Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
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@Johnny Carroll
'The captured plans: it is likely that is was an 101st AB signals officer attached to Brownings 1st AB Corps that crashed landed, and he had operational documents for the 101st but not the whole Corps. This explains why Browning had no radio contact with the 101st.
The timeline also shows that Bittrich reacted faster than when Model received the information. Quote ‘A Bridge Too Far’: “Student had never felt so frustrated. Because of his communications breakdown, it would be nearly ten hours before he could place the secret of Market-Garden in Model's possession”.
The Germans were quick to realise the scope of the Operation. If anything the plans, allowed the Luftwaffe to target the landings over the next few days. They arrived at the right time but missed the landings because of the delay with the weather.'
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@ToolTimeTabor
1st Reconnaissance Squadron war diary quotes, supplied on here by Johnny Carroll:
‘1335 - Glider element, under command of Capt. D. Allsop lands. Flak negligible. Landing zone is a potato field, very soft, and dry. Majority of gliders have crash-landed. Commence to unload.
1410 - Sky full of Dakotas - streams of coloured parachutes in the air.
1500 - Capt. Allsop’ s glider unloaded - move to rendezvous.’
1515 - Report to Commanding Officer, Maj C.F.H. Gough M.C. Glider and parachute personnel coming in continuously.
1530 - Squadron HQ complete except for one glider load carrying Lieut Wadsworth and 2 Jeeps. Casualty list - 4 O.R.s’.
1540 - Tac HQ under command Maj C.F.H. Gough M.C. moves out, preceded by "C" Troop and followed by "D" Troop and Support Troop. "A" Troop report to Divisional HQ. Route is North and then East along track which runs north of railway line but parallel to it in the direction of Arnhem.'
The German Battalion Krafft was in action by 14.40
According to Middlebrook, the recce squadron was due to depart for Arnhem Bridge at 3pm, but left at at.3.35 (noted as 3.40pm in the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron war diary).
If the troops that landed by parachute, had landed in the gliders with their vehicles?
Those troops would have been on the ground at 13.35 pm? With the majority of gliders having ‘crash landed’ into ‘a potato field, very soft, and dry’, it beggars belief that the vehicles would not have taken more time to unload from gliders. Graeme Warrack stated that Horsa glider interior was about the same size as a London Underground train passenger car. A glider lands with its nose in soft ground with its tail in the air, a glider lands with all of its undercarriage smashed, and so on. In almost any case, it seems a likely outcome that the cargo might have shifted and or been left in a state, making it harder to extract from the glider, thus extending the departure time. Perhaps the delay to the departure would have been less if the remainder of the squadron troops had landed with the gliders. Who can say?
Why did troops land separately? How should I know?
Middlebrook noted that the squadron troops had undergone parachute training after they had been left behind in the glider landings in Sicily. I find Antony Beevor’s claim that those troops wanted the honour of landing by parachute to ludicrous, unless his claim is backed up reliable evidence.
Was it a space saving decision?
From a web site ‘Key Military’
BASH ON! GOUGH’S RECCE MEN
‘The squadron travelled to Arnhem on Sunday, September 17 in two parties, one parachuting from Dakotas, the other in gliders. One glider carried a jeep and trailer together with the reserve petrol supply and a hamper of 2in mortar bombs – a heavy and combustible cargo. Others carried less-frightening loads, including 20mm Polsten guns – a simpler and cheaper Polish derivative of the Oerlikon cannon. Two Polstens, each jeep-towed, formed an antiaircraft section, but their heavy rounds and fast rate of fire – between 250 and 320rpm – made them lethal defensive weapons against infantry and light armour. They were included the support troop, commanded by Lieutenant John Christie.’
If the squadron troops had landed with their vehicles, they would have saved a walk from DZ-X to LZ-S. 20 minutes or so? Perhaps those troops could have helped to save time with the unloading of Jeeps. If so, would it have been enough to get the squadron into Arnhem without encountering the Battalion Krafft? Unless there is reliable evidence as to how much quicker it was for six men to unload a Horsa glider than three men. Who can say?
