Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@johnlucas8479
Montgomery met Bradley on the 17th August, and spoke about Montgomery’s proposal that 40 allied divisions should move together towards Germany. Montgomery went away from that meeting in the belief that Bradley had agreed with that proposal.
Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August and proposed that, given the allied logistic situation, half of the allied divisions in Europe could kept on the offensive, if they were priotitized over the remaining divisions, but if no such prioritisation took place, then the whole allied advance would grind to halt. Montgomery proposed that the British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army could advance in the North to the Ruhr with such priotization. Failing that, Montgomery agree to the US 1st, and US 3rd Armies advancing into Germany, South of the Ardennes. Eisenhower did neither, for political reasons, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt.
By the time that Eisenhower met Montgomery again on the 10th September, Eisenhower had taken on the role of allied land forces commander, and he again refused to concentrate allied resources into a plan that keep at least as sizeable part of allied resources on the move. He did however, agree to a limited undertaking, MARKET GARDEN, which was designed to give the allies a bridgehead over the Rhine, and to take the allies to the Ijsselmeer in the hope that such a move would degrade the German V-2 rocket campaign against Britain. The evidence is clear that it was not an attempt to reach Berlin, and that it was not expected to end the war in Europe soon…
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery had received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
There can little doubt that if Arnhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the Ijsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN:
‘21 Army Group Operations
OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
17-26 Sept 1944
Page 3
SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
GENERAL
2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 – NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’
Thanks go to you for drawing attention to this.
MONTGOMERY
ALAN MOOREHEAD
HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946
P 214
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’
79 years later, it is clear, given situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, and with the benefit of hindsight, that Mongomery’s appreciation of the allied situation at that time, and what should be done moving forward was the correct one.
The seems to be allied understanding of the German situation from evidence from allied forces, and from intelligence sources presented a (correct) picture of German armies in the West…
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
At that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces in the area North of the Ardennes than had been in Britain after Dunkirk.
The logistical situation was already easing as the allies moved into September, with the allied armies already getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day…
Dieppe was liberated on the 1st September, and was operational four days later to give the allies another 3,000 tons per day, enough for the 1st Canadian army. Ostend was operational by the 28th of that month. October saw Le Havre (exclusively for US use), operational on the 13th, and Boulogne became operational on the 22nd. Calais became operational during November.
Further, the road and rail network in the allied rear was improving by the day.
By how much the war would have been shortened, and how far the allies would have got into Germany in the late Summer, and Autumn of 1944, due to a sensible concentration of allied resources is a matter that cannot be determined. That such a concentration of resources would have been the correct decision, is be beyond dispute.
Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan of how the OVERLORD campaign would unfold, and gave the allies a huge victory. Only those that want split hairs can find serious falt with that plan. Eisenhower squandered the fruits of Montgomery's victory by adopting a plan that put political considerations ahead of military considerations, a plan that could have been devised by a fourteen-year-old.
Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front ‘strategy brought the allied advance to a halt, and gave the Germany the continuing use of the Ruhr until well into 1945, and in a broader sense, gave the Germans what they most needed after their catastrophe in Normandy, time, and space to rebuild their armies in the West. A look at German production in the Ruhr after Eisenhower’s fateful decision, and the make-up of the German forces in the Ardennes attack, make this clear.
The immediate beneficiary of the ‘Broad Front’ mistake was Nazi Germany. The longer-term beneficiary was the USSR, who went into the Yalta conference knowing how much of Germany they could gobble up, and also, due to US leaders failing to recognize the importance of the Italian campaign, in a commanding position in the Balkans.
Harsh but fair.
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@johnlucas8479
'This is what Alan Brooke (Montgomery Boss) said
"Triumph in the West" Arthur Bryant page 232
"October 5th 1944
"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made of Antwerp in the first place."
Clearly, it was recognized to late that Antwerp was the key for a successful drive into Germany, either by Montgomery single thrust or Eisenhower broad Front.'
Not really…
There is no reason infer that Alanbrook’s words (which he wrote, rather than spoke), appertained to anything other than the situation that developed as a result of the limited MARKET GARDEN undertaking, and the loss of the opportunity to advance towards Germany with a much larger force before then.
In regard to decision making for allied strategy after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, Alanbrook's words are in these extracts:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P262-263
‘Brooke’s diary for Monday, August 28th, reflects this difference in strategic view and the problems raised by Eisenhower’s decision.’
‘ “Difficult C.O.S. meeting where we considered Eisenhower’s new plan to take command himself in Northern France on Sept.1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months onto the war. He straightaway wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans are not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him” ’
…
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [29th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
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'If it was Monty's plan then why wasn't he involved in the battle?'
Montgomery started he battle at his advanced headquarters, 12 miles behind the GARDEN start line, and was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands. Allied land forces commander, Eisenhower was in Normandy, nearly 400 miles away, First Allied Airborne Army commander, Brereton stayed in Britain for almost the entire operation.
