Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@analystanalyst7652
Get lost.
Part One.
'A hero was needed by the British and there he was.' Your words.
Total rubbish. There was no desire to see heroes in Britain during the war from the upper echelons in all parts of public life. The whole thrust of ‘propaganda’ or government messages based on MPs own anecdotes from their contact with the public, and evidence acquired from ‘mass observation’ was to emphasize the collective effort, particularly the men and women in street. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC with broadcasts such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on. Britain mobilized it population more than any other major belligerent, more than Russia, a lot more than the USA . That is what British Propaganda was about.
'When he should have been taking the Scheldt Estuary (as a result of this poor move a great many Canadian troops, once again, paid the price as they did in Dieppe)' Your words.
Total Rubbish. British forces (My own father among them), and Polish forces also took part in the Scheldt campaign. The Canadian government, and the Canadian military leaders then in Britain lobbied hard for Canadian troops to be given the lead role for Dieppe.
Part Two to follow...
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@stetomlinson3146
'Read any decent history book about the battle for Normandy, and beyond. Montgomery was totally out of his depth.'
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.'
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
LONDON 1977
Page 53
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
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@phillipnagle9651
'Beside the already mentioned failure to capture Scheldt Estuary when it was undefended, there was his failure to close the Falaise pocket, there was the Market Garde fiasco, there was his failure to close the "Bulge" pivoting on the northeast corner, there was his inability to break out from the beaches and capture Caen. As a matter of fact, when it came to Europe, his performance went from ordinary to bad. Your words.
Its a definite no.
The Scheldt Estuary was by no means undefended when Antwerp was liberated. The Germans were in force on the South bank of the Scheldt at the Breskens Pocket. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the most formidable in Europe.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
The Bulge:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
US General Robert W Hasbrouck:
Caen:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story
If Montgomery's performance went from ordinary to bad, whee did the performance of Bradley, Eisenhower, and Devers go to?..
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@TheEvertw
Montgomery: Part Two
France 1944 (Operation Overlord)
The then existing plan for Overlord that Montgomery saw comprised three invasion beaches with a target date of 1st May 1944 for D-Day. Montgomery immediately urged that the plan be expanded to five beaches by the addition of Utah and Sword beaches. This was agreed to, but the change created a one-month delay to the start of the operation as the additional shipping was gathered for the additional landings.
Montgomery presented his plan for the land campaign to allied leaders at St Paul’s School in West London on 15th May 1944. The plan showed British 2nd Army holding down the bulk of German forces on the allied left while the US 1st Army broke out on the allied right to capture Cherbourg and other ports, leading to the allies reaching the river Seine by D+90. Overlord began on the 6th June (D-Day), with all allied beaches liking up within a week, despite US mistakes at Omaha beach. Montgomery’s plan coped with the delay to the allied build-up caused by the great storm of 19th-20th June which wrecked the US ‘Mulberry Harbour’, the vast concentration of German forces in front of British 2nd Army, the delay to the US 1st Army break-out which led to the need for several operation in the Caen sector to keep Germans off balance, and the constant badgering of glory hungry, greenhorn US generals.
Montgomery inflicted a defeat of the Germans as big as Stalingrad and that ended with 22% fewer than expected allied casualties, and ahead of schedule, on D+78. If a US general had been in charge of the land campaign, American historians and the US media would hail Normandy a one of the greatest victories in military history. Instead, Montgomery’s performance has been subject to a level of hair-slitting scrutiny far, far greater than any attention ever paid to any US commander.
Market Garden
With the allied advance at a standstill, with the Germans still reeling from their defeat in France and with V weapons being launched at Britain in sight of British troops. Montgomery sought to deploy the First Allied Airborne Army that Eisenhower had made available for Montgomery's use, without Montgomery having full control of.
The operation was a risky undertaking, but Eisenhower and Bradley agreed that the possible gains were worth taking the chance. Montgomery had no final say in the airborne (Market) part of the operation, which was under the control of the US General Brereton. Virtually all of the problems with the operation came out the airborne plan. There is a body of opinion that the weather, which defied allied forecasts was the decisive factor in Arnhem not being taken:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
EISENHOWER
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
CHURCHILL
German General Karl Student gave the weather as the main cause of the failure at Arnhem.
