Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Imperial War Museums"
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
‘Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...." ’ Para Dave.
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’ -notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. All this after five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
‘Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part" ’ Para Dave.
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
‘From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’ Para Dave.
‘Now how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?’
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’ Para Dave.
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him ‘Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ ’ Para Dave.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
Major-General Sir Francis De Guingand was Montgomery’s Chief of Staff. Max Hastings, is that bloke with the Hank Marvin glasses that they call the ‘golf club members bar bore’, who thinks he knows more about the history of warfare than the rest of the world put together.
‘How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ’ Para Dave.
Max Hastings should have checked first:
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
‘How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies’ Para Dave.
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located at Granville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands. Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’ Para Dave.
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty, who was not interested in the estuary’. How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak’ Para Dave.
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion. This is what Churchill stated in a note to Roosevelt:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 15 Dec 43
9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
Not a word about Montgomery’s military accomplishments’. Why do people not check first?..
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
‘Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. -Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” -Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.’ Para Dave.
Who knows?.. Whatever role was, or was not given to Patton, it was nothing to with Montgomery - they were in different armies. Where Patton was, or was not, was down to his US army superiors, Eisenhower, and Patton. As to whether Eisenhower should have reinforced Patton, then that is a matter to be considered in regard to Eisenhower, not Montgomery. Montgomery had in already, in effect stated to Eisenhower: Go with me in the North (Dempsey/Hodges), or go with Bradley in the South (Hodges/Patton), but choose one. He chose neither, and the whole Allied advance ground to a halt, due to a series of under resourced piecemeal efforts.
'might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton'. Here are some German views…
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
This is what Blumentritt said after the war to Liddell Hart: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine""
As for Patton, and MARKET GARDEN… based on his previous behaviour, he would probably have turned left at Nijmegen and then headed towards the Dutch Capital, The Hague, just as he had done in Sicily with Palermo, and in Normandy, with Paris. Plenty of opportunities there for press photo calls and newsreel footage. Still, perhaps that was an American thing, rather than just a Patton thing. What with Mark Clark leaving allied forces in Italy in the lurch so that he could capture Rome. But back to Patton, if he had tried his Sicily nonsense of attacking Sicilian peasants in the Netherlands, he would have been given a right hander back. Then we could have seen how big and tough he was. Also, The Netherlands was nowhere Oflag XIII-B, and so it would seem that the Task Force Baum ‘operation’ to rescue his son in law would have cost a lot more than the 282 casualties that were incurred when the ‘operation’ took place in 1945.
'Patton the real doer' . Here are some German views…
Here is Von Mellenthin regarding Patton's forces compared to the Germans in the Lorraine:
Panzer Battles, page 317
"On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared.
Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry
and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks. While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively, Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground, had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm"
www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view/4/
'German commanders again found Patton’s generalship to be hesitant during the Lorraine Campaign, just as their counterparts had in Tunisia and Sicily. These men included some of Germany’s top armored commanders, Eastern Front veterans who had led troops during such fierce battles as Kharkov and Kursk. As the German armies withdrew east from the invading Allies, these commanders patched together a semblance of the flexible defense they had used against the Soviets, using mobile reserves and trading space for time and survival.'
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@davemac1197
You have made some really good points here. There is little that I can add
Troop numbers:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME VI TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 1954.
Page 608
‘Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. 10 Sept 44
I should be grateful if this [table of divisions in the West, dated 1.9.44] could be brought up to date.
2. You do not seem to have credited the British, or perhaps the Americans, with the number of Army tank brigades, two of which together should count as the equivalent of a division.
3. Even without this it would seem that, taking Italy and France together the British Empire has thirty-four divisions and the United States thirty divisions.’
De-Guingand and Market Garden:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation.'
Bridging Equipment.
One Robin Neillands in The Battle for the Rhine 1944, (A book I have read but I do not own a copy of), noted in words to the effect that the front end of XXX Corps was choc-a-block wih Bridging equipment.
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@davemac1197
'Brian Urquhart's story was discredited after the aerial photo was found in a Dutch government archive in 2015.'s story was discredited after the aerial photo was found in a Dutch government archive in 2015.'
Also, am I right in thinking that there is no record of the aerial recce flight that Brian Urquhart claimed to have commissioned, ever taking place?
A bloke that posted comments on YouTube, who used the name Dave Rendall, claimed to be Brian Urquhart's nephew. A claim that I stated that I was sceptical of. That notwithstanding, he stated that his Uncle never briefed General Browning on German armour in the Arnhem, and that Urquhart did not take part in MARKET because of a leg injury, rather than nervous exhaustion.
The whole Brian Urquhart stuff in the Cornelius Ryan book 'A Bridge Too Far', and the film of the same name was all too neat. From memory, the photos in the film showed post-war German tanks neatly framed in oblique angle photos.
I think it was this Sebastian Richie that stated that there would not have been oblique angle photos unless the pilot was briefed to photograph a specific location. There seems to be little reason to doubt what this Sebastian Richie stated on this point.
I suppose that examples of aerial recce, oblique angle photos of specific places are shots are the shots taken by Squadron Leader Hill RAF of German Radar installations Bruneval, France in December 1941, and later at Domburg in the Netherlands. In each case, Hill was working to a specific brief.
What were RAF recce pilots supposed to do for a Brian Urquhart brief to try to find German tanks in the Arnhem area in 1944? Fly up and down wooded areas at low level until they found tanks? How long would that have taken? How long before the aircraft were shot down? How many recce flights could have taken place before the Germans became suspicious?
Why can't these people like Nick Danger think before they post on here?
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@benbarber2369
'his horrendous Market Garden campaign'
MARKET GARDEN freed a fifth of the Netherlands, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the months ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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@phillipnagle9651
'Hodges and Patton were held up because of extremely long supply lines because of Montgomery's failure to take the Scheldt Estuary when it was lightly defended so the allies could make use of the port of Antwerp.' Your words.
Not really...
The Scheldt was never lightly defended. German troops were South of the Estuary, particularly, at the Breskens Pocket. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the heaviest in Europe. The Germans were always ready to mine the estuary The estuary banks totaled 100 miles, every single part of which, had to be in allied hands before Antwerp port could be used. If Hodges and Patton had placed any reliance on Antwerp being available when they broke out of Normandy, then that would seem to have been irresponsible, as the allies had no way of knowing when Atwerp port would be available when the break out started.
'To make it worse, Eisenhower gave supply priority to Montgomery so he could launch the ill fated Market Garden. Montgomery had the stupidity to lose an airborne division while failing to do his primary job of opening the port of Antwerp.' Your words.
The priority of supply given to support Market Garden, was 500 tons of supplies per day, enough to support one division in an offensive mode. This lift capability had previoisly been used to feed the civilian population of Paris, rather than support allied ground forces.
Montgomery's primary job at that time was toundertake MARKET GARDEN, as confirmed by Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
'At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.' His words.
'His failure cost a lot of Canadians their lives when they had to go in and take the Scheldt Estuary and cost the the allies a great amount of time and men.' Your words.
The capture of the Scheldt involved British, Canadian, and Polish troops.
'Of course British mythology does not allow such facts to be put forward.' Your words.
And what mythology would that be?
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@phillipnagle9651
'An absolute lie! The 6th Panzer SS Army. the main German force was stopped cold with zero help from the British.' Your words.
Really?.. Montgomery was British.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army. His words.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
‘There was no doubt that the Americans had had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
Field Marshall Alanbrooke
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