Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  8. @Eduardo-zg7nf Sicily: From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este. Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988. ‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’ MONTY MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON. 1983 CHAPTER SEVEN Patton Absconds to Palermo Pages 319-320 General Maxwell Taylor later recalled: I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.³ General Truscott, commanding the reinforced 3rd US Division (which became the main formation of Patton's Provisional Corps). was later asked by the American Official Historian why 'there was no attempt to try to cut off a part of the Germans' (who were known to be retreating eastwards rather than westwards); moreover, why was `Seventh Army not directed in pursuit of the Germans towards the Catania plain?' Truscott blamed the slowness of Intelligence (`there was a lag of a day or two before the whole picture of the enemy could be assembled'), but primarily Patton's obsession with Palermo: 'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton. P322 Alexander, embarrassed that he had given Patton permission to bolt in the opposite direction, now lamely offered to put the American division under Monty's direct command, explaining why he had given Patton permission to split off the major portion of his Seventh Army in its drive to Palermo: 'Would you like to have one American Div front under your command now for operating in your northern sector? Seventh Army should take advantage of Italian demoralization to clear up the west of the island and at least seize Palermo, from which port they can be based, and if Germans are too strong for you Seventh Army can take over a sector in the north from St Stefano to Troina.¹ Had Monty been the glory-seeking British bigot of Patton's imaginings, he would undoubtedly have taken up Alexander's offer. Instead Monty insisted the American division stay under Patton's command, no doubt as a gage in ensuring, belatedly, that Seventh Army face eastwards and not westwards: 'Re American div. Would like one to operate eastwards on North coast road, but suggest it should remain under Patton,' he signalled back.² ¹ Alexander Papers (WO 214/22), PRO. ² Ibid.
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  9. @Eduardo-zg7nf Normandy: The diary that you quoted was not written by Montgomery, from D-Day to VE Day, it was a series of notes composed by members of Montgomery’s staff. On the 4th August date that you noted, Alanbrooke wrote to Montgomery: ‘I am delighted that our operations are going so successfully and conforming so closely to your plans. For the present all the 'mischief making tongues' are keeping quiet; I have no doubt they will start wagging again and am watching them.’ Montgomery planned for British Second Army to protect the US First Army whilst it spread out to take the key port – Cherbourg, the Cotentin Peninsular and then further afield from the earliest days of his planning for OVERLORD. Caen disappeared as a D-Day objective with the jettisoning of General Morgan’s OVERLORD plan. On this matter, the evidence is clear: C-in-C's Directives (21 A Gp/1062/2/C-in-C): 21.03.1944 It is very important that the area to the S.E. of CAEN should be secured as early as Second Army can manage.' This, from an attendee at Montgomery’s briefing to allied leaders at St Paul’s School, West London on the 15th May 1944: OPERATION VICTORY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON P 393 ‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen and these airfield sites.’ From Montgomery’s directive: NO mention that Caen had to be taken on D-Day. The claim that Caen not being captured on D-Day ‘stalled the entire Normandy campaign’ is absurd. Caen was far less important objective than Cherbourg. Whatever importance capturing Caen had for the allies began to subside almost from the first day of OVERLORD as the Germans played into Montgomery’s hands by beginning to mass almost all of their armour at CAEN. The scale of the German armour at Caen was noted by Alanbrooke to Montgomery on the 28th July, 1944: ‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front.” ‘ As for Eisenhower the military leader... He made a poor job of the allied campaign in Tunisia, he, and, in turn Alexander failed to grip the situation in Sicily, and then went on to make a muck of the invasion of Italy by, not for the last time failing to concentrate allied forces, in this case by undertaking AVALANCHE, BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK at the same time. In North West Europe, he failed to concentrate allied forces for a push into Germany when he took over as allied land forces commander on the 1st September 1944, prolonging the war well into 1945. He dithered at the start of the German push in the Ardennes, and failed to support in his race against time to stop the Russians from getting into Denmark.
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  14. David Olie Casualties British and Colonial deaths for their 72 months of combat amounted to 383,786 military plus 60,595 British civilian deaths. The number of Colonial civilian deaths is not known. In addition, the Dominions lost the following military deaths: Australia, 40,040. Canada, 45,383. India, 87,032, New Zealand, 11,929. South Africa. Here is an American view on how Britain waged war and its casualties: www.youtube.com/watch?v=opDuw4OZ3QI (39 minutes 37 seconds onwards…) Aircraft Production 1939-45 Britain 131,000, Germany 119,000, Russia 158,000, USA 300,000. Italy The campaign in Italy tied down 25 German divisions, the landings at Salerno and Anzio made zero difference to the timing for Overlord. As for the idea that the USA was going to fight in the Far East rather in Europe: ‘Memorandum for Hon. Harry L. Hopkins, General Marshall and Admiral King Subject: Instructions for London Conference, July 1942 16 July 42 9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that the defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatre and in the Near east. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably of without firing a shot or losing a life. Franklin D. Roosevelt Commander-in-Chief. Misc. Nothing on Frederick the Great, Frederick Forsyth, the War of Jenkins Ear, Gone with the Wind, the death of Elvis or the lunatic proposition that a broad front strategy prevented German disobedience after the war.
