Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "TIKhistory"
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@johnlucas8479
From US Offcial history....
As night came the British stopped in Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. The objective of Eindhoven, which General Horrocks had indicated he hoped to reach on D-Day, lay six miles to the north.
So, XXX Corps was on schedule meeting their objective. XXX Corps reached Eindhoven at 1230 hrs, [d-day+1] running through without stopping, only to stop at the Zon bridge which the US 101st failed to seize.
US Official history...
at 0645 (D plus 2, 19 September) the armor rumbled across [the Zon bridge].
That is about 19 hours delay - OK knock off an hour for getting through Eindhoven, say 18 hours. An 18 hours delay because the US 101st failed to seize their objective.
US Official history....
Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column, reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's S04th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. Major formations of the British armor were not far behind.
XXX Corps covered over 26 miles in 2 hr 45 mins, averaging about 7 mph. They got to Zon at about 1330hrs d-day+1, So they would have reached the 82nd at 1615hrs d-day+1, at the latest. More like an hour earlier, or as fast as the vehicles could go.If the 82nd had secured the Nijmegen bridge XXX Corps would have linked up with the British paras early evening d-day+1.
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@scaleyback217
The state of play on the 17th, d-day, was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. If the bridges are secured by paras forming an airborne carpet then just a cruise up the road.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, at the planned expected time, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@thevillaaston7811
Since WW2 and up to the wildly inaccurate film A Bridge Too Far, the way Market Garden was portrayed was that XXX Corps were too slow, the US paras took all their bridges, the British after seizing Nijmegen bridge stopped for tea not wanting to move to Arnhem, the British planned the operation, etc, etc. This was US propaganda backed up by Hollywood, and poor US authors. US blame shifting. Since the film, many have researched the operation in depth collectively concluding another rather accurate story. The conclusion was that Market Garden was an American failure.
Americans:
1) Failed to seize two bridges immediately, putting the operation back 42 hours in total;
2) Primarily planned the operation;
3) Gave the operation the go ahead, despite British reservations expressed over its viability;
4) Under resourced the operation - only one corps above Eindhoven;
5) Had the final say over air operations;
6) Prevented fighter-bombers from operating;
7) Prevented two air drops in one day.
The British XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong getting to Nijmegen on schedule. Instead of rolling over the bridge onto Arnhem six miles away, they then had to seize a bridge themselves which they were not tasked for.
The British paras held one end of a bridge denying its use to the Germans, until they ran out of ammunition - the Germans said they were the best soldiers they had met in WW2.
Brereton after WW2, on film stated XXX Corps were too slow. He lied knowing they were not. All facts prove they were not slow. Since WW2 Americans have lied through their back teeth over Market Garden, constantly blaming Montgomery who had little involvement, with the OK given by ground forces commander Eisenhower.
This vid TIK on Gavin shows the lies that have been put in place by the US over the operation since WW2. Contrast the British.
1) Browning was corps commander saying I take responsibility, not casting any on the three divisional generals under him, of which one was clearly to blame;
2) It was Montgomery's 21st Army Group, so he said the buck stops with him;
3) Brereton, head of the First Allied Airborne Army, said nothing - except lies after WW2;
4) Gavin all though attempted to defect blame - even onto Lindquist, as this vid proves;
The British were gentlemen, the Americans chose the blame game pointing at anyone except themselves. A culture difference.
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@donupton5246
What drivel!
Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the reason why the Market Garden plan was flawed. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak".
The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends. General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 20 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800.
XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 8 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men in the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself. XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge.
If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A failure responsible by General Gavin. Even the US Official War record confirms this.
Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm
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@donupton5246
Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts:
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen when he issued the directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. It was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"the evidence also suggests that certain necessary objectives on the road to Berlin, crossing the Rhine and perhaps even taking the Ruhr, were possible with the existing logistical set-up, provided the right strategy to do so was set in place. Montgomery’s popular and astute Chief of Staff, Freddie de Guingand, certainly thought so: 'If Eisenhower had not taken the steps he did to link up at an early date with Anvil and had held back Patton, and had he diverted the resources so released to the north, I think it possible we might have obtained a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter - but not more.' "
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again. This northern thrust over the Rhine obviously would not work with the resources starved First Army, so a lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the divisions of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance.
Montgomery, although not liking Eisenhower's broad front strategy, making that clear continuously since the Normandy breakout, being a professional soldier he always obeyed Eisenhower's orders keeping to the laid down strategy, unlike Bradley who also allowed Patton to disobey his own orders.
Montgomery after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to what forces were available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly General Brereton, an American, of the First Allied Airborne Army. Brereton, who liked the concept, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day and Brereton oversaw the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead, as he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
Montgomery left all the planning to his generals to plan and execute: Brereton, Williams, Browning, Urquhart, Gavin, Taylor, Horrocks, etc. Monty gave them a free run at it with their own discretion not interfering. Montgomery had no involvement whatsoever in its execution. Montgomery was an army group commander, in charge of armies. The details were left to 'competent' subordinates.
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@ErikExeu
The state of play on the 17th, D day, was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was largely clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen who were getting out fast;
4) a few scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
i) XXX Corps would deal from the Belgium border to Eindhoven;
ii) 101st from Eindhoven to Grave;
iii) 82nd from Grave to north of Nijmegen;
iv) British and Polish paras from north of Nijmegen to north of the Rhine;
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 2 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition, hanging around in the village. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured it.
