usable engine. The French lost a lot of time playing around with the German engines, instead of working with the British. The French and Soviets after WW2 attempted to improve the German axial-flow engines largely failing.
The British in order to get a usable and reliable jet engine quickly into service that was superior to the best piston planes, with the technology of the time, went for a centrifugal design rather than the troublesome axial-flow design. This design produced less thrust than an axial-flow but was quicker to develop and reliable. It took 5 months to develop, while the first reliable axial-flow engine was the 1950 Rolls Royce Avon, which took 5 years to get right.
In 1945 the French made and tested some German designed turbo jets made with quality steel unavailable to German industry in WW2. They ran for 25 hours instead of 10 hours to the German engines that used poor quality steel. Not much better. The German axial-flow engines failed because of heavy design faults. The centrifugal compressor used by the first British Meteor plane was fine being much more reliable, but unable to reach high compression ratios. This limited performances. Centrifugal compressors were used up to the 1960s.
In 1945 the team from the French ATAR laboratory plus some BMW and Junkers engineers, were engaged by the French SNECMA research bureau, with the objective to built a new reliable with performance axial-flow turbojet. The BMW 003/Jumo004 was considered unusable. It was tested on the first French jet aircraft, the 1946 So6000 Triton, overheating and exploding. The plane only flew with a Rolls Royce Nene centrifugal turbojet.
The ATAR project took 6 years to produce the first acceptable axial-flow turbojet (ATAR 101 B1), produced in 1953. So eight years research & developments by the French using the German jet engines as the base. It was installed on the first French jet fighter, the Dassault Ouragan.
The French lost a lot of time because the German jets had poor efficiency with some concept fails. Essentially in the combustion chambers and fresh air circulation to reduce the external temperature of the engine. The BMW jet was known for overheat problems which precluded fuselage installation.
The question at the end of WW2 was what is the most efficient way to produce jet fighters. The answer is clearly not adopting the German design of engine and fuselage. The build costs for a jet engine were much higher than a piston engine, with the fuel consumption near 3x. The centrifugal compressor the British adopted in some planes was the best choice with 1944-45 technology, more compression pressure was not an advantage when the hot turbine was unable to resist higher temperatures. The German turbojets had big overheat problems as the engine would not work in an enclosed fuselage for single engined fighters. This defect was immediately noted by the French on the 1946 "SO 6000 Triton" prototype, and by the Soviets on the 1946 Mig 9. The Soviets quickly replaced the BMW 004B2 by the centrifugal Rolls Royce Nene which worked without problems, dismissing the BMW engine for fighter planes.
The Rolls Royce Nene was copied to the last nut by the USSR being installed in the Mig 15 being used effectively in the Korean war. About 10 years ago the USSR eventually paid royalties to Rolls Royce.
The Meteor was the first proper fully developed jet plane introduced. The 262 was slightly faster than the Meteor F3, but extremely unreliable. The British would never put into the sky such an undeveloped plane as the me262. the Me262 and Meteor were leagues apart in safety and reliability. The British could have had a jet fighter operational in 1941, but it would have been as bad as the me262.
The Germans advanced R&D on jets after they interrogated captured British RAF men. They learned the British were advanced in jet technology actually flying prototype planes. Until then the Germans had no intention of mass producing jet planes.
The rushed together Me262 started claiming kills on 26 July 1944. However the supposed kill was a Mosquito reconnaissance plane that had a fuselage cap blown off in a sharp fast manoeuvre, which flew on landing in Italy. The Meteor claimed its first V1 kill a few days later on the 4 August 1944. But the Meteor was a proper fully developed jet plane, not a thrown together desperate effort as the me262 was. The me262 fuselage was similar to a piston plane with the pilot over the wings obscuring downward vision, while the Meteor was a proper new design fuselage specifically for jet fighters with a forward of the wings pilot position with superior vision, as we see today. The cockpit was very quiet. The high tail was not to impede the rear jet thrust. The partial sweptback wings of the me262 were to move the engines further back for better weight distribution, not for aerodynamic reasons as is thought the case. The 262 balancing problem would be exasperated when firing the guns as the weight of the bullets exiting suddenly made the the air-frame unbalanced.