What if Gough’s troops had made it to Arnhem Bridge before the Germans?
Middlebrook notes that the Grabner Squadron included 22 armoured cars and half-track armoured personnel carriers. I can hardly bare to type the next bit: Para Dave has pointed out that the Germans had 20 mm cannons.
Up against that force would have been 16 jeeps armed with machine guns and 48 men.
As far as I can see, Gough’s actions in the landings on the 17th September are a footnote in the Arnhem story. The biggest specific issues in regard to Arnhem seem to have been the MARKET air plan, and events at Nijmegen Bridge. But of course, all this is hindsight by someone (me) who was nowhere these events, and does not even have any military background.
For, all those persons involved in MARKET GARDEN made reasonable decisions based on the information available to them at that time. In the case of Major Gough, it hard to see how he could have assessed whether sending his troops in by parachute would be crucial to the outcome at Arnhem, and that it seen by people in the future to be crucial to the outcome of the MARKET GARDEN undertaking.
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@johnlucas8479
Comparisons of casualties for MARKET GARDEN, AACHEN, METZ, and the HURTGEN FOREST are noted by me as a response to a multitude of comments (99% American) about 17,000 killed in MARKET GARDEN, which I then correct to 17,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Those American posts normally go on to state that Montgomery should have been in front of a court martial, or in the case of Para Dave, that he should have shot himself.
Responsibility (not blame) for MARKET GARDEN, must surely start with Eisenhower, who, as you know, was both supreme commander and allied land forces commander by the time that MARKET GARDEN was proposed. If Eisenhower does take any responsibility for MARKET GARDEN then he is off the list for NORMANDY, the RHINE and so on. Which one do want? Brereton would seem to have been able to veto proposals by Montgomery for the deployment of airborne troops (as evidenced by his veto of use of airborne forces on WALCHEREN),and was clearly involved in the planning for MARKET. And yet, in American histories, films, moronic American comments on YouTube, Brereton, the head of the FAAA hardly ever gets a mention. No doubt there is a Brereton memorial library, or something similar, in some US state. As the person who proposed MARKET GARDEN to Eisenhower, and as the commander in the area where the operation took place, Montgomery takes his share of responsibility for MARKET GARDEN, something he always accepted. As to this stuff about Browning and Gavin at Nijmegen, for me you would have to have been there, and I was not there, and nor were you.
As someone who was not there, and who has zero military experience, I am in no position to pass judgement, leading to blame, on MARKET GARDEN, and similar events. As far as I see, the decision to undertake MARKET GARDEN was a reasonable one, given the circumstances of those times, which included the perception (which was backed up by solid evidence) - that the Germans were not strong enough to withstand the operation, the need to counter the V2 rocket attacks on Britain, the need, on Britain’s part to keep the war moving, and the desire by allied leaders to see the FAAA in action.
As to the new insights you mentioned, Churchill’s words were in print in the early 1950s, Eisenhower’s before then, Gavin’s words were in print by the late 1970s. Even Martin Middlebrook (who was not around at the time of ARNHEM), and the quote from Staff Sergeant Joe Kitchener, were published 38 years ago.
There is more…
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
Page 204
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying the operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
We have no regrets.’
I hold the same view today, when the survivors are scattered all over the world, some of them still in the Army; when Arnhem is a busy and architecturally attractive post-war city with most of its scars healed. A new bridge spans the Neder Rhine. Sometimes a Dutchman finds a mortar splinter in his garden, and people on their Sunday walks come across spent British ammunition in the pine woods and the polder-land by the river.’ His words.
Here is an opinion from someone who was there :
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
First published in the United Kingdom by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1946
This White Lion Edition 1973
Xll Great Argument
P 214
‘With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days later with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’ His words.
A high proportion of the comments on YouTube items about MARKET GARDEN / ARNHEM, are posted by Americans. As are comments on YouTube items about Montgomery – usually linked to MARKET GARDEN, CAEN and so on.