Market Garden did not succeed in reaching Arnhem but it did free up to a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German forces another 50 miles, hindered V weapon attacks on Britain and gave the allies a launching point for Operation Veritable in early 1945. The losses incurred (17,000) should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
US historians have sought to airbrush Eisenhower and Brereton from the history of Market Garden to ensure that responsibility is heaped on the British, and on Montgomery in particular. This process culminated with the infamous film, ‘A Bridge Too Far’, which is filled with falsehoods and American cliché images of the British.
The Bulge
Montgomery had warned Eisenhower about the dangers involved in his broad front strategy of spreading out allied forces too thinly. When the German attack in the Ardennes began, Bradley lost his head and refused Eisenhower’s instruction to move his headquarter s back, Hodges, the US 1st Army commander went AWOL. Montgomery had the only major reinforcements available to the allies (XXX Corps). Montgomery cancelled Operation Veritable and moved quickly to sort out the northern half of the bulge. His actions drew this comment from Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
The German offensive petered out and Montgomery, as he later admitted, unwisely held a press conference about the battle which was seized upon by German propaganda, changed, and re-broadcast with an anti-American slant which but hurt American commanders, looking to take offence, seized on and accepted with bothering to check on its provenance. This is attested to by Chester Wilmot, who actually attended that press conference:
‘My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.’ His words.
And also, by one of Montgomery’s harshest critics, Tedder:
‘ When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
The Rhine
Montgomery gave a masterclass in planning and execution of a plan with the crossing of the Rhine at it widest point and against the most formidable opposition that the Germans could still offer. Bradley had already crossed the Rhine at its narrowest point against far weaker opposition That Bradley then crowed about this (as did his his subordinate Patton as well) reflects badly on both of those US officers.
This from Eisenhower:
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
And a more recent opinion:
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.’
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@phillipnagle9651
Not really...
Caen:
”While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout."
"In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort."
"The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“
US General Omar Bradley.
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@TheEvertw
Montgomery: Part One
The First World War.
Unlike almost all US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experience. Montgomery fought on the Western Front in the First World War, where he was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO for his efforts. The citation for this award in the London Gazette stated: "Conspicuous gallant leading on 13th October, when he turned the enemy out of their trenches with the bayonet”.
France 1940.
Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940 in command of the 3rd Infantry Division. He trained and led his division superbly, closing the gap on the allied left at Dunkirk after the sudden surrender of the Belgian Army and then leading his division back to Britain intact. Alanbrooke noted the outstanding performances of Montgomery and Alexander in France and marked both men down for higher command in the future. However, Montgomery was sidelined for some time afterwards due to his outspoken criticisms of the handling of the campaign in France.
North Africa
Appointed to command of the ground forces in ‘Torch’, Montgomery was moved across to command Eighth Army after the death of Gott. In his first big command, Montgomery acted quicky and decisively as he reorganized and rejuvenated Eighth Army to make it fit to take on and defeat the Axis forces led by Rommel. There is plenty of evidence of Montgomery’s effect on his new command, here are some:
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight.’
DE GUINGAND
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
ALANBROOKE
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
CHURCHILL
Montgomery, with four divisions defeated Rommel with his six divisions at Alam-el-Halfa and then defeated Rommel again at the Second Battle of El Alamein.
For Alamein, Montgomery set about re-training the entire Eighth Army, regrouping divisions that had been broken down into smaller units and creating an armoured reserve to exploit a breakthrough in the enemy front. Further, he resisted political pressure to attack before he was satisfied that everything he required for victory was in place – including extensive medical care facilities for his troops.
Alamein ended the war in North Africa as a contest at the cost of 13,500 (7.9%) casualties. Victory in North Africa freed up a million of allied shipping for use elsewhere and led to the campaign in Italy, which together with the allied threat to the Balkans tied down 50 German divisions. Troops that the Germans could not deploy in Normandy or Russia.
Montgomery may have been fortunate to benefit from increased resources being available but he made his own good fortune with the thoroughly professional way in which he set about his task. Further, Montgomery showed how the allies could beat the Germans in the future: thorough preparation and concentration of resources, which paid off in Normandy and would have paid off in the autumn of 1944 in the advance on Germany if Eisenhower had heeded these lessons instead of allowing political considerations to dictate strategy.
