Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Imperial War Museums" channel.

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  12.  @Heathcoatman  ‘t's actually quite funny watching this and seeing yet another British attempt to lay blame elsewhere. The common excuse is alluded to here, that General Gavin didnt prioritize the Nijmegen bridge over the Groosbeek heights. The Heights had to be taken first. Had the Germans held the heights they could have just decimated any troops fighting in and around the bridge. It's not up for debate among military scholars at all. The heights first.’ Your words. A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994. P xiii The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.’ The Groesbeek Heights are 100 ft above sea level. ‘1st, Montgomery held up the Canadian armored formation that was running up the coast just before they reached the Schelde. Had they capped the Schelde, it would have trapped the majority of the 15th Army on the peninsula, approximately 70,000 Germans. Instead this narrow access was left open, and many of the units that put pressure on the bridges came from this area. Big oops nobody ever talks about (because it was Montgomery's fault, and we never criticize Monty, right?).’ Your words. It’s a definite no. The Canadian First Army, was tasked with clearing the Channel Ports. No allied forces were in a position to contest the German 15th Army move in the Scheldt. ‘General Browning felt that his HQ unit was needed near Nijmegen with the first drop. What? With the extreme shortage of transport units, Browning's HQ ate up almost a battalion's worth of air transport......for an HQ unit......on day 1. No wonder Gavin didnt have enough troops for both the bridge and the heights.’ Your words It’s a definite no. Browning’s gliders were taken from 1st Airborne’s glider allocation, leading to two Companies of the South Staffords being left behind.
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  13. Heathcoatman ‘lets looks at his 'accomplishments'. Widely hailed as the 'winner of 2nd El Alamein' he showed up about a week before the battle as a replacement. The defenses were already set and his forces grossly outnumbered Rommel's. That victory is mainly due to the ANZAC forces who held the line a month before Monty even got there, allowing the reinforcements that followed to dig in in great defensive positions. That victory was sealed before Monty was ever a factor, but he's the hero of El Alamein (pause to let chuckles subside).’ It’s a definite no. Montgomery arrived in Egypt in Mid-August 1942. The Second Battle of Alamein began at the end of October and early November of that year. At the First Battle of Alamein, Eighth Army comprised one Australian Division, one Indian division (two brigades), one New Zealand Division, one South African Division, and three British divisions. All clear now? ‘Then there's Sicily, where Monty was Monty, dragging his feet, moving at a snails pace while the Americans took Palermo AND Messina against the bulk of the FJs, then ole' Monty claimed himself the hero again.’ Your words. Read this: MONTY MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983 Pages 319-320 CHAPTER SEVEN Patton Absconds to Palermo General Maxwell Taylor later recalled: I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³ General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanisetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.' 'Then there's Caen. targeted to be captured by June 7th, taken well into July with the typical Monty excuse of 'it was hard, they fought back'. Your words. There was no target date for Caen. The Only target date that Montgomery set was the allies to be at the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78. ‘Then there's MG, a bad plan to start with then executed poorly while Patton's tanks sat facing open country without any fuel. Good call.’ Your words. CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P589 It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division.’ ‘If you want to argue Monty with me, please do, I've only scratched the surface here.’ Your words. Bring it on
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  17. Montgomery Ardennes Press Conference... This from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics: WITH PREJUDICE The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder G.C.B. CASSELL & COMPANY 1966 P 636– 637 ‘In a press conference given on 7 January, Montgomery described how Eisenhower had placed him in command of the whole northern front. He emphasized that the repulse of the German onslaught had been an Anglo-American effort, but somewhat unfortunately went on to describe the battle as ‘most interesting. I think, possibly, one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake.’ Montgomery expressed his admiration for the fighting qualities of the American soldier and how grieved he was to see uncomplimentary articles about Eisenhower in the British Press. However, the subsequent handling of Montgomery’s statements by the British newspapers and by the B.B.C. caused a crisis. The Prime Minister telephoned several times to Eisenhower, who said that Bradley was most upset. He proposed to award the Bronze Star to Bradley with a citation drawing attention to his fighting qualities, and to the work of the American armies bearing the brunt of the German offensive. At a meeting on 9 January, the Supreme Commander remarked that censorship was a two-edged weapon. Anything withheld by the censors immediately acquired news value, and the Press, by inuendo or other means, invariably circumvented it. It seemed to him that he reaction of the American Press to the statements in the British newspapers would be to exaggerate the United States point of view. There would be no end to the statements which the Press of the two countries would make in reply to each other. He also remarked: ‘For two and a half years I have been trying to get the Press to talk of “Allied” operations, but look what has happened.’ ‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’ And this from a reporter at the press conference: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P683 My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar. Any quwstions?
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  41.  @lauriepocock3066  This from 9th September 1944: 'VCIGS, General Nye, [in the absence of Alanbrooke] Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.' N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The V1 flying bomb, and the V2 rocket came from the same German specification issued to the German Army, and the German Air Force: The ability of a pilotless aircraft to deliver a one ton warhead on London. The German Army developed the V2, the German Air Force developed the V1. This is what Albert Speer, head of the German armaments production had to say on the matter of the German atom bomb. www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJCF-Ufapu8&ab_channel=SergioIQ 3hrs, 15 mins, 54 seconds onwards. As a layman, the opinions of Bradley and Eisenhower on Montgomery make little impression on me. Those two US commanders had little in the way of military accomplishments to their name. Neither of them even had any any personal combat experience, Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. MARKET GARDEN seems to have conformed to Eisenhower's misguided broad front strategy. It was actually a limited undertaking that took no supplies away from Bradley - his armies carried on with their activities throught the MARKET GARDEN undertaking. The only additional forces involved were parts of the FAAA.
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