Why is this so? For the USA, there was no Dunkirk, Battle of Britain, Blitz, Moscow, Leningrad, or Stalingrad. They have production figures for lorries, loans, reverential works about their war leaders.
Perhaps many of these Americans who post comments on YouTube see the likes of MARKET GARDEN, or Russian excesses in occupied GERMANY, and so on, as somehow evening up the score, like their people made a difference or a unique contribution on a one to one basis. Perhaps many of these Americans who post comments on YouTube are just thick. Who can say?
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@mgt2010fla
'The Bismarck wasn't damaged until the night before by Swordfish so it wasn't damaged when the US plane, a PBY, sighted the Bismarck it was under control although damaged in the bow and leaking oil by a hit from the PoW!'
Bismarck's prime mission ended with the hit it took from Prince of Wales causing a fuel leak that stopped its Atlantic raiding mission. Lutjens's continued radio transmissions led the Royal Navy to him. The RAF flying boat that spotted him had one US serviceman onboard and therefore to imply that the USA had some sort of crucial role in its destruction is absurd.
'The distance didn't stop the JIN from attacking Pearl Harbor and invading and attacking Alaska! '
It must have been terrifying in Alaska. Thank god Britain was such a backwater with regard to enemy activity!
'Where did 50 of those destroyers come from!'
Err.. It was 46 actually. By May of 1941 not even 30 of them wee fit for action - by which time British escort construction had rendered their presence all but a burden on manpower. I believe that it was said of the US President Nixon: 'Would you buy a used car from this man.' The same might be said of the US President Roosevelt: 'Would you buy a used destroyer from this man.'
'Also, the US move the escort line to reach Iceland and US sailors were killed before the US entered the war!'
US goods, occasionally in US ships. A good way of protecting US Markets.
'The Atlantic Charter made Germany the primary enemy, but the Japanese made the Americans hate them and the US was losing men and land to the Japanese.'
Why would Americans hate Japan in September 1941?
'why have ships in the Atlantic at all?'
Who can say?
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME I THE GATHERING STORM
BOOK I The Fall of France
Chapter 1: The National Coalition
P5
‘Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyed in European theatre, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces, who also disposed of all of the German battleships, cruisers and destroyers, besides destroying or capturing the whole Italian Fleet.’
There was of course the exeption of the German cruiser Blucher which was sunk by the Norwegians but apart from that what reasonable person can take issue with the words of the outstanding war leader of the Second World War.
You must try to do better...
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@johnburns4017
From Big Woody (aka Para Dave):
‘The evidence was Monty again ran advantages into the sand with his unimaginative schemes,a gross underestimation of the enemy and a serious misjudgment of the terrain and unwillingness to show up and direct like an actual Field Marshall - Walter Model.Biggest Air Drop up until that point and the pathetic pratt couldn't be bothered?’ Para Dave.
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started . Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg, twenty miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, was at Granville, in Normandy, France, 400 miles from Arnhem.
Whether Eisenhower was a ‘pathetic pratt’ or not is probably a matter of opinion. At the time of MARKET GARDEN, he was in Granville in Normandy, 400 hundred miles from his field armies, even further away from the FAAA.
'The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Para Dave.
Wilmot went on to state:
‘It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation, which should, and could, have been the decisive blow of the campaign in the West.’
A British caution in regard to casualties is entirely understandable, given that Britain, with a population of 47 million had been at war for FIVE years, in just about all parts of the world. Whereas the ‘American reluctance to concentrate’ ran in defiance of clear headed military planning, and therefore there can be no excuse on the part of the USA.
And over the page in Wilmot's work…
‘Ambitious American generals, like Patton and MacArthur, habitually represented their progress and prospects in the rosiest light, for they believed that they were then likely to be given greater resources. Reinforcing success ' is sound military practice, provided that the success is advancing the strategic plan, but, in war as in life, the Americans tend to value success for its own sake.’
Ouch!
Interestingly, the above quotes are taken from the chapter headed THE LOST OPPORTUNITY in THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE by Chester Wilmot.
‘Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany” Para Dave.
