Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@kenmazoch8499
'nearly 14,000 casualties is not rubbish and the troops there most surely did not think so.'
14,000 out of 195,000. You should compare that with the Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, and Metz... amongst others.
'if the attack had been made as an armored assault, with engineer and infantry support, rather than the other way around, the casualties would have been some 20-30 percent less,'
And you know this because?..
'cig alan brooke, saw to it lumsden did not have a job afterward.'
You do of course mean CIGS Alanbrooke.
Not really, Lumsden, had several jobs after he was sacked by Montgomery.
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Chris Wilson.
'Montgomery won the battle only because of the significant contribution of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, something he never acknowledged.' Your words.
EIGHTH ARMY
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE ARMY COMMANDER
To be read to All Troops
1. When we began the Battle of Egypt on 23 October I said hat together we would hit the Germans and Italians for six right out of North Africa.
We have made a very good start and to-day, 12th Nov., there are no German and Italian soldiers on Egyptian territory except prisoners.
In three weeks we have completely smashed the German and Italian Army, and pushed the fleeing remnants out of Egypt, having advanced ourselves nearly 300 miles up to and beyond the frontier.
2. The following enemy formations have ceased to exist as effective fighting formations:
Panzer Army. 15 Panzer Div.
21 Panzer Div.
90 Light Div.
164 Light Div.
10 Italian Corps. Brescia Div.
Pavia Div.
Folgore Div.
20 Italian Corps. Ariete Armd. Div.
Littorio Armd. Div.
Trieste Div .
21 Italian Corps. Trento Div.
Bologna Div.
The prisoners captured number 30,000, including nine Generals.
The amount of tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, transport, air-craft, etc., destroyed or captured is so great that the enemy is completely crippled.
3. This is a very fine performance and I want, first, to thank you all for the way you responded to my call and rallied to the task. I feel that our great victory was brought about by the good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire rather than by anything I may have been able to do myself.
4. Secondly, I know you will all realise how greatly we were helped in our task by the R.A.F. We could not have done it without their splendid help and co-operation. I have thanked the R.A.F. warmly on your behalf.
5. Our task is not finished yet; the Germans are out of Egypt but there are still some left in North Africa. There is some good hunting to be had further to the West, in Libya; and our leading troops are now in Libya ready to begin. And this time, having reached Bengasi and beyond we shall not come back.
6. On with the task, and good hunting to you all. As in all pursuits some have to remain behind to start with; but we shall all be in it before the finish.
12.11.42 B. L. Montgomery
General, G.O.C.-in-C,
Eighth Army.
His words.
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'If you note the scene from the PATTON film wherein Patton is playing traffic cop to his lines of armor, then gets shut down by Bradley (and Eisenhower! ) , Patton correctly guesses that it was Montgomery swallowing up all available fuel and supplies.' Your words.
Its a definite no. No fuel supplies were diverted to Montgomery from Patton.
'Montgomery had persuaded Churchill to use the "V2 missile sites" as an excuse and persuade Roosevelt to turn the allied offensive over to Montgomery for this reason ....' Your words.
Read this:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
For Monty now to cancel the British part of 'the main effort' of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem—Nijmegen axis had been Monty's own proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind
Eisenhower's directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. To Nye Monty thus signalled back:
Your 75237 re V 2. As things stand at present it may take up to two weeks but very difficult to give accurate estimate. There are aspects of the present situation which cause me grave concern and these are first the present system of command of the land battle and secondly the admin situation. My letter being sent by DAWNAY will give you all the facts. These matters affect the time we will take to do what you want.
To Eisenhower Monty also signalled, recording his disquiet:
Have studied your directive no. FWD 13765 carefully and cannot see it stated that the northern advance to the RUHR is to have priority over the eastern advance to the SAAR. Actually 19 US Corps is unable to advance properly for lack of petrol. Could you send a responsible staff officer to see me and so that I can explain things to him.
'The Poles caught the brunt of it and were decimated....!!' Your words.
21.1% of 1st Airborne got back to safety, 42.5% of the glider pilots got back to safety, 88% of the Poles got back to safety.
But who else was there to play " hero" for England's armed forces ??
What evidence is there that 'England's armed forces' needed anyone to play " hero"?
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@kenmazoch8499
'but the canadian, us and french forces, while they did cut down the rear echelon troops in theater, none disbanded any full divisions or brigades/regiments. some units back at home were, as were several british units at home, no combat units in theater were.' Your words.
But 'the canadian, us and french forces', were not in the fighting to the same extent that British forces were. The British Army was in Norway, France, Greece, North Africa, Italy and the Far East, before France - Germany 1944-45.
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‘A Can-Loan 1st Gordon Highlanders Para Vet of Arnhem, taught 2 generations of Canadian Officers Infantry the dangers of "my man will do it" disease. Monty did not double-check his staff. His bloody-minded "make my plan work" top-down manner gave him a staff unwilling to raise inconvenient truths. Hence:’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Montgomery had already cancelled COMET because of advice from his staff. His decision to include Arnhem in MARKET GARDEN was taken after consulting his staff.
‘1. Monty & his staff Ignored the Inconvenient Truth of plain RAF Photo Recce showing a full Panzer heavy Division. Couldn't contradict Monty's of an empty Drop Zone.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
The ‘Photo Recce’ can be seen on line. Far from showing a ‘full Panzer heavy Division.’, they are grainy overhead shots of a few heavily camouflaged German Mark lll tanks from a training battalion. The tanks can probably only be discerned experienced photo interpreters.
Montgomery had no had no final on the airborne MARKET plan. On this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
‘2. Monty & his staff inexcusably failed or refused Net In, Test, & Exercise their Radios. No command or control save slavish devotion to Monty's Plan which was entirely grounded on the assumption of an empty Drop Zone’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
The problems with radios were confined to the FAAA (That is the FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY, to save you looking it up). As I have already pointed out FAAA was not part of Montgomery’s forces.
‘3. Monty was inflexible because he was deafened by no Communications, and therefore blind. Guards Armour refused to seek or seize let alone to maintain the initiative because they knew of Monty's obsessive compulsive control freak nature. Radio up and just do it unless ordered to stop? That would take an O'Conner, or a Slim at the top. Oh, and working radios.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
XXX Corps reached Grave at 8am on the morning of the 3rd day, 50 miles from the start line. This with a 12 hour delay due to the Son Bridge having been blown up. How was that a failure to’ maintain the initiative’?
‘Sure, there are always 378 other factors. Usually rasied as excuses or fog. But these 3 all by themselves killed a golden opportunity, and relegated Mony to 3rd tier general everywhere but England. What's Monty's equivilent of Slim's ? The vainglorious tripe in Monty's autobiography on has to be some of the worst vainglorious stuff & nonsense ever published. There was no excuse for Monty's gravest blunder, Arnhem.’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Three factors that could help to explain the failure at Arnhem could be:
The Germans finding a copy of the compete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, at a US Landing zone at the very beginning of the operation.
The unexpected onset of adverse weather, as cited by Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Student.
The failure to capture Nijmegen city and bridge before the arrival of XXX Corps on the morning of the 3rd day.
As for Montgomery..
As a single division commander Montgomery performed with distinction in trying circumstances in France in 1940, his night march with the 3rd infantry division to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian surrender was a foretaste of his outstanding career as an army / army group commander. As a single army commander, Montgomery won in North Africa, and Sicily.
As an army group commander, Montgomery won in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Scheldt, and the Rhine. No other allied commander came close to matching Montgomery’s career.
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