Montgomery was an army group commander, responsible for two armies. MARKET GARDEN involved one of those armies. Bradley was an army group commander, responsible for two armies. Bradley was no more involved in the Lorraine Campaign, Aache, and the Hurtgen Forest, than Montgomery was with MARKET GARDEN.
What do people expect? Montgomery to have been in the lead tank?
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'A single road wide open to flank attacks, both sides. Monty checked out before the battle and went dark. '
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
'I believe Monty would've been smashing in the Quartermaster Corps but not as a combat General.'
So what roles should have been given to Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers?
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@johndawes9337
Big Woody also uses the name Para Dave. He lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
He hates Britain, and Britons, especially Montgomery.
He has called Churchill a drunk, Carrington a coward, XXX cowards, my Uncle a coward, Montomery a rancid runt, and many other things. He is a sucker for any opinion about the war that agrees with his views, no matter how far removed from those events the author is. This being the likes of Antony Beevor, Nial Barr, William Weidner, and so on...
Over the last five or six years he has regularly copied my turn of phrase. In this , I am not remotely flattered.
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@tspoon772
Rubbish.
Stop stating things up about Polish people that you cannot back up.
_______________________________________________________________________
Who went war for what reasons:
Germany attacked Poland.
Italy attacked France.
Japan attacked the USA.
Russia was attacked by Germany.
The USA was attacked by Japan.
Great Britain (And France) went to war on behalf of Poland.
_______________________________________________________________________
Australian forces in North Africa (Including Egypt) were called home by their government in order ro meet a perceived threat to their homeland.
_______________________________________________________________________
The idea that Britain was on he verge of starvation is absurd.
Food in Great Britain in 1941:
UK crops harvest: 53.164 million tons
Cereals, Potatoes and Sugar Beet: 6.5 million tons
Cattle, Calves, Sheep and Lambs:13.109 million
UK Milk production: 1,222.8 million gallons
Total food imports: 14.654 million tons
Lend-Lease food imports (7.4% of total food imports): 1.078 million tons
UK Processed food production:20,314 million tons
Total food consumption (UK): 19.996 million tons
Foodstuffs lost at sea enroute to Britain: 787,200 tons (5.3%) of the intended 15 million tons of food imports in 1941.
We can do 1939, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945 if you wish...
_______________________________________________________________________
UK war finaces were built around UK taxation, government borrowing at home and overseas, trading in Sterling Credits, and after British Dollar reserves were almost exhausted by cash and carry purchases from the USA, US Lend-Lease, which amounted to 11% of Britain's wartime needs, and not forgetting the generous gifts from Canada.
_______________________________________________________________________
All clear now?
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@johnburns4017
Czechoslovakia, Autumn 1938.
If Britain did not agree to German demands, Czechoslovakia would be invaded straightaway. Germany would not even allow the Czech government to attend the conference. Britain was going to save the Czech's how? The Fench did not want it, and they actually had an alliance with Czechoslovakia. The Munich agreement found favour in the US press, and with the US government - 3,000 miles away.
Dunkirk, Spring 1940.
Britain was taking bullets as it evacuated 110,000 French troops, mostly in British ships, and even extended the evacuation by another day to take away more French troops. And all this after the French war effort had folded like a house of cards.
Italy / Southern France, Summer 1944.
Like the French were going to pass up the chance to liberate their own soil as the stupid American leaders stopped the chance to finish Italy in 1944, allowed the Germans to move troops to Normandy and the Eastern Front, as the invasion of Southern France achieved nothing that could not be left to a later date, and damaged the West's position in the Balkans in the post-war years.
The Netherlands, Autumn / Winter 1944 to Spring 1945.
The Dutch government in London urged the Dutch people to obstruct German transport before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived, which was designed to take allied troops to the Lower Rhine and the Ijsselmeer and not to Berlin. an operation that Montgomery attended to from just 12 miles behind the start line, while Eisenhower was in Normandy, and Bereton was in Britain.
Cleveland, Ohio, USA, Summer 2023.
Big Woody (aka Para Dave) needs professional help.
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hdfoster5507
' the lives of 3,996 US, and 11,000-13,000 Brits & Poles with 6,450 captured, all elite fighting men.'
The dead of MARKET GARDEN amounted to 2,224, out of 17,000 killed, wounded, and captured.
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From the US Official History:
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
Page 156
In the eyes of the 8zd Airborne Division commander, Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin, possession of the ridge represented the key to success or failure. "With it in German hands," General Gavin was to note later, "physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it." General Gavin believed that if he held this ridge, the British ground column ultimately could succeed, even if his airborne troops should be driven away from the bridges. The high ground also represented a ready airhead for later operations.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994
Preface
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited.
It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
You need to look further than Antony Beevor.
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