Perhaps de Guingand was right. Perhaps Eisenhower’s ‘SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing ‘a some Germans’ Para Dave.
Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles’ Para Dave.
As I have to hand, the works of the seemingly trusted Chester Wilmot, let us see what he has to state:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXIX. THE AUTUMN STALEMATE
P 631
‘with every division trying to make a breakthrough, the artillery support was dispersed, and [Manton S] Eddy was able to gain only fifteen miles in eight days. The German line sagged, but did not break, for at no point was it subjected to an overpowering onslaught. Meanwhile, the enveloping attack against Metz, also made on a broad front, was similarly checked by skilful and stubborn defence. Even after a week of heavy fighting, the city was not encircled.’
P 634
‘after a bitter month which had taken heavy toll of his infantry, Bradley's troops were only eight miles deeper into Germany.’
As I am in a good mood...a lesson for Para Dave for the future... If you are going to cite Chester Wilmot, its best to go to his works, rather show a few of his words that have been included in some comic book US history.
‘As the Dutch poster Oddball SOK stated on this board *Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944.So tell me, how come ?How come the Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals under the ever watchfull RAF at Pannerden, and Monty/Horrocks could NOT do the same ? Not in September, not in October and not in November.’ Para Dave.
This has got be one of the most stupid YouTube comments I have read in a long while… And considering the number of idiotic YouTube comments posted by Para Dave, that is quite an accolade.
Its actually hard to see whether Oddball SOK or Para Dave is responsible for this throwaway comment. However, let us examine this claim…
The Scheldt. The 15th Army evacuated across the waterway (a 45 minute journey) between 5th September and the 20th September 1944. An evacuation that took place with German and Dutch shipping already in place, with both banks in German hands, with the mouth of the estuary closed off, and which took place at night and on bad weather days.
The Scheldt. Liberated by the 21st Army Group in a series of landings for operations in which ‘tanks and troops’ were ferried across the estuary and landed on hostile shore with the mouth of the estuary closed off, and therefore closed to allied shipping.
So how do these compare?..
What else with this ferrying of 'tanks and troops over rivers/canals?'..
MARKET GARDEN? The Germans used bridges already in their hands to help to get forces to the battle area, including the Arnhem (later, John Frost) Bridge which they recaptured it, rather than ferrying troops. There was no major German river assault at Nijmegen, or anywhere else in that operation. The allies were able to ‘ferry’ troops across the Rhine from Oosterbeek to allied lines. By allies, in this instance, I do of course mean British, Canadian, and Polish forces.
Anyone know where else were the Germans ferrying tanks and troops in that period? I do of course mean more than just the odd tank and troops across a Dyke here or there... If there is such an instance... we can take a look the circumstances.
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GR Joe
MARKET GARDEN never envisaged reaching Berlin by Christmas. As evidenced by Arthur Tedder when interviewed by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated 'that
the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.'
GARDEN was devised the FAAA, headed by the US general Lewis Brereton, over who, Montgomery had no jurisdiction.
'The whole planning and the operation itself shows the short comings of the
bureaucratic top comand structure of the British.'
If any top command had shotcomings, it was the US top command: their failure to see the importance of the campaign in the Mediterranean, theit linatic plan to invade France in 1942, Eisenhower's dipersal of the forces in the invasion of Italy. Eisenhower, and his US colleagues failure to understand the stategy for Normandy, Eisenhower's failed broad front strategy, which led directly to US Ardennes debacle, via Aachen, Lorraine, and the Hurtgen Forest. And then crowning foul up, when Eisenhower and Bradley made an absolute meal of encircling the Ruhr, then allowing too many allied formation to the south and then neglecting to support the allied forces in the North, which nearly alllowed the Russians to get into Denmark.
By the time of MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower and his vast bureaucracy was 400 miles behind the front, in, as usual, the the biggest chateaux he could find, with his signals taking up to three days to reach front-line commanders. His communications were so poor, his message would have reached the front more quickly if he had stayed in London. Later in the Autumn, he even had to get his chauffeur to telephone a US commander to find out if a particular attack had gone ahead.
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