Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@Eduardo-zg7nf
The Bulge:
‘He went on in the Bulge, provisionally commanding the US 12th Army Group, and managed to irritate the Americans (again) in a press interview (‘In his book The Longest Winter, Alex Kershaw says, “The picture Montgomery gave of the battle was of massive American blundering: only when he had been brought in to command the armies holding the northern shoulder had catastrophe been averted.”’
Of the US 12th Army Group, Montgomery was actually brought in to command the US 1st army (Hodges) and the US 9th army (Simpson). US 3rd Army (Patton) remained under US command.
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, US 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, German 5th Panzer Army.
And the press conference:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 637
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
'My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.'
All this can be found on-line. Why don’t people like this Alex Kershaw check first?
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David Olie
Normandy and France 1944.
As allied land forces commander Montgomery created the plan for Overlord which targeted allied forces at the Seine by D+90 – which was achieved earlier than those 90 days. The only channel port specifically targeted was Cherbourg which US forces took 10 days behind schedule. Le Havre was liberated on 12.09.44, Dieppe on 01.09.44, Boulogne 22.09 .44, Calais 01.10.44. The North Sea port of Antwerp was liberated 04.09.44. Of the Atlantic ports, Brest was liberated 19.09.44, Saint Nazaire, La Rochelle and Lorient were not liberated until VE Day.
The allied divisions employed on D-Day were:
British 6th Airborne Division.
British 3rd British Infantry Division.
British 50th Infantry Division.
British 79th Armoured Division.
Canadian 3rd Infantry Division.
US 1st Infantry Division.
US 29th Infantry Division.
US 4th Infantry Division.
U.S. 101st Airborne Division.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
Montgomery’s astute leadership created conditions that led to almost complete destruction of German forces in Normandy, coping with, and turning the concentration of German forces in front of British and Canadian forces and the great storm of June 1944 which destroyed the shoddily installed US artificial harbour and damaged the properly installed British artificial harbour.
A performance that drew this comment from Eisenhower:
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’
Also:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
Regarding the Falaise Pocket and the subsequent breakout, this is what the US General Bradley had to say:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
‘In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise’.
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
British expertise dominated the planning for D-Day and Overlord with artificial harbours, PLUTO, assault armour and a vital deception plan.
Events prior to that entirely vindicate the British stance regarding any attempt to invade France before June 1944. In 1942, General Marshall badgered for an invasion of Europe but was only able to offer two US divisions for such an enterprise to go with the available seven British Divisions, the necessary landing craft were not available, the U-boat war was not won, the Luftwaffe was still too powerful to preclude overwhelming allied air superiority. Put this against 25 German divisions in France that would have dealt with any allied incursion without taking any resources away from the Russian front.
In 1943, as in 1942 the shipping for a full scale cross channel invasion was not available. Even the agreed start date for Overlord of 1st May 1944 had to be put back until June 1944 due to need to provide the necessary shipping for the troops at Sword and Utah beaches which Montgomery added to the Overlord plan at the beginning of 1944.
The charge that Churchill was reluctant to support a cross channel invasion is nonsense. As evidenced by what was stated at that time:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 24 Nov 42
‘2. It seems to me that it would be a most grievous decision to abandon “Round-Up”. “Torch is no substitute for “Round-Up”, and only engages thirteen divisions as against the forty-eight contemplated for “Round-Up”. All my talks with Stalin, in Averell’s presence, were on the basis of a postponed “Round-Up”, but never was it suggested that we should attempt no Second Front in Europe in 1943 or even 1944.’
As for Teheran, These are Churchill’s words:
‘Before we separated Stalin looked at me across the table and said “I wish to pose a very direct question to the Prime Minister about ‘Overlord’. Do the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff really believe in ‘Overlord’? I replied, “Provided the conditions previously stated for ‘Overlord’ are established when the time comes, it will be our stern duty to hurl across the Channel against the Germans every sinew of our strength.” On this we separated.’
What reasonable person can argue with that?
I will be back to deal with the remainder of rubbish spouted by the little shit in due course.
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Back to France 1944 (Yawn).
‘nine American division involved in the D-Day invasion’
The allied divisions employed on D-Day (06.06.44) were:
British 6th Airborne Division.
British 3rd British Infantry Division.
British 50th Infantry Division.
British 79th Armoured Division.
Canadian 3rd Infantry Division.
US 1st Infantry Division.
US 29th Infantry Division.
US 4th Infantry Division.
U.S. 101st Airborne Division.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
The number of allied divisions landed by 02.07.44 was:
British: 11, Canadian: 1, US: 13.
Mobilization:
Across SIX years of war, Britain, the British Commonwealth and British Empire mobilized 9 million people into in land forces. This figure of course excludes auxiliary, naval and air force personnel.
As for the USA, the following would seem to explain that 55% reduction in divisions:
file:///C:/Users/A%20User/Desktop/Misc%20Leisure/90-Division%20Gamble.html
ROTFL.
GDP
Total British GDP in the SIX years of war amounted to $2,622 billion with approx. $200 billion spent on the war.
Lend-lease
To Britain amounted $21.6 Billion (Net) between 1941 and 1945.
Aircraft Production (1939-45)
Britain: 131,000, Germany: 119,000, USA 300,000.
Peak allied aircraft strengths in Europe (December 1944) amounted to 14,500 British, 12,200 US and 15,800 Russian machines. The opposing German Strength amounted to 8,500.
Trump
Word is that he is busy trying to get Russia back into the G8 – as of course he owes Putin for fixing the US presidential election. Also, he is waiting for an answer from Canada as to when they burned down the US capital.
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@ErikExeu
'Fantastic. I have never seen such made up excuse before. He "drew all the veteran German troops and numbers on him intentionally to help the American". You use quatation marks, can you provide the source for this fairytail?'