American hacks like Stephen Ambrose claim that Montgomery was over praised because Britain needed heroes at that time. That is total rubbish. The whole thrust of government propaganda, the works of filmmakers and of writers was to emphasize the collective effort and the deeds of the man in the street rather than the deeds of generals or politicians. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched were: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. The BBC chipped in with output such as ‘Workers Playtime’ JB Priestly, and so on, and so on, and so on
Sicily (Operation Husky)
Here, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was alongside the US General Patton’s 7th Army. The was the last occasion that those two generals were of equal status as Patton went on to assault two of his own soldiers and some Sicilian peasants and thus get himself passed over for army group command. Before the operation started, Montgomery strongly recommended to the land forces commander Alexander, that Patton’s lunatic plan to land in small numbers at a several places around the Island should not take place but that landings should be concentrated in the South East of the Island.
Montgomery's plan worked. As with Alamein, casualties were low, Patton went AWOL until he was enticed back into the battle by Montgomery by allowing Patton to capture Messina. An event later portrayed by Hollywood as a race between the two generals to be first to reach that place.
Italy
Allied landings in Italy after Husky comprised Operations Avalanche, Slapstick and Baytown which were widely separated. Montgomery argued that resources should be concentrated on Avalanche and that Baytown would not divert German forces away from anywhere else. Montgomery was proved right and he later stated that he was ‘glad to leave the ‘dog's breakfast’ when he left on the 23rd December 1943 to take up his appointment as allied land forces commander of Operation Overlord.
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@davidtuttle7556
The combined banks of the Scheldt amounted to 100 miles in length, ALL of which had to be cleared before Antwerp could be used. The fortifications at its mouth were some of the strongest in Europe, the Germans still on the South Bank in force, at the Breskens Pocket.
Clearly, the Germans attached great importance to denying Antwerp to the allies, by tenacity with which they fought in the Scheldt, amount of aerial attack they subjected Antwerp to, and the fact that Antwerp was the goal for the German Ardennes offensive at he end of 1944. There was never going to be a 'speeding up the build-up of Allied Units for the assault on Germany' by capturing the Scheldt. Even if the entire 21st Army Group could have been put to that task, it would still have taken a month to capture the estuary, and another three to four weeks to clear the waterway of mines - as actually did happen. Meanwhile, the Germans would have been given even more of what they most wanted, time and space to rebuild their forces, after their defeat by Montgomery in Normandy.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591
‘When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little
help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which
Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten’
P 592
‘days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P126
‘from Normandy to Holland. In Monty's eyes the true reason for the relative collapse of Allied hostilities was in no measure the absence of a deep-water port other than Cherbourg or Marseilles. It was a combination of the administrative bungle whereby a shortage of artillery ammunition had arisen in the American zone; of the growing lack of infantry reinforcements; and of Eisenhower's failure to take a firm 'grip' on the campaign. These problems were exacerbated by the paucity of ports but the failure to get Antwerp working before November was not the primary reason why the Allied offensive against Germany had ground to a virtual halt,¹ since Antwerp could never have been operational before October, even if all 21st Army Group resources had been assigned to it.
Monty's aversion to such administrative and command incompetence has been characterized as ill-bred, even demented. Certainly, to those who did not appreciate Monty's professionalism, his unceasing campaign to get Allied command in North-west Europe on a sound footing seemed at best wearying, at worst egotistical, even megalomaniacal. Eisenhower became, in the eyes of many sympathetic historians, the 'long-suffering', forbearing Supreme Commander arbitrating between prima-donnas. Eisenhower's own view of his task, as spelled out in his 'put-down' of 13 October to Monty, was 'adjusting the larger boundaries to tasks commensurate to the several groups operating in these several areas, assigning additional support by air or reinforcements by ground and airborne troops, when [there is] a general pool, and shifting the emphasis in maintenance arrangements'.
St Malo fell on 17 August, Brest on 18 September 1944; neither was used. Monty's own chief of administration, 21st Army Group, Maj-General Miles Graham later considered that 'at the period at which the advance would have taken place we were no longer based on the Normandy beaches. The port of Dieppe was opened on September 5 and by the end of the month was dealing with over 6,000 tons a day. Ostend was captured on September 9 and opened on the 28th of the same month. Boulogne and Calais were captured on September 22 and 30 respectively. Meanwhile the depots on the Normandy beaches were being rapidly cleared by rail and road and the new Advance Base established in central and northern Belgium. An additional 17 General Transport companies with a lift of some 8,000 tons and preloaded with petrol and supplies were borrowed from the War Office and arrived in the latter half of September and early October. '
A summary of Channel and North Sea Ports Liberations:
Dieppe. Liberated: 01.09.1944. Operational: 05.09.1944.