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  21. seth1422 A quick recap: TIK has demolished Beevor's version events at Nijmegen Bridge. Beevor's claim that Market Garden caused the Hungary Winter is not backed up with any facts. As for the latest one: XXX Corps should have turned right somewhere between Eindhoven and Arnhem and headed towards Wesel?.. ...straight into the Siegfried Line. How stupid can he get? 'The subtext being that Montgomery was chaffing and jealous about the Americans' celebrated dash out of Normandy and across the Seine.' Your words. ROTFL. Who can tell what Montgomery's emotions were? That 'celebrated dash' was equalled by 21st Army Group - after it had defeated the vast bulk of German forces in Normandy. As obseverved by Eisenhower: ‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’ His words. Of course, as well as this, 21st Army Group had created the opportunity for US forces to advance against the thinly spread German forces. As obseved by Bradley: ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris.' His words. Q.What differentiates Eisenhower and Bradley from Beevor regarding events in 1944? A. Eisenhower and Bradley were actually there.
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  33. When Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August 1944, Montgomery told Eisenhower that the allies supply situation could only sustain half of its forces in attack at that time, and that in order to keep the allied advance going, two of the armies in the North (British Second Army, and US First Army) should be prioritized for resources, (while the Canadian First Army, and the US Third Army were stopped) as they were the best position to hurt the Germans by attacking the Ruhr. Montgomery went on to state that failing that, the US First Army and the US Third Army should advance towards the Saar region, with British Second Army and the Canadian First Army stopped to make this happen. He went on to state that he would abide with Eisenhower’s decision, provided such a prioritizing of resources took place. Eisenhower did neither, and when took over as land forces on the 1st September, the whole advance ground to a halt . Montgomery and Patton were never equals after HUSKY. Patton attacked Sicilian peasants and two of his own soldiers, and was then passed over for army group command in favour of his subordinate Bradley. Patton missed out on D-Day, and the battle in Normandy until it was two parts over. Montgomery went on to command allied land forces in OVERLORD, and remained as an army group commander until the end of the war, being promoted to Field Marshal rank in that period. There does not seem to be much evidence that Montgomery ever gave Patton much thought. Why would he have? If anything, Montgomery was Patton’s nemesis. As for Rommel. He prospered when he took part in the battle of France in 1940, where so much was in the German’s favour, and then in North Africa in the period there that the British were under resourced, and still trying create a large modern mechanized army. He eventually outran his supplies, and was defeated by Auchinleck at Alamein, and then by Montgomery at Alam el Halfa, Alamein, at other points various in North Africa, and in Normandy, where, like in North Africa, Montgomery, did not give him the slightest opportunity to alter the overall course of the battle. Rommel was severely wounded in Normandy, when his car was attacked by RCAF Spitfires, and he then took no further part in the war, until death later in the same year. As for Rommel and Patton, they never faced each other in battle at any time during the war.
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  40.  @RaderizDorret  'And yet TIK himself said that the paras didn't bring as many guns or (more importantly) as much ammo for those guns as they could have (around the 12:00 mark).' But TIK did not qualify this remark by stating how many more of these items could have been taken to Arnhem. The 1st Airlanding Brigade had its complement of 6 pounder guns doubled for Arnhem. Don't know about the situation regarding the three Parachute Brigades. Does TIK? 'Hell, if they're going to be fighting in cities, PIATS would arguably be better than 6 pounders or 17 pounders for some situations. Furthermore, the 9th SS Panzer division lost between 12 and 23 of 40 reconnaissance vehicles in Arnhem (reports vary) compared to the paras getting absolutely hammered.' But it was the the 2nd Parachute Batallion that did most of fighting against Germans at Arnhem, and most of the incidents involved the use PIAT weapons, taken there by the batallion's three rifle companies. Even the film 'A Bridge Too Far' depicts the use of the PIAT weapon at the bridge. There was only one gun team of 4 anti-tank guns from the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery within the Arnhem Bridge perimeter. The overall plan was based on XXX Corps Armour arriving at Arnhem bridge within two to four days from the onset of MARKET GARDEN. 'Seems to me those guns they did bring with them weren't particularly useful at keeping the armor from beating the crap out of the paras.' Who can say? Not me. The 17 pounder was the most powerful allied anti-tank gun, at that time, and was capable of knocking out the German Panzer VI 'Tiger Tank'. It seems that presence at Arnhem of 17 pounder anti-tank guns came as shock to the Germans.
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  47. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P 141 ‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’ CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 561 ‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’ MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO WITH WILFRED GRETOREX ARNHEM CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958 P42 ‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village. Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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