Comments by "Sar Jim" (@sarjim4381) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  5.  @bkjeong4302  I just showed you that two light cruisers are barely, if all, equal in antiaircraft firepower to one Iowa with just plain statistics, yet now you seem to have ignored that to go back to your narrative. What does the South Dakota's record at Santa Cruz in October, 1942, when she was still armed with primitive communications and fire control compared to 1945 ships, 1.1" guns, and before VT fuses, have to do with the performance of an Iowa in the antiaircraft role? South Dakota was still an effective escort for Enterprise, shot down at least seven attacking aircraft, and protected the Enterprise from the fate of the Hornet. An Iowa would have required less stores than two Clevelands per man and gun simply because of economies of scale. Rations alone would have required less because there's less wastage on one ship that two. It's one of the reasons cruise ships have become so gigantic. The Iowas were always built as fast carrier escorts, hence their high speeds. The assumption was their main role would be antiaircraft protection and shore bombardment with antisurface being secondary by late 1943. The 40mm gun was a very effective gun, shooting down about 35% of total planes downed in the Pacific. The 20mm gun was even more effective, shooting down about 39% of all planes and 42 of all suicide planes downed when the planes were in range. Rather than continuing to debate with a person who has his own notions about what happened, I'll quote something from a postwar Navy report about the effectiveness of antiaircraft guns and fire from a report you've clearly never read. "Thus, in suicide actions, battleships appear to have shot down twice as many planes as would have been expected on the basis of their opening ranges, the amount of ammunition they fired, and the average success attained by all ships under similar conditions." http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Kamikaze/AAA-Summary-1045/index.html#V Read the report and others like it before you come back again.
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  13. You've got the FRAM upgrades a bit wrong. The FRAM I upgrade was the most comprehensive and involved stripping most of the superstructure down to the main deck level, completely rebuilding the engines, adding all the modern radars and sonars, mostly removing the "B" forward 5" mount, although some kept two mounts forward and none aft, and then rebuilding the superstructure with a new and roomier bridge, an ASROC deck and launcher, and the DASH hanger and landing deck. Automation helped reduce crew size, habitability was improved, and they were given full air conditioning and NBC protection. This upgrade was performed exclusively to Gearing class ships. The FRAM II was a more austere upgrade, with the original superstructure forward of the stacks kept, engines rebuilt but only to the extent need to extend service life by seven years, no ASROC, although deck space was reserved for a later installation, and some ships having te B mount replaced by a pair of trainable Hedgehogs. Not all ships received full NBC protection. Some kept all three 5" mounts while some had one fore and aft like the FRAM I ships. Almost all the FRAM II ships were Sumner class, but sixteen were Gearing class deemed to have less service life available than other Gearings. Four Fletcher class ships were involved with FRAM II upgrades, but only three were part of the official program. One, USS Hazelwood, had the DASH landing deck and hanger added in 1957, and she served as a trials ship for the DASH program. She never received any other FRAM upgrades but had the largest DASH landing deck of all the FRAM type destroyers. She was decommissioned in 1965. The bottom line is every FRAM ship got a DASH deck and hanger. Other than that, there was wide variability in retained guns, superstructure, ASROC, torpedo tubes, and Hedgehogs.
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  15. To be fair, one of the reason why almost all scouting and scout bomber aircraft were two place is so the observer could use a pretty good set of optics to give them more details than the Mark I Eyeball. As Drach pointed out, in less than ideal conditions, accuracy of identification deteriorated rapidly. The RN not only recognized this problem earlier than other major navies, they treated finding a solution as an emergency. Consequently, they used Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) systems on their ship and aircraft earlier than other countries. As usual, you can identify the pioneers by the arrows in their back. The original IFF system depended on a passive system using a vertical dipole, and the only receiver sensitive and wide banded enough was a superregenerative type. I won't get into all the technical detail since I'm sure most you don't really care about them, but the super regen receiver was extremely difficult to tune sitting at a desk on dry land. Doing so in a Swordfish, while being buffeted by rough air and rapid changes in altitude, required an observer that was both skilled and lucky. The passive dipole system was unreliable even if the receiver was working correctly. Yet another British invention allowed the radar signal itself to actively interrogate a receiver on a ship or another aircraft. The IFF was then transmitted as a coded part of the radar return. That meant no fiddling with receivers on an aircraft, and it was also more difficult for the enemy to compromise the system. By the second half of 1944, about 75% of RN ship and aircraft and nearly 100% of US ships and aircraft were equipped with IFF. The extremely time consuming teaching of ship and aircraft recognition from models, photos, and drawings became much less important. A pilot merely had to interrogate the IFF receiver on a ship. If it was one of ours, a spike on the radar screen would show a positive return. In later iterations, the return could even tell a pilot the name and type of a ship or the type of aircraft being interrogated. While this greatly reduced blue on blue attacks for a time, it didn't eliminate them. Imagine seeing an unidentified ship, interrogating on the correct IFF channel, and getting no return. Enemy ship, attack away...except what happens if the IFF on the ship was broken and not working? With pilots given less recognition training and early electronics subject to frequent failures, the number of mistaken attacks on friendly ships actually increased for a short period of time in late 1944. A crash program to make IFF more reliable and getting pilots trained in better visual recognition reduced the blue on blue attacks to much lower levels by early 1945 than those seen earlier in the war. IFF systems in use today, although much more sophisticated and reliable, are still based on the same principles as used in the late WWII systems.
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  16. Thanks, Drach. The Battle class were very pleasant looking ships, and I liked them at first sight when I first saw them as a kid. Of course, this was long before the internet, and ship pictures were only found after many a Saturday afternoon poring through every book with pictures I could find. I assumed that, much like the USN Allen M Sumner class, these had another twin turret aft, and all the pictures were of such poor quality they just didn't show the aft turret, hidden among the top hamper of all the Bofors guns. I must have been about 15 before I found a really good book about WWII British destroyers, something not easy to find in small town Ohio in what must have been 1959-1960. It was then I found out this class really didn't have any aft main battery turrets, but it had a single open 4" mount instead. Since the Sumner and Battle classes were of roughly equal size and displacement, it really didn't make much sense to limit the heavy DP guns to forward mountings only. To this day, I'm still somewhat baffled by that design decision on the part of the Admiralty. Maybe someone who knows more about British destroyers than I do can explain it for me. Admiral Cunningham hated these ships. He rather famously said, after his first voyage on HMS Solebay that the ship was too big and "had every damned weapon and gadget except guns". Cunningham was an old-time destroyerman and believed newer destroyers should match the "Greyhound of the Seas" design philosophy of older destroyers. Cunningham, as great an admiral that he was, just didn't have much appreciation for the need to accommodate all the new electronics and weapons of modern naval warfare. He wasn't wrong about the Hazemeyer mounts though. At six tons for a twin mount, and even heavier as more on-mount radars were added, they really were the first of what we now call a close in weapons system. The design and requirements were just too advanced for the times they were built. They were excellent mounts when they worked but, with the vacuum tube technology of the day, that wasn't very often. Combined with the mass of gears and valves needed to maintain the triaxial stabilization, it would have been a good mount if it was introduced in 1950 instead of 1940. Unfortunately, the RN decided the way forward was the STAAG mount, an even heavier and more unreliable mount, but that's a story for another day.
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