Le Havre. Liberated: 12.09.1944. Operational: 13.10.1944.
Boulogne. Liberated: 22.09.1944. Operational: Mid October 1944
Ostend. Liberated: 09.09.1944. Operational: 28.09.1944.
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@phillipnagle9651
How ridiculous can this get?..
The very person that decided not close the Falaise Gap (Bradley), confirmed that he did not close the Falaise Gap.
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
His words.
Americans set themselves up to fall with this, in their haste try to re-write history. And for no really big reason. 40,000 escaped from the Falaise Pocket, with vitually none of their equipment. The Germans lost 440,000 in Normandy, and out of 2,400 tanks, they crossed to Seine with 120 of those machines. Any of those surviving German troops that got sent to the Eastern Front probably that their luck had changed.
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@cliveengel5744
Slow, cautious, won in North Africa, Sicily, Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge, and the Rhine.
Britain out of the war in 1940 tied down a million German troops, two thirds of the German air force, forced the Germans into their submarine building programme, stopped the Germans from being able to trade outside of mainland Europe, and by intervening in the Balkans, helped to cause a fatal five week delay to the start of Barbarossa. The Royal Navy dealt with the German, Italian, and French fleets, and it accounted for three quarters of the 785 German and Italian submarines destroyed during the war.
The RAF destroyed German superiority in the air war with victory in the Battle of Britain. Never again would Germany be as strong in real terms in relation to its tasks and its enemies as it had been in the early summer of 1940. From then on its personnel and equipment decreased in quality and numbers.. Germany attacked Russia in 1941 with just 2,400 aircraft, and from 1940 until 1944 , its only new major combat aircraft was the fw-190. Half of the German fighter aces from the entire war fought in the Battle of Britain.
The campaign in the Mediterranean prevented the Germans from reaching the Middle East oilfields, it prevented a East West Axis link up, it prevented Germany from importing from outside of mainland Europe, and it freed up 9one million tons of allied shipping.
Bletchley Park took on initial work by Polish codebreakers and created the most comprehensive codebreaking operation in history.
Missing in action does not apply to the lateUSA. They were never in action, what with their country beimng three thousand miles from the nearest enemy. Americans saw more of Halleys Comet than they saw of German bombers.
That is why their film makers have to steal other countries history.
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@phillipnagle9651
'I am describing what happened. Montgomery made strong but ineffectual efforts to capture Caen ( a day one objective) that were rebuffed with heavy casualties. You can quote whomever you wish, it doesn't change what happened.'
But you cannot quote anyone to back up what you claim.
There is no evidence that any firm timing commitment was made in regard to Caen, or any any other Overlord objective, apart from the Seine, which was scheduled for D+90. The allies got there by D+78.
Have you evidence in regard to timings? By evidence, I mean testimony from people who were there, or contemporary documents.
As for 'heavy casualties'...How do you define heavy casualties?
31,000 in two months, spread among 3 armoured divisions, 11 infantry divisions, 5 armoured brigades,
and 3 tank brigades.
This against an enemy comprising 7 infantry divisions, 8 panzer divisions, and 3 heavy tank battalions.
If you rate this as heavy casualties, what are you comparing it to?
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@richardthelionheart6924
Yea, America started all this, and its gathered pace since Reagan got elected in 1980. As far as the war is concerned, Ameicans dont seem to be able to feel good about themselves unless they do other countries down. You only have to look at the number of lead comments posted by Americans on YouTube items about Montgomery, or Dunkirk, or Alamein, and so on.
There was no Battle of Britain, or Stalingrad for the USA. The war was 3,000 miles from their mainland. So they seem to want to make it about this General, or that General, and so on. As if it somehow levels things up.
If anyone looked at American comments on here without knowing anything about the war, I doubt that they would even work out that the USA and Britain were allies. Those comments seem to show more appreciation of Nazi Germany than Britain...or Russia.
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
'colossal defeat'?..
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