Sure...
US General Omar Bradley:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
Field Marshal Alanbrooke:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
July 27th [1944].
‘Then Dinner with the P.M., Ike and Bedell Smith’
‘Next morning [28th] Brooke wrote to Montgomery about his talk with the Supreme Commander.’
‘ "The Strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight forward. But now comes the trouble; the press chip in and we heard that the British are doing nothing and suffering no casualties whilst the Americans are bearing all the brunt of the war"
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
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On the 8th September 1944, the first German V2 rockets landed in London, launched from the Western part of the Netherlands, in the area around The Hague. An urgent signal was sent from London to Montgomery about know what could be done about those attacks. The rockets could not be intercepted once they were in flight, and given they were launched from mobile launchers, usually in built up area, thus the chances of hitting their launch equipment were almost zero. Therefore, the only thing that could be attempted was to stop delivery of rockets to the western part of the Netherlands. When Montgomery met Dempsey on the 10th September, they discussed whether MARKET GARDEN should end at Nijmegen or Arnhem. Montgomery showed Dempsey the signal from London which settled the matter.
Where is the ego in that?
Prior to that, Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken over the available resources being spread out over all four armies – leaving the allies being not strong enough to advance properly anywhere – which is what happened.
Where is the ego in that?
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'Any overal field commander of Market Garden should be on top of the main points. Proven by the Germans in 1940 using seaplanes in Rotterdam. And by the capture of the Orne bridges at D Day.'
Apart from Eisenhower, in his role as Supreme Commander, and as allied land forces commander, there was no overal field commander of Market Garden until Brereton's MARKET forces linked up with Dempsey's GARDEN forces, at which point, Dempsey would be he overall field commander. By then, the type of things you have mentioned, would have been decided by the FAAA. Montgomery had no final say in FAAA planning for MARKET.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
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@gerhardris
OK. Its your funeral.
'placing Market Garden in all aspects under one agressive overall commander of US forces. Preferably Patton with a few of his staff.'
Why? What had Patton ever done?
'And to make clear that anything needed such as flighingboats or whatever that was difficult to get could go through him. Direct line to Eisenhower and Churchill would work wonders.'
Err... Montgomery had a direct line to Eisenhower, albeit, Eisenhower was in Granville in Normandy. Before, and during MARKET GARDEN, Churchill was travelling to, attending, and coming home from the OCTAGON conference at Quebec, in Canada. In any case, why would Churchill have involved himself in such a limited matter as MARKET GARDEN?
'Yet, granted logistics permitting to have both the Schelde as priority and MG as a nice to have. Then Monty's plan of MG would with the benefit of hindsight probably have worked. As would the subsequent thrusts into Germany the broad front being in supply after Antwerp was open.'
Rubbish.
Opinion has it that even if the allies could have turned the entire 21st Army Group towards the Scheldt, opening up the estuary would have taken a month. You name the date, say 4th September, 1944? Then, as Admiral Ramsay had warned, there would be a three week campaign to clear the estuary of mines. That takes until almost the end of October. Thus, MARKET GARDEN, that was devised to take advantage of German weakness in the wake of the German defeats in Normandy and Belarus would have been overtaken by events.
'The newly formed FAAA (first allied airborne army under Brereton) was placed under command of the 21st Army Group thus under Monty.'
But as the evidence shows, command of the FAAA by 21st Army Group did not extend to 21st Army being able to control any detail of Brereton's plan. It did lead to Brereton agreeing to FAAA units taking part in INFATUATE.
The USAAF man, Brereton would not even yield to his own airborne forces commanders in regard to the air plan for MARKET:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
'have Bradley in charge of Pattons former command. All on the defensive.'
Then you would be back to something like Montgomery's proposals to Eisenhower on the 23rd August, based on the then current supply situation: that First Canadian Army, and US Third Army be stopped to allow British Second Army, and US First Army to advance in the North. OR, that First Canadian Army, and British Second Army be stopped to allow US First Army, and US Third Army to advance in the South. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed, time and space to rebuild their forces in the West.
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If Hitler had 'waited 2-3 years(instead of 1939)or focused on Britain rather than the Soviets, probably all be speaking German as our 2nd language'
If Hitler had waited until 1941 or 1942 to start the war, Germany would have been up against Britain and France, both of who's rearmament programme would have been far more complete. What is to say that in 1941 or 1942, the French Army would have collapsed in the way that it did in 1940? By then Britain would have been more able to commit a lot more troops to to the fighting in France. Belgium and The Netherlands would also been far better prepared to resist a German attack.
If Hitler had decided to attack Russia in 1939, German forces would still have to had to got through Poland to get to the Soviet Union. If Germany had attacked Poland, Britain and France would still have been obliged to go to war, unless there was no Anglo/French/Polish agreement. Probably the only way that this would have happended would have been if Hitler had slackened the pace of his moves in the East, against Austria, and Czechoslovakia. In that case, German forces would have been even further from Russia than they were in 1939.
In 1937, German technocrats had warned Hitler that then German weapons technology would be obsolete by 1943. A warning that by largely proved to be correct. German treasury officials warned about the long-term unsustainability of German armaments spending as the war approached. Hitler then gambled on a short war, and lost.
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@imperialcommander639
'Anyone visiting the battlefield will be struck by the strategic value of the Groesbeek Heights, which form some of the highest ground in the Netherlands.' Your words.
Get real. Groosbeek is 112 ft above sea level.
I have been to the highest point in the Netherlands, Drielandenpunt, at the Town of Vaals in Limburg. Its 700 feet above sea level. Even Deelen, North of Arnhem is 282 feet above sea level.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994.
Preface
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
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