Evidently expecting that Major La Prade's flanking battalion would have captured the highway bridge, these two battalions made no apparent haste in moving through Zon. They methodically cleared stray Germans from the houses, so that a full two hours had passed before they emerged from the village. Having at last overcome the enemy 88 south of the Zonsche Forest, Major LaPrade's battalion caught sight of the bridge at about the same time. Both forces were within fifty yards of the bridge when their objective went up with a roar.- US Official History.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up.
The road was still largely clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump. Horrocks promised the 1st Airborne at Anhem XXX Corps would reach them within 48 hours. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820 hrs on d-day plus 2, on schedule making up for the delay at Zon, having seven hours left to travel 8 miles. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over. If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves, after the 82nd tried again and failed again. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4"
- Harry Yeide
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
“ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE.
Page 589
"Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and to implement"
- Eisenhower at the Art of Warfare
by DJ Haycock, page 182.
Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flow in from England.
Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by the First US Army's 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however.
This was soon followed up by a larger advance by US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a LARGER ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52..."by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
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"It is worth repeating that the first and most important duty of a commander in battle is the selection and maintenance of the aim or, to put it in layman’s terms, to answer the prime question: what are we trying to do here? What the airborne divisions were trying to do was to lay an airborne carpet from the Meuse-Escaut Canal to the north bank of the Neder Rijn, and that aim had to be achieved — or maintained — whatever difficulties arose on the Groesbeek heights or anywhere else. Major-General Maxwell Taylor of the US 101st Airborne also had trouble, a great deal of trouble, with strong German attacks along Hell’s Highway, but he handled those — and took the bridges first, on D-Day. It appears that at Nijmegen Gavin and Browning either forgot or elected to ignore one of the principles of war. Their prime task was to take the bridges, including the Nijmegen road bridge, as quickly as possible and hold it until XXX Corps arrived and advanced across it. This they failed to do and the effect on the entire operation was disastrous, creating a delay of some thirty-six hours after the Guards Armoured Division arrived in Nijmegen, a mere eight miles from Arnhem, on the morning of D plus 2."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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To say Churchill did all this to cajole/impress the USA is fanciful.
This Syria invasion was in June 1941. The situation in May/June was:
♦ There was legitimate concerns at protecting the oil in the Middle East, as the Axis was desperate for oil.
♦ In May 1941 the Italian fleet could not put to sea as they had no oil.
♦ What remained of the German surface fleet was quietly retired to port through lack of oil.
♦ The Germans held all of Greece.
♦ A pro-Axis coup in Iraq was in April 1941. British forces suppressed it, securing the oil in Iraq.
♦ Turkey showed no sign of joining in on the Axis side - they initially assessed Germany would be beaten unable to match the troop numbers from the British Empire.
♦ Were the Axis to invade Turkey as a springboard into the Middle East? To invade Syria they needed a large naval invasion force which they never had. Turkey would be via land, or short water hops.
♦ The British knew of the German build up for the invasion of the USSR in June 1941. The Germans would go for the Soviet oil fields near Iran/Turkey/Iraq.
♦ Operation Crusader was being planned to gain Libya - with troop and armour build ups.
♦ The British had an oil refinery in Iran.
♦ The British had an oil refinery in Haifa, Palestine (Italians bombed it in 1940), in easy bombing range from Syria.
♦ An oil pipeline from the Gulf to the Med at Palestine was being built.
That the Axis would make a lunge for the Middle East was a legitimate concern - they were involved in the coup in Iraq. They were already trying to get there via Egypt. Pro Nazi Vichy controlled Syria. Securing the countries south of Turkey/USSR was essential. There was a possibility that Vichy France would collaborate closer with the Axis, allowing the Axis a firm hold in the Middle East in Syria. Vichy was not to be trusted, as they allowed the Japanese into Indochina near to British Malay/Burma, also breaking an agreement in making a separate peace with Germans in France. As the securing of Syria started the Germans invaded the USSR. Only a matter of weeks after the conclusion in Syria the British and Soviets invaded Iran to secure the refinery and oil pipeline into the USSR. This secured oil for British forces in the North Africa/Middle East and the USSR.
All this securing the Middle East paid dividends. At the end of 1941 the British controlled all the Middle East and all the coast from Turkey to Libya. The Axis had been driven back 500km in North Africa in Operation Crusader, with the British expecting to rid them from North Africa quite soon controlling all the southern Med coast. The Germans had been stopped and pushed back at the Battle of Moscow. 40% of the tanks used were supplied under British lend lease. The British were planning an invasion of Sicily in 1942. Once North Africa and the Middle East were secure, with British convoys using the Med, the British could concentrate in aiding the Soviets 100%. The British and Soviets were expecting to defeat the Germans.
In Dec 1941 the Japanese attacked the British, Dutch and Americans. The Royal Navy moved many ships to the Indian Ocean from the Mediterranean. Ground troops to face the Japanese were moved from the theatre. This was bad timing as the British were expecting to rid the Axis from North Africa and gain control of all the southern Med coast. This seriously weakened British forces against the Axis. The Axis took advantage to counter-attack the weakened British. The British took another year or so to defeat the Axis in North Africa.
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