There were five turbojet engines in the UK under R&D in WW2:
♦ Centrifugal, by Whittle (Rover);
♦ Centrifugal, by Frank Halford (DeHaviland);
♦ Axial-flow, by Metro-Vick;
♦ Axial-flow by Griffiths (Rolls Royce);
♦ Axial flow compressor, with reverse flow combustion chambers. The ASX by Armstrong Siddley;
Metro-Vick sold their jet engine division to Armstrong Siddley. The Metro-Vick engine transpired into the post war Sapphire. Most American engines in the 1940s/50s were of UK design, many made under licence. The US licensed the J-42 (RR Nene) and J-48 (RR Tay), being virtually identical to the British engines. US aircraft used licensed British engines powering the: P-59, P-80, T-33, F9F Panther, F9F-6 Cougar, FJ Fury 3 and 4, Martin B-57 Canberra, F-94 Starfire, A4 Skyhawk and the A7 Corsair.
The US General Electric J-47 turbojet was developed by General Electric in conjunction with Metropolitan Vickers of the UK, who had already developed a nine-stage axial-flow compressor engine licensing the design to Allison in 1944 for the earlier J-35 engine, first flying in May 1948. The centrifugal Rolls Royce Nene is one of the highest production jet engines in history with over 50,000 built.
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@11B Retired
Patton was an average US general, like Simpson, Patch, Hodges, etc. No more. "The Allied armies closing the pocket now needed to liaise, those held back giving way to any Allied force that could get ahead, regardless of boundaries – provided the situation was clear. On August 16, realising that his forces were not able to get forward quickly, General Crerar attempted to do this, writing a personal letter to Patton in an attempt to establish some effective contact between their two headquarters and sort out the question of Army boundaries, only to get a very dusty and unhelpful answer. Crerar sent an officer, Major A. M. Irving, and some signal equipment to Patton’s HQ, asking for details of Patton’s intentions intentions and inviting Patton to send an American liaison officer to the Canadian First Army HQ for the same purpose.
Irving located but could not find Patton; he did, however, reach the First Army HQ and delivered Crerar’s letter which was duly relayed to Third Army HQ. Patton’s response is encapsulated in the message sent back by Irving to Canadian First Army; ‘Direct liaison not permitted. Liaison on Army Group level only except corps artillery. Awaiting arrival signal equipment before returning.’ Irving returned to Crerar’s HQ on August 20, with nothing achieved and while such uncooperative attitudes prevailed at the front line, it is hardly surprising that the moves of the Allied armies on Trun and Chambois remained hesitant."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
Patton refused to liaise with other allied armies, exasperating a critical situation.
"This advance duly began at 0630hrs on August 18 which, as the Canadian Official History remarks, ‘was a day and a half after Montgomery had issued the order for the Canadians to close the gap at Trun, and four and a half days after Patton had been stopped at the Third Army boundary’. During that time, says the Canadian History, the Canadians had been ‘fighting down from the north with painful slowness’ and the Germans had been making their way east through the Falaise gap. They were not, however, unimpeded; the tactical air forces and Allied artillery were already taking a fearful toll of the German columns on the roads heading east past Falaise.
Patton’s corps duly surged away to the east, heading for Dreux, Chartres and Orléans respectively. None of these places lay in the path of the German retreat from Normandy: only Dreux is close to the Seine, Chartres is on the Beauce plain, south-east of Paris, and Orléans is on the river Loire. It appears that Patton had given up any attempt to head off the German retreat to the Seine and gone off across territory empty of enemy, gaining ground rapidly and capturing a quantity of newspaper headlines. This would be another whirlwind Patton advance – against negligible opposition – but while Patton disappeared towards the east the Canadians were still heavily engaged in the new battle for Falaise – Operation Tractable – which had begun on August 14 and was making good progress."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944
Instead of moving east to cut retreating Germans at the Seine, Patton ran off to Paris. John Ellis in Brute Force described Patton's dash across northern France as well as his earlier “much overrated” pursuit through Sicily as more of “a triumphal procession than an actual military offensive.”
Patton at Metz advanced 10 miles in three months. The poorly devised Panzer Brigade concept was deployed there with green German troops.
The Panzer Brigades were a rushed concept attempting to plug the gaps while the proper panzer divisions were re-fitting and rebuilt after the summer 1944 battles.The Panzer Brigades had green crews with little time to train, did not know their tanks properly, had no recon elements and didn't even meet their unit commander until his arrival at the front. These were not elite forces.
17th SS were not amongst the premier Waffen SS panzer divisions. It was not even a panzer division but a panzer grenadier division, equipped only with assault guns not tanks, with only a quarter of the number of AFVs as a panzer division. The 17th SS was badly mauled in Normandy and not up to strength at Arracourt in The Lorraine.
Patton's Third Army was almost always where the best German divisions in the west were NOT.
♦ Who did the 3rd Army engage?
♦ Who did the 3rd Army defeat?
♦ Patton never once faced a full strength Waffen SS panzer division nor a Tiger battalion.
In The Lorraine, the 3rd Army faced a rabble. Even the German commander of Army Group G in The Lorraine, Hermann Balck, who took command in September 1944 said:
"I have never been in command of such irregularly assembled and ill-equipped troops. The fact that we have been able to straighten out the situation again…can only be attributed to the bad and hesitating command of the Americans."
Patton was mostly facing a second rate rabble in The Lorraine.
Patton was neither on the advance nor being heavily engaged at the time he turned north to Bastogne when the Germans pounded through US lines in the Ardennes. The road from Luxembourg to Bastogne saw few German forces, with Bastogne being on the very southern German flank, their focus was west. Only when Patton neared Bastogne did he engage some German armour but not a great deal at all. Patton's ride to Bastogne was mainly through US held territory. The Fuhrer Grenadier Brigade was not one of the best German armoured units with about 80 tanks, while 26th Volks-Grenadier only had about 12 Hetzers, and the small element of Panzer Lehr (Kampfgruppe 901) left behind only had a small number of tanks operational. Patton did not have to smash through full panzer divisions or Tiger battalions on his way to Bastogne. Patton's armoured forces outnumbered the Germans by at least 6 to 1.
Patton faced very little German armour when he broke through to Bastogne because the vast majority of the German 5th Panzer Army had already left Bastogne in their rear moving westwards to the River Meuse. They were engaging forces under Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Leading elements were engaging the Americans and British under Montgomery's command near Dinant by the Meuse. Monty's armies halted the German advance and pushed them back.
On the night of the 22 December 1944, Patton ordered Combat Command B of 4th Armored Division to advance through the village of Chaumont in the night. A small number of German troops with anti tank weapons opened up with the American attack stopping and pulling back. The next day fighter bombers strafed the village of Chaumont weakening the defenders enabling the attack to resume the next afternoon. However, a German counter attack north of Chaumont knocked out 12 Shermans with Combat Command B retreating once again. It took Patton almost THREE DAYS just to get through the village of Chaumont. Patton's forces arrived at Chaumont late on the 22nd December. They didn't get through Chaumont village until Christmas Day, the 25th! Hardly racing at breakneck speed.
Patton had less than 20 km of German held ground to cover during his actual 'attack' towards Bastogne, with the vast majority of his move towards Bastogne through American held lines devoid of the enemy. His start line for the attack was at Vaux-les-Rosieres, just 15km southwest of Bastogne and yet he still took him five days to get through to Bastogne.
In Normandy in 1944, the panzer divisions had been largely worn down, primarily by the British and Canadians around Caen. The First US Army around St Lo then Mortain helped a little. Over 90% of German armour was destroyed by the British. Once again, Patton faced very little opposition in his break out in Operation Cobra performing mainly an infantry role. Nor did Patton advance any quicker across eastern France mainly devoid of German troops, than the British and Canadians did, who were in Brussels by early September seizing the vital port of Antwerp intact. This eastern dash devoid of German forces was the ride the US media claimed Patton was some sort master of fast moving armour.
Patton repeatedly denigrated his subordinates.
♦ In Sicily he castigated Omar Bradley for the tactics Bradley's II Corps were employing
♦ He accused the commander of 3rd Infantry Division, Truscott of being "afraid to fight".
♦ In the Ardennes he castigated Middleton of the US VIII Corps and Millikin of the US III Corps.
♦ When his advance from Bastogne to Houffalize stalled he criticised the 11th Armoured Division for being "very green and taking unnecessary casualties to no effect".
♦ He called the 17th Airborne Division "hysterical" in reporting their losses.
After the German attack in the Ardennes, US air force units were put under Coningham of the RAF. Coningham, gave Patton massive ground attack plane support and he still stalled. Patton's failure to concentrate his forces on a narrow front and his decision to commit two green divisions to battle without adequate reconnaissance resulted in his stall. Patton rarely took any responsibility for his own failures. It was always somebody else at fault, including his subordinates. A poor general who thought he was reincarnated. Oh, and wore cowboy guns.
Patton detested Hodges, did not like Bradley disobeying his orders, and Eisenhower's orders. He also hated Montgomery. About the only person he ever liked was himself.
Read: Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds and_Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies_ by Harry Yeide
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Burlats de Montaigne
Montgomery, having been a general since 1917, knew about soldiers and how they thought and reacted. He understood them and cared about all the men under him, British, US, Canadian, Auss, NZ, Indian, etc. He knew in time of battle their morale was essential. He observed in WW1 that men seeing their own men being killed in large numbers would demoralise quite quickly, reducing their fighting capability. Preserving their lives was essential to Monty on many levels. This was paramount in his mind. If Monty could muster all available forces and push forwards minimising casualties, he would - only a fool would not.
The Canadians had the same view. They invented the modern armoured personnel carrier during the Battle of Normandy. They asked the British to convert a Churchill tank by removing its turret and fitting a door. They did and the Canadians called it the Kangaroo because it could jump men to the place where they should be, rather than go across open ground and half of them get killed. The British took this up.
The British and Canadians were far more efficient than the over-bloated green US armies. The did not need as many men for the same punch. In fact far less.
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The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.
- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up for the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem. XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
According to the official American Army historian, Forrest Pogue, he stated that the failure of US 82nd Airborne to assault the lightly defended Nijmegen bridge immediately upon jumping 'sounded the death knell' for the men at Arnhem.
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@johnlucas8479
All you do is go around in circles in an attempt to obfuscate.
The state of play on the morning of the 17th:
1) There was condensed German resistance on the Dutch-Belgian border. There would be as it was the front line.
2) The road from Zon, north of Eindhoven, was clear all the way to Arnhem.
3) The bridges were largely undefended. No ditches, barbed wires and the likes. The large Nijmegen bridge had 19 guards on it.
4) About 750 men in the Nijmegen area, who were older men of a training unit, no match for the highly trained and experienced 82nd men.
5) There was no German armour anywhere along the road from Zon to Arnhem.
How it went
If the airborne units seized their assigned bridges, The ground troops, XXX Corps would breeze through to the Arnhem, the prime objective.
The British 1st Airborne made it to Arnhem bridge, taking the north end of the bridge, denying its use to the Germans. The other two airborne units, both US, failed to seize their assigned bridges immediately. If they had XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day+1, before any armour came in from Germany. Game set and match. The Germans would not have known what had hit them.
XXX Corps dealt with the initial German resistance making excellent progress. The US Official History states about XXX Corps, "progress was remarkable". The 12 hour delay caused by the 101st not seizing the Zon bridge, meant the Germans for 12 hours had a critical time window to pour in troops and get armour moving towards Arnhem. The longer the time delay the more Germans poured in, hence more resistance. Obvious.
On top of the 12 hour delay, the 82nd failing to seizing their bridge at Nijmegen (XXX Corps had to take it for them), caused an additional 36 hour delay. This meant another longer time window for the Germans to keep up the reinforcing. The extra 36 hour delay created by the 82nd, meant a bridgehead over the Rhine was precluded, as the two day time window in total given to the Germans was far too long.
The British paras did their part in securing a crossing over its assigned waterway, the Rhine - the crossing was denied to the Germans. The two US para units failed in theirs. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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